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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance:  
 
An Atlantic History of the 1795 Insurrection at Coro, Venezuela 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
 
Enrique Salvador Rivera 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in History 
 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2019 
 
Professor Peter James Hudson, Chair 
 
 
On the night of Sunday, May 10, 1795, hundreds of enslaved and legally free people of 
African and native American descent took up arms to overthrow colonial rule in Coro, 
Venezuela. The rebels stated that their new society would be free of Coro’s coercive 
political and economic systems, particularly slavery and taxes. After three days of 
fighting, however, Coro’s rebels were ultimately defeated, and at least 125 of them were 
killed in combat, or brutally executed in the days, weeks, and months that followed. 
Despite this defeat, the Coro rebellion has created an archive that allows historians to 
unearth new information on the history of capitalism, as well as the radical ideologies 
that circulated the Atlantic during the Age of Revolution.  
iii	
 This dissertation bridges the fields of capitalism studies and histories of enslaved 
people’s resistance movements to examine the role of the Atlantic’s political economy in 
structuring eighteenth-century Coro, as well as rebel ideology.  It argues that Coro’s 
rebels were inspired, not so much by abstract Enlightenment ideas of liberty and equality, 
but by their autochthonous political and economic customs, as they were practiced in 
Coro, and in the Gold and Loango Coasts of West and West Central Africa, from where 
most rebels descended. This dissertation also intervenes in the history of capitalism, 
asserting the need to define and periodize capitalism. It begins with a study of textile 
production in the manufacturing enclaves of Flanders, Brittany, and Devon, and 
investigates the three joint-stock companies that shaped eighteenth-century Coro: The 
Dutch West India Company, the South Sea Company, and the Real Compañía 
Guipozcoana.  Through a study of the political economies of the people indigenous to 
Coro and the Gold and Loango Coasts, it demonstrates that the precapitalist class 
structure of eighteenth-century Europe, based on peasant production and merchant 
capital, was unable to completely destroy autochthonous social systems in Africa and the 
Americas, as would progressively become more common under capitalism. These 
communalist mores informed the moral economy of the African and native American 
communities of Coro, and they were the ones that inspired the 1795 insurrection.   
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Introduction: The Coro Rebellion, Enslaved People’s Resistance Movements, and 
the History of Capitalism 
 
 On the night of May 10, 1795, in the lush mountains nestled south of the City of 
Santa Ana de Coro in the Captaincy General of Venezuela, six men launched a 
revolutionary movement that, although brief and ill fated, would reverberate for centuries 
to come. The rebels, led by the legally free zambo José Leonardo Chirino, attacked and 
killed white elites, recruited hundreds of others to join them, and stormed onto the city of 
Coro, demanding that local authorities hand over the city. The insurgents stated that once 
they were in control, they would abolish slavery, the alcabala, and all other taxes paid for 
by free men. After three days of fighting, culminating in a bloody armed conflict between 
as many as 450 rebels and half as many loyalists, the rebels were ultimately defeated; 
dozens were brutally killed in the battlefield and many more were callously executed in 
the days that followed. Despite this defeat, Coro’s rebels have inspired hope for 
generations of Venezuelans, and fear and hatred for still others. For historians, the Coro 
rebellion has generated an archive that reveals important, yet understudied, aspects of the 
history of capitalism, and of the radical ideologies of liberty and equality that circulated 
the Atlantic during the Age of Revolution.1 
 “The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance: An Atlantic History of the 
1795 Insurrection at Coro, Venezuela” examines the rebellion alongside the Atlantic 
system that gave rise to it. On the one hand, it argues that eighteenth-century Coro and 
the 1795 insurrection were shaped by peasant production and mercantile expansion in 																																																								1	The	term	Age	of	Revolution	was	coined	by	late	great	Eric	Hobsbawm:	Eric	J.	Hobsbawm,	Age	of	
Revolution,	Europe,	1789-1848	(N.Y:	Praeger	Publishers,	1962).	
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Europe. On the other hand, the rebellion was molded, not by the latest waves of 
Enlightenment thought, but by the communalist political and economic practices of the 
people indigenous to Coro and to the Gold and Loango Coasts of West and West Central 
Africa. The political and economic claims of Dutch, English, French, and Spanish elites 
connected Coro’s rebels to artisans and merchants in Brittany, Devon, and Flanders, and 
to investors, traders, and suppliers of the Dutch West India Company (WIC), England’s 
South Sea Company (SSC), and Spain’s Real Compañía Guizpocoana (RCG). European 
elites were also responsible for creating the Atlantic slave trade that captured Coro’s 
rebels and their ancestors throughout the African continent, particularly on the Gold and 
Loango Coasts, from where most rebels descended. Although they rested an ocean away, 
these royal families, as well as these stockholders, merchants, and bureaucrats, created 
the plantation economy of eighteenth-century Coro—the one that the 1795 rebels aimed 
to destroy.  
 The political economy of eighteenth-century Coro, and the Atlantic, was the 
product of the class structure of contemporary Europe. The history of this Atlantic world 
is also the history, or perhaps more appropriately, the prehistory, of capitalism. The 
agricultural and manufacturing industries of eighteenth-century Europe were based on 
peasant production and/or feudal land tenures. This mode of production constrained 
economic growth in these industries and had the effect of funneling capital into 
mercantile activities. The accumulation of capital in Europe during the eighteenth century 
relied heavily on the Atlantic trades, the conquests of new territories, and the coerced 
labor of African and native American people in the Americas. These Atlantic ventures 
required the administrative, financial, and military support of European states. With the 
3	
expenses of Atlantic commerce being too high for individual merchants or small 
groupings of merchants, European states filled the void through providing capital, and the 
security needed to broaden the pool of potential stockholders. State support was also 
necessary because large conglomerates were illegal without royal charters in England and 
Spain.  
 In a similar vein, geopolitical concerns drew European states to joint stock 
ventures. If Atlantic commerce were somehow monopolized by one European power, this 
would ensure the political and economic dominance of that power over all the others. It 
was the imperial state’s duty, then, to ensure claims in the Atlantic, and to strive for 
dominance over their rivals. The political and economic stakes in the Atlantic also 
required military force, which was the domain of the state. All joint-stock companies had 
these forces at their disposal, and relied on them to acquire new markets and territories, 
and to protect the strongholds they already occupied. It is this dissertation’s contention 
that the joint-stock companies and their methods for acquiring investments and 
accumulating capital came as a result of the dominant mode of production of eighteenth-
century Europe. These methods would ultimately give rise to the capitalist mode of 
production in Europe, as peasants would be forced from their land to work for wages 
under a capitalist employer. From this point of departure, the Atlantic economy would 
become increasingly capitalist over time.  
 Coro’s rebels, who were all of African and/or native American descent, took 
advantage of Europe’s political and economic conjunction by continuing to practice their 
autochthonous social systems in the face of coercion and imperial intervention.2 Legally 																																																								2	When	referring	to	the	people	indigenous	to	Coro,	this	dissertation	rejects	the	term	“indio”	that	colonial	authorities	used	across	Spanish	America,	as	well	as	it’s	English	language	equivalent,	Indian.	
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free indigenous and Afro-descended people in Coro, and across the Atlantic, conducted 
political and economic practices that centered on communal production and egalitarian 
distribution. This production and distribution was based primarily on agriculture, hunting, 
fishing, and manufacturing. But these communities and societies were not entirely self-
sufficient—they also engaged in commodification and trade to acquire goods that 
complemented those they themselves produced. Leadership was also highly valued and 
respected in these communities and societies, and local leaders in the home and at-large 
were almost always allotted a higher share of produce, game, and merchandise. African 
and native American commoners in Coro, and across the Atlantic, also paid tribute to 
their local or national leaders.  
 These autochthonous practices served as the foundation for the moral economy of 
Coro’s rebels. Following E.P. Thompson and his study of “riots” in eighteenth-century 
England, this dissertation understands moral economy to be a form of ideology, which is 
informed by conceptions of just and unjust political and economic practices. 3 All social 
groups rely on conceptions of right and wrong, and these codes also exist within the 
realm of economic practices. As James Scott argues, moral economies are based on the 
rational application of strategies for survival on the part of group members.4 Moral 
economies are maintained by the socieites in question because they facilitate the 																																																																																																																																																																					This	is	for	the	obvious	reason	that	these	peoples	were	not	natives	of	India,	as	early	conquistadors	had	thought.	Instead,	this	dissertation	uses	the	terms	“native	American”	and	“indigenous”	when	referring	to	the	peoples	of	Coro	as	a	whole.	When	appropriate,	this	dissertation	identifies	the	indigenous	peoples	of	the	region	by	their	ethnicity.	Native	American	with	a	lower	case	“n”	is	used	so	as	not	to	confuse	with	the	racial	classification	used	for	the	indigenous	people	of	the	contemporary	United	States.			3	E.P.	Thompson,	“The	Moral	Economy	of	the	English	Crowd	in	the	Eighteenth	Century”	Past	&	Present	50	(1971):	79.			4	James	C.	Scott,	The	Moral	Economy	of	the	Peasant:	Rebellion	and	Subsistence	in	Southeast	Asia	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	1976.)	
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achievement of the maximum level of harmony possible within the strucutural posibilites 
of each society. In the case of migration and/or regime change, social groups maintain 
aspects of their moral economies, although these do, of course, undergo certain 
adjustments in order to survive within a new environment.  
 Slavery and taxes, as they operated in eighteenth-century Coro, violated the moral 
economy of Coro’s native American and Afro-descended peoples. This moral outrage 
became more acute as plantations expanded, community lands were encroached upon, 
and tax collection soared, in the years prior to the rebellion. Using the words of 
Thompson, Coro’s rebels considered communalist practices to be “the proper economic 
functions” of legitimate societies, and they were rightfully convinced that this view was 
“supported by the wider consensus of the community.”5 This dissertation aims to 
demonstrate that the moral economies of their African and American homelands inspired 
Coro’s rebels to take up arms, and that this moral economy also informed how the rebels 
conceptualized the new society that they hoped to build.  
 Therefore, it was the political economies of Europe, as well as those of the 
indigenous peoples of Coro and the Gold and Loango Coasts, that shaped eighteenth-
century Coro and its 1795 rebellion. This dissertation intervenes in the literature on the 
history of capitalism, as well as the history of anti-slavery resistance in the Americas. It 
argues in favor of more clearly delineating a definition of capitalism, one that is based on 
the Marxian emphasis on mode of production. This dissertation also argues that it was the 
autochthonous moral economies of Coro’s rebels, rather than Enlightenment concepts, 
that informed their ideology and shaped their visions of a new society. But before these 
																																																								5	Ibid.,	78.	
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interventions are discussed in more detail, it is necessary to provide more background on 
eighteenth-century Coro, and to present a narrative of the 1795 insurrection.  
 
Introduction to The Political Economy of Eighteenth-Century Coro and its World 
 
 Santa Ana de Coro was the first European settlement in the region that would later 
become known as the Captaincy General of Venezuela. The city of Coro was established 
in 1527 by the Spanish conquerer and encomendero Juan de Ampíes. Ampíes founded the 
city after negotiations with the Caquetío, the Arawak-speaking group that was the 
dominant indigenous polity of the time.6 The Diocese of Coro was established three years 
later, and this remained the center of eccliastical authority in Coro until the Diocese of 
Caracas was established in 1637. Coro was also the capital of the Province of Venezuela 
for fifty years, until Caracas took this title in 1578.7  
 During the eighteenth century, Coro’s principal role in the European world system 
was to produce livestock and agricultural goods for Caribbean and European markets, 
and to consume commodities brought by Europeans.8 As will be seen in the first chapter, 
the bulk of European goods consumed were textiles manufactured on the continent. Coro 
also imported thousands of enslaved African people, whose descendants became the 
majority of the region’s population, and who would largely define the moral economy of 
																																																								6	See	Chapter	4	for	more	details	on	this	negotiation.			7	Otilia	Margarita	Rosas	González,	“La	población	indígena	en	la	Provincia	de	Venezuela”	(Ph.D.	Diss.:	Universidad	de	Salamanca,	2015),	93-6.			8	The	term	European	World	System	is	inspired	by	Immanuel	Wallerstein.	See:	Immanuel	Wallerstein,	
Capitalist	Agriculture	and	the	Origins	of	the	European	World-Economy	in	the	Sixteenth	Century	(New	York:	Academic	Press,	1974).	
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the 1795 rebels. Coro’s African and native American peasants and plantation workers 
produced livestock, grains, fruits, vegetables, sugar, hides, cacao, and Brazil wood for 
domestic consumption and for export. Livestock, agricultural commodities, and sugar 
were consumed in Coro, exported to other parts of the Captaincy General of Venezuela, 
and to other colonies in the Caribbean.9 Sugar, cacao, hides, and Brazil wood were traded 
in the region before they were shipped to Europe, where they entered circulation and 
served as the basis for a number of industrial pursuits.10  
 The raising of livestock, such as bovine animals, horses, and mules was the 
dominant economic activity of eighteenth-century Coro. The meat from bovine creatures 
was consumed in Coro and other parts of the Captaincy General of Venezuela, while the 
skins were illegally traded in Curaçao before they were shipped to Europe. Most horses 
and donkeys were used domestically, but most mules were exported to Saint Domingue 
to power the French colony’s infamous sugar mills. All of these farm animals were raised 
by enslaved black people and legally free black and native American people on the 95 
haciendas throughout the region, which were owned by white elites.11 It is important to 
note, however, that some peasants of African and/or native American descent raised these 
animals independently on their own lands. The Peninsula of Paraguaná, of which the vast 
majority of the population was Caquetio, was famous for its livestock rearing.  
																																																								9	See	chapter	four	for	more	details.	Also	see:	Wim	Klooster,	“Curaçao	as	a	Transit	Center	to	the	Spanish	Main	and	the	French	West	Indies,”	in	Dutch	Atlantic	Connections,	1680-1800:	Linking	Empires,	
Bridging	Borders,	ed.	Gert	J.	Oostindie	and	Jessica	V.	Roitman	(Leiden	and	Boston:	Brill,	2014),	25-51.		10	Wim	Klooster,	Illicit	Riches:	Dutch	Trade	in	the	Caribbean,	1648-1795	(Leiden:	KITLV	Press,	1998),	96.			11	“Expediente	sobre	la	insurrección	de	los	negros,	zambos	y	mulatos	proyectada	en	el	año	1795	a	las	inmediaciones	de	la	ciudad	de	Coro,	Provincia	de	Caracas,”	1795,	Caracas,	426,	Archivo	General	de	Indias,	Seville	(AGI),	ff.	1-2.	
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 Sugar production followed the raising of animals as Coro’s second major 
economic activity—the former being produced mainly in Coro’s sierra, the birthplace of 
the 1795 rebellion. White slave masters owned the approximately 48 sugar plantations in 
Coro and their trapiches.12 They employed enslaved black people, as well as legally free 
black and native American workers, who lived on or near plantation grounds, and who 
were paid a wage. This sugar was consumed domestically and traded to Curaçao, where 
some of it was consumed there, while another portion was exported to Amsterdam. 
Blocks of raw sugar cane, known as panelas or papelones, also served as a form of 
currency in the region, and agricultural laborers were often paid their wages in these 
goods.13  
 Coro also provided other agricultural commodities for European markets. Cacao 
was Venezuela’s most important cash crop, but it was of only minor significance in 
eighteenth-century Coro, as there were only seven cacao plantations in the region at the 
time of the rebellion.14 Brazil wood was also an important commodity that was collected 
in Coro’s mountains and sold, often illegally, to foreign merchants, most of who were 
from Curaçao.  
 But most plantation and hacienda workers in Coro dedicated the bulk of their days 
to independent agricultural production. There were only 150 haciendas and plantations in 
the region of Coro, but there were nearly 27,000 people. If each plantation and hacienda 
employed 30 people at a time, this could only employ 4,500 enslaved and legally free 
																																																								12	Ibid.			13	“Tocuyo:	El	Protector	General	de	Indios	Don	Antonio	Briceño,	sobre	el	pago	de	tributos,”	1759,	Indígenas	Tomo	XIII,	Archivo	General	de	la	Nacíon,	Caracas	(AGN).			14	“Expediente,”	ff.	1-2.		
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workers, or less than 17% of the overall population.15 With about 74% of Coro’s 
population being legally free people of African and/or native American descent, these 
people settled on unoccupied land that was usually within a day’s walk to a neighboring 
plantation or hacienda.  
 Throughout the eighteenth century, peasants would plant and harvest agricultural 
goods both for their own consumption and for commodification and sale, until repression 
increased in the years leading to the rebellion. Black and indigenous peasants would grow 
rice, corn, cassava, and plantains, as well as raise chickens and goats.16 These products, 
as well as small batches of cotton and tobacco were consumed in the household and sold 
at local markets, which relied on the goods provided by local peasants. Even enslaved 
people tended their own crops in the eighteenth century, as slave owners would grant the 
people they owned small plots of land, known as conucos, where they would grow the 
crops they needed to feed themselves. As will be discussed in the third and fourth 
chapters, these practices were rooted in precolonial African and native American political 
and economic traditions. But with the expansion of plantation production and the 
proliferation of new taxes in the years leading up to the 1795 insurrection, these 
independent customs became untenable.  
 But the lives that the people of Coro lived were not consumed solely by work. 
People would often socialize outside their homes, and children, as well as adults would 
play games. In fact, playing cards were becoming increasingly popular in eighteenth 
																																																								15	For	more	on	this	see	chapter	four.	This	estimation	is	made	upon	the	basis	of	the	figures	which	cite	29,000	heads	of	livestock	produced	on	95	haciendas.	As	well	as	the	documents	pertaining	to	the	plantations	of	Josef	de	Tellería,	which	housed	about	15	enslaved	people	on	each.	See:		“Testamentaria	de	Joseph	de	Tellería,	1798.”	Archivo	Histórico	del	Estado	de	Falcón.	Coro,	Venezuela.		16	“Expediente,”	ff.	1.		
10	
century Venezuela, so much so that taxes on their sale were implemented in 1779.17 As 
will be discussed in the second chapter, black people in the city of Coro, and in the sierra, 
were known for throwing parties on the eve of holidays, where they would play music 
and dance. In the neighborhood known as Guinea, in the center of the city of Coro, these 
dances were often held in the open and even white elites attended them.18 The inhabitants 
of Guinea were also known to sing and dance when returning home after a day’s work in 
the fields they held in Coro’s sierra, which lay about 15 miles away.19  
 The political and economic structure of eighteenth-century Coro was arranged in 
accordance with the region’s unusual topography. Coro was one of 23 cities and towns 
that made up the Province of Venezuela, but it was—by far—the city that held the largest 
jurisdiction, spreading across over 32,000 square miles. According to a 1787 census, 
Coro had a sparse population of 26,549, which, nevertheless, gave it the third largest 
population in the Province of Venezuela, after Caracas and La Victoria.20 The coast of 
Coro stretched over 260 miles long. It had an arid climate, which made agriculture 
difficult in that zone, although it was practiced in a few patches in and around the city of 
Coro.21 This climate encouraged the establishment of livestock raising as an economic 
activity. This was particularly the case for the Peninsula of Paraguaná, which began at the 																																																								17	Eduardo	Arcila	Farias,	Economía	colonial	de	Venezuela	(México:	Fondo	de	Cultura	Económica,	1946),	328.		18	“Sublevacion	de	los	negros	de	Coro,	pieza	3,”	1795,	Criminales,	Letra	C,	Archivo	General	de	la	Nacion,	Caracas,	ff..	70-84.	See	the	second	chapter	for	more	details.				19	Ibid.			20	“Población	de	la	Provincia	de	Venezuela,	1785-1787,”	1787,	Caracas	397,	Archivo	General	de	Indias,	Seville.	The	Province	of	Venezuela	(also	known	as	the	Province	of	Caracas)	was	one	of	six	provinces	that	were	united	after	the	establishment	of	Venezuela	as	a	Captaincy	General.	The	other	five	provinces	were	those	of	Barinas,	Guayana,	Maracaibo,	Nueva	Andalucía	(also	known	as	Cumaná),	and	Mérida.		21	“Expediente,”	ff.	1	
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base of the city of Coro and extended over 80 miles north, and consisted of a surface of 
over 1,500 square miles. Going south from the city of Coro into the highlands, or sierra, 
which lay 15 miles south, there was about 225 square miles of lush forest, in which the 
many of the region’s sugar plantations were located.  
 Coro’s inhabitants were diverse and whites were a minority. Most of the Coro 
region’s population was racially classified as “free people of color” or pardos, who 
numbered nearly 12,000 or approximately 44% of the overall population.22 The second 
largest population in the region was “free Indians,” Caquetíos who were exempt from 
tribute payments because of their loyalty to the Spanish Crown. The Caquetío numbered 
over 7,000, or about 26% of the population of Coro and mostly lived in the towns 
scattered along the Caribbean coast, and in the Peninsula of Paraguaná.23 Coro’s legally 
free indigenous population was—by far—the largest in the Province of Venezuela. 
According to the 1787 census, the jurisdiction of Guanare had the second largest “free 
Indian” population at less than 1,900.24 The third largest group was whites that numbered 
3,700 or nearly 14% of the population.25 Most whites were native born and descended 
from Spaniards, although there was also a community of white migrants from the Canary 
Islands. It is probable that many of those classified as “white” were also of partial native 																																																								22	“Sublevación	de	los	negros	de	Coro,	pieza	1”	1795,	Criminales	Letra	C,	Archivo	General	de	la	Nación,	Caracas.	Pardo	literally	translates	to	Brown.	It	is	generally	understood	that	pardos	in	colonial	Venezuela	were	people	of	mixed	African	and	European	descent.	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	the	term	negro,	or	black,	was	used	only	when	referring	to	enslaved	people.	In	addition,	mestizo,	was	a	term	rarely	used	in	Coro.	This	may	be	because	many	mestizos	were	categorized	as	white.	Given	the	large	number	of	native	American	people	in	Coro,	however,	it	is	probable	that	many	pardos	were	also	of	mixed	indigenous	and	African	descent.	The	often-used	category,	zambo,	is	not	used	in	the	population	censuses,	and	therefore	zambos	fell	under	the	category	of	pardos.		
 23	Ibid.			24	“Población	de	la	Provincia	de	Venezuela.”		25	“Sublevación	de	los	negros,	pieza	1”	ff.	1.	
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American and African descent. Many of the white militia members of the neighboring 
Province of Maracaibo, for example, were described as “trigueño” or “wheat-colored” in 
1787.26 The fourth largest group was enslaved people of African descent who numbered 
over 3,200, equaling about 12% of the population. Most enslaved people toiled on 
plantations, although some worked as domestic servants.  
 Finally, there were the Ajaguas and Ayamanes, the tribute paying indigenous 
people who numbered 768, or 3% of the region’s population.27 Most of these 
communities were concentrated in Coro’s sierra, and west of it. The indigenous towns in 
Coro’s sierra were San Luis, Pecaya, and Pedregal, and they were inhabited mostly by 
Ajagua people. Like the Caquetio, the Ajaguas were Arawak speakers, while the 
Ayamanes spoke Jirajara. More research in needed on the origins of Coro’s indigenous 
peoples, but all evidence thus far points to the Ajaguas, Ayamanes, and Caquetios being 
indigenous to the region, with their descendants having settled there 10,000-12,000 years 
ago.28  
 Most of Coro’s rebels, and the region’s population as a whole, were of African 
descent. As was the case throughout the Americas, these people arrived to Coro via their 
enslavement or that of their ancestors. Also like enslaved and legally free people of 
African descent throughout the Americas, the Afro-descended people of Coro had origins 
throughout the African continent, although the vast majority came from West and West 
Central Africa. The Gold Coast of Guinea and the Loango Coast of West Central Africa 																																																								26	“Revista	de	Inspección	de	la	Tropa	Veterana	y	de	Milicias	de	Maracaibo,”	1787,	SGU	7198,	18Archvio	General	de	Simancas,	Simancas.		27	“Sublevación	de	los	negros,	pieza	1”	ff.	1.		28	Jossy	M.	Mansur,	E	indiannan	Caquetio	(Aruba:	Imprenta	Nacional	Arubano,	1981),	29;	Willem	F.H.	Adelaar,	The	Languages	of	the	Andes	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004),	129.	
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were the two leading places of origin for Coro’s population of African descent. The SSC 
held the asiento for the Spanish Crown between 1715-39, and provided many of the 
enslaved people of Coro. Just over 23% of people enslaved by the SSC had origins on the 
Gold Coast, while 32.8% had origins in the Loango Coast.29 It is likely, however, that the 
Dutch illegally provided most enslaved people to eighteenth-century Coro. After the 
English asiento, 33% percent of enslaved people purchased by the Dutch were from the 
Gold Coast, while 37% were from the Loango Coast, making 70% of enslaved people 
procured by the Dutch having origins in one of the two regions.30  
 The Gold and Loango Coasts were home to several ethnic groups and polities. 
The largest ethnicity on the Gold Coast was the Akan, followed by the Ga, and the Guan. 
All three groups spoke mutually intelligible Kwa languages. During the eighteenth 
century, Greater Asante was the largest polity of the region. The Loango Coast was home 
to the Vili, the Woyo and the Kotchi, who all spoke Kikongo languages, but were 
politically divided into three kingdoms: the Loango, the Ngoyo, and the Kakongo, 
respectively. Despite the ethnic, linguistic, and political diversity of the regions, all ethnic 
groups adhered to an ideology of consanguinity, which allowed for the adoption of 
neighbors and strangers into their homes and communities. As will be shown in the third 
chapter, these practices would continue in eighteenth-century Coro.  
 The political economy of eighteenth-century Coro was geared towards serving the 
political and economic interests of European and white creole elites. The region 
consumed European manufactures, including enslaved African people, and produced 																																																								29	Colin	Palmer,	Human	Cargoes:	The	British	Slave	Trade	to	Spanish	America,	1700-1739	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	1981),	107-110.		30	Alex	Borucki,	“Trans-imperial	History	in	the	Making	of	the	Slave	Trade	to	Venezuela,	1526-1811.”	
Itinerario	36:2	(2012):	29-54.	
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agricultural commodities that were utilized in neighboring colonies and in Europe. Many 
of the goods exported from Coro were produced on the region’s haciendas and 
plantations. But despite the fact that thousands of people of African and native American 
descent were coerced into laboring on these plantations and haciendas, most of Coro’s 
population was able to plant, harvest, and trade agricultural goods during the eighteenth 
century with only limited state interference. As the third and fourth chapters demonstrate, 
however, this would change in the years leading up to the 1795 rebellion.  
 
The 1795 Insurrection  
  
 The May 10-13 insurrection, and its aftermath, reveals important details about 
eighteenth-century Coro’s political and economic system, as well as that of the wider 
Atlantic complex. African-born and Afro-descended people, who were in Coro because 
of WIC, SSC, and RCG efforts, rose up in a revolutionary attempt to overthrow white 
supremacy in the region, and to establish a new, independent republic.31 This new 
republic would be of slavery and taxes, such as the alcabala and indigenous tribute. 
People of African descent were joined by rebels of native American descent, with whom 
they worked with on the plantations and haciendas of Coro’s sierra. These plantations and 
haciendas produced agricultural commodities for Atlantic markets. During the rebellion, 
Coro’s rebels ransacked the plantation homes of white elites and many of the goods 
																																																								31	For	a	discussion	of	white	supremacy,	see	below.	Also	see:	Charles	W.	Mills,	“Revisionist	Ontologies:	Theorizing	White	Supremacy,”	Social	and	Economic	Studies	43:	3	(1994):	105-34.	For	a	particularly	illuminating	look	into	White	Supremacy,	see:	Jemima	Pierre,	The	Predicament	of	Blackness:	
Postcolonial	Ghana	and	the	Politics	of	Race	(Chicago	and	London:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2013)	
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seized, and distributed, were textiles manufactured by European peasants, and shipped to 
Coro via the joint-stock companies.  
 The Coro rebellion was planned well in advance, although there are contradictory 
details about how exactly this happened, and who was involved. As will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter 2, authorities claimed that before the rebellion, a legally free black 
man known as Cocofio had been roaming the sierra telling people of African descent that 
the Spanish Crown had abolished slavery, but that Coro’s authorities were ignoring the 
law.32 Officials also stated that Cocofio died two or three years before the rebellion, but 
that the legally free, African-born Josef Caridad Gonzalez had been communicating the 
same message. Gonzalez’s version of Cocofio’s message, however, added that the Crown 
had also abolished the alcabala.33  
 While under duress and offering contradictory details about the rebellion and it’s 
planning, Chirino stated that he started planning the insurrection in April at the house of a 
friend named Juan Bernardo Chiquito. Chirino and Chiquito also testified that only they, 
González, and Joaquin, an enslaved man racially classified as zambo, and living as the 
legal property of Doña Nicolasa Acosta, were the only ones who knew about the 
rebellion in advance.34 But it appears that at another point during Chirino’s testimony, he 
also stated that Gonzalez was innocent; making the above claims difficult to prove.35 
																																																								32	“Expediente,”	ff.	84.	Emancipation	rumors	were	common	in	anti-slavery	rebellions	and	conspiracies	during	the	1790s.	See:	David	Patrick	Geggus,	“Slave	Resistance	in	the	Spanish	Caribbean	in	the	Mid-1790s,”	in	A	Turbulent	Time:	The	French	Revolution	and	the	Greater	Caribbean,	edited	by	David	Barry	Gaspar	and	David	Patrick	Geggus	(Bloomington	and	Indianapolis:	Indiana	University	Press,	1997).		33	“Expediente”	ff.	90-1.		34	“Sublevacion,”	ff.	3-9.		35	Ibid.,	ff.	144-51.	
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Only small fragments of Chirino’s testimony survive in the statements given by Coro’s 
authorities who sometimes make reference to it when interviewing witnesses or suspected 
rebels.  
 Don Nicolas de Coronado, a landowner in Coro’s sierra, claimed that in the days 
leading up to the rebellion, black people were meeting in large groups in the sierra, and 
he insinuated that this is how the rebellion was planned.36 Coronado added that he was 
not the only person who thought that these meetings were odd, stating that an unnamed 
black neighbor considered abandoning his home because there were “nightly meetings of 
blacks.”37 In addition, as will be seen in Chapter 2, Coro’s priest, Don Pedro Pérez, 
Ramírez Valderraín, and other white elites testified that in the city of Coro, many black 
people would gather to sing scandalous songs on the eve of the insurrection. The lyrics 
included threats to “cut off the head” of white men, and looking forward to the day when 
“Josef Leonardo with his gang” would strike “a blow from his Royal Palm,” which would 
result in the death of “the white.”38  
 Although facts concerning the insurrection’s planning are scattered and murky, 
most details about the rebellion itself are well documented.39 On the night of Sunday, 
May 10, 1795, Chirino, accompanied by four indigenous and enslaved black men, killed 
Don Josef de Martínez, a native of Nueva España, who was living at the Socorro 
plantation; the same place where Chirino, his enslaved wife, his enslaved children, and 
the other men accompanying him lived. After killing Martinez, the rebels stole his clothes 																																																								36	“Sublevación	de	los	negros,	pieza	1”	ff.	217-18.		37	Ibid.:	“juntas	de	negros	por	las	noches.”		38	Ibid.,	ff.	74-6.		39	The	following	narrative	is	largely	based	on	Mariano	Ramirez	Valderrain’s	testimony:		“Expediente,”	ff.	1-15.	
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and other valuables and distributed them amongst themselves. The rebels then turned 
their attention to the Socorro owner’s son, Don Yldefonso de Telleria. They tried to kill 
him and left him for dead, but he would survive the attack. As will be detailed in the first 
two chapters, the rebels then moved on to neighboring plantations, sacking homes, 
stealing textiles and clothes, and distributing them amongst themselves. They killed Don 
Josef Maria Manzanos, a friend of Joaquin’s owner Acosta. They then tried to kill Acosta 
herself and left her for dead, although she too would ultimately survive her wounds. The 
insurgents then burned Acosta’s house down after robbing it, and did the same to the 
nearby homes of Don Miguel de Urbina and Don Josef de Arcaya. Arcaya managed to 
escape, and Urbina’s son Manuel, who appears to have been administering his father’s 
plantation, escaped to the city of Coro, and would later give the first news of the uprising 
to Coro’s officials.  
 The rebels then set up a guard post outside of the sierra, on the path to the city of 
Coro, to intercept anyone trying to leave or come in. The next morning, May 11, the rebel 
guard intercepted Josef de Telleria’s party, which they knew would be arriving that 
morning. The rebels killed Telleria and his brother in law, Pedro Francisco Rosillo, and 
kidnapped Telleria’s wife, Doña Maria Josepha Rocillo, and her three children; escorting 
them to the plantation of Macanillas, which served as rebel headquarters.   
 Recounting that day months later, Rocillo stated that she reprimanded Chirino, 
asking “how could they be so ungrateful, and traitors that Tellería being the father of all 
of them they went out and killed him the same people of his house, who he loved so 
much and helped!” Rosillo stated that Chirino replied to her scolding by stating that 
Tellería had told him “that he would never be governed by a sambo,” to which Rocillo 
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stated that if Chirino’s “intent was to dominate the person who said those words how 
could he find him after his death.” To this Chirino responded “Tellería did not impede the 
tax collector of Coro from charging the alcabala with such excess and rigor.” Rocillo 
said that after she told Chirino that her husband had tried to address the issue through 
legal means, Chirino responded furiously, “it is none of that, that the whites were in 
cahoots with the tax collector so that they did not have to pay, and so that all the weight 
of the contributions fell onto the arms of the poor, and that now either it would be 
repaired, or Coro would be ruined.”40 
 Manuel de Urbina and his child arrived to the city of Coro at 2 PM that same day 
to warn, “the blacks were coming to attack the city, sack it and kill all of the whites.41 
With this news, Coro’s Justicia Mayor Mariano Ramirez Valderrain sent a message to the 
closest Caquetio towns of Carrisal and Guaybacoa to come to Coro with haste to help 
defend the city. Ramirez Valderrain then helped gather all the people he could from the 
city of Coro at his home in the city center, and instructed them to bring weapons if they 
had any. Ramirez Valderrain also ordered a force of 16 men to arm a post at Caujarao, 
which was a league from the city, en route to Coro’s sierra, and which served as a 
customs post to charge the alcabala. At some point that same night, Gonzalez and 21 or 
22 other loangos arrived at Ramirez Valderrain’s home saying that they wanted to help in 
their fight against the rebels. Ramirez Valderrain later testified that he was suspicious of 
their request and imprisoned them instead.  
																																																								40	“Expediente,”	ff.	260-2.		41	Ibid.,	ff.	228-9.	“los	negros	traian	ánimo	de	asaltar	a	la	ciudad,	saquearla	y	matar	a	todos	los	blancos.”	
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 That night, according to authorities, the rebels sent two spies down to the city of 
Coro to inform González and the loango militia that they were to attack the city the next 
morning. The two spies were captured by Ramirez Valderrain’s contingent at Caujarao. 
Ramirez Valderrain received word soon after and responded by doubling the forces at the 
customs post. By the time the second force arrived at around 1 am on the morning of May 
12, however, they found a bloody scene. The rebels had ambushed the alcabala at 
Caujarao, and had defeated Ramirez Valderrain’s initial force, killing two men and 
injuring two others, one who would later die as a result of his wounds. They then freed 
their two comrades and took aim at the house of the aduanista, Luis Barcenas. The rebels 
broke the doors and windows of Barcenas’s home, and taunted Barcenas to come out “to 
charge the alcabala, to receive through seizure the rosaries and other personal property 
that he was used to taking.”42  
 When Ramirez Valderrain received news of the ambush, he rallied all the local 
and foreign white and mulatto men he could, along with some Caquetio from Carrizal, 
Guaybacoa and Santa Ana, as well as two cannons, which would soon prove decisive. 
Ramirez Valderrain and his troops waited until about six in the morning when over four 
hundred men appeared, waving two flags, one white and one black. The rebels then 
exclaimed, “to give them freedom for the slaves, exemption from the alcabala and all the 
other taxes on the free, and that no harm would come if we handed them the city.”43 
Ramirez Valderraín said that his response was to shoot a canon filled with shrapnel at 
them.  																																																								42	Ibid.,	ff.	228:		“a	cobrar	las	alcabalas,	a	recivir	en	prenda	los	rosarios	y	demas	muebles	que	acostumbrava	quitar.”		43	Ibid.,	ff.	22:	“se	les	concediesela	livertad	a	los	esclavos	y	la	exepcion	de	derechos	de	alcavala	y	demas	impuestos	a	los	libres,	y	que	nada	se	ofreceria	entregandoles	asi	la	ciudad.”	
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 Ramirez Valderrain’s force of 213 men, armed with cannons, guns, and bows and 
arrows, soundly defeated the rebels that day. Ramirez Valderrain later boasted that he 
killed two men with his own hands, and that “we created a formidable carnage going after 
them, as many as two leagues in distance.”44 He added, “the ones that appeared on the 
plains were twenty five: the signals of blood that flowed, informed of the many injured, 
and the fields are now sowed with bodies.”45 Coro’s assorted army also captured 24 
rebels who were tormented into confessions, which Ramírez Valderraín claimed 
implicated Chirino and González as the masterminds of the insurrection. These rebels 
were escorted to Coro’s jail where they were decapitated in public.   
 Back at Macanillas, Chirino got word of the rebel defeat and sent a letter to the 
Cacique of Pecaya in an attempt to recruit help. Meanwhile, Ramirez Valderrain and his 
soldiers claimed more lives. Ramirez Valderrain later claimed that before they were 
decapitated, the 24 rebels admitted their guilt and stated that they were lead by González 
and Chirino. Having been apprehended the night before, Ramirez Valderrain went to 
transfer the loangos from his home to Coro’s jail. Ramirez Valderrain claimed that 
González and another man tried to escape and were thus killed by officers wielding 
swords and lances. It is far more likely, however, that Ramirez Valderrain murdered 
Gonzalez, having had his suspicions of him confirmed by the men he had just executed.  
 On the morning of Wednesday, May 13, Caquetio groups from Santa Ana, Mitare 
and Moruy, lead by Ramirez Valderrain, made rounds around the city of Coro and its port 
of La Vela, apprehending anyone who they considered suspicious. At around 1pm that 																																																								44	Ibid.,	se	hizo	una	carniceria	formidable	yendo	en	alcanze	de	ellos,	hasta	mas	de	dos	leguas	de	distancia.”		45	Ibid.,	“los	que	aparecieron	en	el	llano	fueron	veinte	y	cinco:	las	señales	de	sangre	de	los	que	corrian,	avisaban	ser	muchos	los	heridos,	y	asi	estan	los	campos	sembrados	de	cuerpos.”	
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day, a group of locals began shouting, “the blacks were coming” and Ramirez Valderrain 
jumped out of bed “almost naked and without shoes I rushed to the fields to register the 
troops where the enemy incursion was coming from and I explored more than two 
leagues of the countryside, returning after not having found anything at four in the 
afternoon.”46  
 The following day, Ramirez Valderrain sent two expeditions, comprised of 200 
men each, into the sierra to announce a general amnesty for anyone who would surrender, 
but to also secretly apprehend suspected leaders. While on these campaigns, local 
officials murdered three suspected rebels and captured nine more. Ramirez Valderrain 
had these nine people hanged on May 15. Subsequent expeditions into the sierra brought 
more carnage. On May 18, Ramirez Valderrain had 35 suspected leaders executed by 
gunshot, and five days later he executed 21 more people. The local Justicia Mayor of the 
Peninsula of Paraguaná executed five more people there who had escaped from the 
decisive battle of May 12.  
 Chirino fled in the days following the rebellion, and was not discovered until 
nearly three months later in Baragua, approximately 80 miles south of Coro. A man 
named Juan Manuel Aguero captured Chirino, who had been armed with a sword and 
arrows. Chirino escaped after Aguero had captured him the first time, but he was soon 
apprehended again by Aguero and escorted to Coro.47 For his trouble, Aguero was 
awarded the 100-peso bounty authorities had put on Chirino’s head. Chirino spent the 
																																																								46	Ibid.,	“quasi	desnudo	y	sin	sapzatos	me	tire	al	campo	a	registrar	la	tropa	por	donde	venian	la	incursion	de	los	enemigos	y	explore	toda	la	campaña	en	mas	de	dos	leguas,	retornandome	sin	haver	encontrado	novedad	a	las	quatro	de	la	tarde.”		47	Ibid.,	ff.	10-11.	
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next year in jail at Coro where he was repeatedly questioned by authorities, under what 
were, no doubt, tortuous conditions.  
 On December 16, 1796, Chirino was publicly executed in what was a grisly 
spectacle that took place in Caracas’s Plaza Mayor. He was hung to death and his body 
was then mutilated: his head and hands were cut off and these body parts were then 
transported to Coro to be hung up at various locations in the sierra, serving as a warning 
to those who would dare defy white rule.48 As was the case in most anti-slavery 
rebellions, Coro’s rebels and those members of their community who happened to be of 
African descent, and were presumed guilty, felt the brunt of the suffering. The rebels 
killed nine people: seven white and two native American, but Valderrain’s bloodbath 
claimed the lives of at least 125 people of African and Afro-indigenous descent.  
 The rise and fall of Coro’s revolutionary movement was structured by the political 
economy of the region, and that of the greater Atlantic world. Informed by a moral 
economy based on African and native American communal practices, Coro’s rebels 
found this moral economy violated by the institutions of slavery and taxes, and the way in 
which they functioned in Coro. The rebellion was crushed by Coro’s military authorities 
who relied on the efforts of Coro’s tribute-free indigenous people, the Caquetio. As will 
be seen in the fourth chapter, Caquetio loyalty was the product of the long and peculiar 
history of the conquest of Venezuela. As will also be demonstrated, the Caquetio helped 
defeat the insurrection because, ironically, they thought that this would bring their 
community relief from alcabala payments. Connecting back to the Atlantic, Coro’s 
defenders brutally suppressed the rebellion because Coro formed a small piece in the 
giant puzzle that was the European world system during the eighteenth century. This 																																																								48	Ibid.,	ff.	1-4.	
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world system was forged through the efforts of Europe’s joint-stock companies, and ruled 
by the interlocking logics of capital accumulation and white supremacy.  
 
Historiographical Interventions  
  
 This dissertation bridges the historiographies on capitalism and anti-slavery 
resistance in the Americas, and intervenes in each of these fields. More specifically, it 
engages histories of capitalism that discuss the role of the conquest, slavery, and coerced 
labor within this history. This dissertation intervenes in this literature by suggesting the 
need to more specifically define and date the emergence of capitalism. It also argues in 
favor of a periodization that begins in the nineteenth century. In addition, this dissertation 
engages the history of anti-slavery resistance in the Americas, particularly those works 
that focus on rebellions during the Age of Revolution (1789-1848). It adds the Coro 
rebellion to a list of case studies on anti-slavery resistance during the period, and it 
intervenes in this literature by emphasizing the significance of the Atlantic’s political 
economy in giving rise to these movements. In particular, this dissertation identifies 
African political and economic practices as providing the ideological foundation for anti-
slavery movements.  
 Recent decades have seen an explosion of scholarly work dedicated to antislavery 
resistance movements in the Americas. This literature has demonstrated that enslaved 
people detested their condition so much that they went through great lengths, often 
risking their lives, to abolish slavery. These works have also shown that enslaved 
people’s resistance movements were generally ambitious, meaning that these movements 
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had established goals that usually included the destruction of the political, economic, and 
political orders of their societies, and their replacement with a radically different one.  
 Given the fragmentary and prejudicial nature of contemporary sources, case 
studies on antislavery resistance movements have been essential in providing depth to 
scholars’ understandings of the character of these movements.49 These case studies have 
uncovered details about rebel leaders and their backgrounds, rebel demands and 
ideologies, as well as rebel strategies and alliances. These studies have also been able to 
provide new details on the societies in which these people lived.  
 Although this dissertation is not the first work to examine the 1795 Coro 
rebellion, it is the first book-length study of the insurrection and the world that gave rise 
to it. The historiography on the Coro rebellion begins in 1910, with Venezuelan historian, 
intellectual, and politician Pedro Manuel Arcaya’s induction speech—which was later 
published—at Venezuela’s Academia Nacional de Historia, titled Una insurrección de 
negros en 1795.50 In his speech, Arcaya argues that the rebellion was a spasmodic 
episode of violence, fueled by abolition rumors and the inebriation of the rebellion’s 
leader, Chirino. Although Arcaya’s work is a rich resource for information on eighteenth-																																																								49	For	examples	of	case	studies,	see:	:	Emilia	V.	da	Costa,	Crowns	of	Glory,	Tears	of	Blood:	The	
Demerara	Slave	Rebellion	of	1823	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1997);	Douglas	Egerton,	He	
Shall	Go	Out	Free:	The	Lives	of	Denmark	Vesey	(Madison,	Wis.:	Madison	House,	1999);	Manuel	Barcia	Paz,	The	Great	Slave	Revolt	of	1825:	Cuba	and	the	Fight	for	Freedom	in	Matanzas	(Baton	Rouge:	Louisiana	State	University	Press,	2012);	Matt	D.	Childs,	The	1812	Aponte	Rebellion	in	Cuba	and	the	
Struggle	Against	Atlantic	Slavery	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2006);	Aisha	K.	Finch,	Rethinking	Slave	Rebellion	in	Cuba:	La	Escalera	and	the	Insurgencies	of	1841-1844	(Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2015);	Robert	Paquette,	Sugar	is	Made	with	Blood:	The	
Conspiracy	of	La	Escalera	and	the	Conflict	Between	Empires	Over	Slavery	in	Cuba	(Middletwon,	Conn.:	Wesleyan	University	Press,	1988);	Michele	Reid-Vasquez,	The	Year	of	the	Lash:	Free	People	of	Color	in	
Cuba	and	the	Nineteenth-Century	Atlantic	World	(Athens:	Univeristy	of	Georgia	Press,	2011);	Joao	José	Reis,	Slave	Rebellion	in	Brazil:	the	Muslim	Uprising	of	1835	in	Bahia	(London:	John	Hopkins	University	Press,	1993).		50	Pedro	Manuel	Arcaya,	“Una	insurrección	de	negros	en	1795:	Discurso	de	incorporación	a	la	Academia	Nacional	de	Historia,	11	de	diciembre	de	1910”	in	Pedro	Manuel	Arcaya,	Personajes	y	
hechos	de	la	historia	de	Venezuela	(Caracas:	1977),	227-273.		
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century Coro and the 1795 rebellion, this dissertation rejects his conclusion that the 
rebellion was unplanned and void of political substance.  
 This dissertation compliments the studies of Venezuelan historians who have 
written on the Coro rebellion from within the Marxist tradition. As part of their larger 
studies of black life and labor in Venezuela during the colonial period, Miguel Acosta 
Saignes and Federico Brito Figueroa, included narratives of the Coro rebellion.51 Acosta 
Saignes and Brito Figueroa censured Arcaya’s patronizing posture and perspective, while 
demonstrating that Coro’s 1795 rebels were part of a long history of coordinated Afro-
Venezuelan resistance to systems of exploitation and oppression. This position was taken 
up again by Pedro Gil Rivas, Luis Dovale Prado, and Lidia Lusmila Bello’s 1996 essay, 
La Insurrección de los negros de la serranía coriana: 10 de mayo de 1795, which was 
based on their university thesis.52 In La insurrección, Gil Rivas, Dovale Prado and 
Lusmila Bello argue that the Coro rebellion was a reaction to increasing land 
concentration in the region. This dissertation complements the work by Acosta Saignes, 
Brito Figueroa, and Gil Rivas, Dovale Prado and Lusmila Bello by providing depth to 
their examination of local conditions, and by adding an investigation into how these 
conditions were shaped by Atlantic ones.  
  In the United States, studies on enslaved people’s resistance movements also 
began as a response to the racist logic of white historians of slavery. Early works on anti-
slavery resistance, such as C.L.R. James’s 1938 classic The Black Jacobins and Herbert 
																																																								51	Miguel	Acosta	Saignes,	Vida	de	los	esclavos	negros	en	Venezuela	(La	Habana:	Casa	de	las	Americas,	1978);	Federico	Brito	Figueroa,	El	problema	de	tierra	y	esclavos	en	la	historía	de	Venezuela	(Caracas:	Universidad	Central	de	Venezuela,	1985).		52	Pedro	A.	Gil	Rivas,	Luis	Dovale	Prado	and	Lidia	Lusmila	Bello,	La	insurrección	de	los	negros	de	la	
serranía	coriana:	10	de	mayo	de	1795	(Caracas:	Ministerio	de	Educación	Cultura	y	Deportes,	2001).	
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Aptheker’s 1943 book American Negro Slave Revolts and were written as rebuttals to the 
racist logic dominant at the time, in regards to slavery and slave rebellions.53 This 
position, which was posited by nineteenth and early twentieth-century historians, such as 
Arcaya and Ulrich Phillips, assumed the natural inferiority of black people.54 These 
historians tended to consider that black people were generally accepting of their condition 
as slaves, concluding that the institution was thus a natural one, and one that was 
necessary for the integration of black people into white societies. As mentioned earlier, 
white scholars of this generation viewed slave rebellions as spasmodic acts of 
indiscriminate violence—ones void of political content.  
 The Black Jacobins and American Negro Slave Revolts showed the above claims 
to be untenable. The latter recounted the history of 250 slave rebellions and conspiracies 
in the North American territory that would become the United States, as well as during 
the first decades of the republic, showing that enslaved black people did not like, nor 
easily accept their condition as slaves. As a biography of Toussaint L’Ouverture and a 
history of the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804), The Black Jacobins effectively flipped the 
ideology of white supremacy on its head, by displaying the political and ideological 
complexities of the revolution, as well as the ability of black revolutionaries to outwit, 
and ultimately defeat, numerous European battalions. Although the points these historians 
made may seem self-evident to much of the reading public today, this was not the case 
																																																								53	C.L.R.	James,	The	Black	Jacobins:	Toussaint	Louverture	and	the	San	Domingo	Revolution	(London:	Secker	and	Warburg,	1938);	Herbert	Aptheker,	American	Negro	Slave	Revolts	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	1943).		54	Ulrich	Bonnell	Phillips,	American	Negro	Slavery:	A	Survey	of	the	Supply,	Employment	and	Control	of	Negro	Labor	as	Determined	by	the	Plantation	Regime	(New	York:	D.	Appleton	and	Company,	1918).		
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when these books were published, making them groundbreaking contributions to the 
study of antislavery insurrections and revolutions.  
 Since the publication of the second edition of The Black Jacobins in 1963, 
scholars began identifying the Age of Revolution as a historical watershed in the history 
of enslaved people’s resistance movements.55 Eugene Genovese’s 1979 book From 
Rebellion to Revolution and Michael Craton’s 1982 response, Breaking the Chains, both 
see the Age of Revolution as a period in which the ideological content of anti-slavery 
resistance took a turn.56 Genovese and Craton concur that, before the period, enslaved 
people’s resistance movements sought to recreate their African homelands in the 
Americas. After the period, however, anti-slavery resistance changed. For Genovese, 
these movements adopted the “bourgeois-democratic” spirit of the age, while Craton 
believed rebels were guided by their desire to live independent lives as peasant producers. 
This dissertation largely rejects the dichotomy of before and after the Age of Revolution, 
instead focusing on the continuity of rebel concerns throughout the periods in question. 
This dissertation aims to demonstrate that the political economy of the Coro rebels’ 
homelands, or that of their parents and/or grandparents, largely informed rebel ideology.  
 The question of ideology has continued to burn in recent years for historians of 
enslaved people’s resistance movements during the Age of Revolution, although opinions 
vary greatly. Some scholars, such as Laurent Dubois, David Patrick Geggus, and David 
Scott, have emphasized the influence that Enlightenment ideas about liberty and equality 																																																								55	C.L.R.	James,	The	Black	Jacobins:	Toussaint	L’Ouverture	and	the	San	Domingo	Revolution	(New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1963).		56	Eugene	D.	Genovese,	From	Rebellion	to	Revolution:	Afro-American	Slave	Revolts	in	the	Making	of	the	
Modern	World	(Baton	Rouge:	Lousiana	State	University	Press,	1979);	Michael	Craton,	Testing	the	
Chains:	Resistance	to	Slavery	in	the	British	West	Indies	(Ithaca,	N.Y.:	Cornell	University	Press,	1982).	
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had on anti-slavery insurrections during the Age of Revolution.57 Other scholars, such as 
Manuel Barcia, Jacob Carruthers, and Walter Rucker have stressed the significance of 
African cultural and military practices on resistance during the period.58 Although this 
dissertation does not aim to discount the multitude of ideas that informed enslaved 
people’s resistance movements, it finds itself more in line with those scholars that have 
emphasized the significance of African concepts in the construction of rebel ideology.  
 This dissertation intervenes in the scholarship on antislavery resistance in the 
Americas during the Age of Revolution through a study of African political economy and 
its role in structuring the ideologies of Coro’s rebels. This dissertation investigates the 
indigenous social relations on the Gold and Loango Coasts, from where most rebels 
																																																								57	David	Patrick	Geggus,	Slavery,	War,	and	Revolution:	The	British	Occupation	of	Saint	Domingue,	1793-
1798	(Oxford:	Clarendon	Press,	1982);	David	Patrick	Geggus,	Haitian	Revolutionary	Studies	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	2002);	David	Barry	Gaspar	and	David	Patrick	Geggus,	eds.,	A	
Turbulent	Time:	The	French	Revolution	in	the	Greater	Caribbean	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	1997);	David	Patrick	Geggus	and	Norman	Fiering,	The	World	of	the	Haitian	Revolution	(Bloomington:	Indiana	University	Press,	2009);	David	Scott,	Conscripts	of	Modernity:	The	Tragedy	of	
Colonial	Enlightenment	(Durham:	Duke	University	Press,	2004);	Laurent	Dubois,	Avengers	of	the	New	
World:	The	Story	of	the	Haitian	Revolution	(Cambridge,	Mass.:	Belknap	Press	of	Harvard	University	Press,	2004);	Laurent	Dubois,	A	Colony	of	Citizens:	Revolution	&	Slave	Emancipation	in	the	French	
Caribbean,	1787-1804	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2004);	Ada	Ferrer,	Freedom’s	
Mirror:	Cuba	and	Haiti	in	the	Age	of	Revolution	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014);	);	Nick 
Nesbitt, Universal Emancipation: The Haitian Revolution and the Radical Enlightenment (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia Press, 2008); Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti and Universal History (Pittsburg, Pa.: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009); Doris Garraway, ed., Tree of Liberty: Cultural Legacies of the 
Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2008); David P. 
Geggus and Norman Fiering, eds., The World of the Haitian Revolution (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2009); Gerald Horne, Confronting Black Jacobins: The U.S., the Haitian Revolution, and the Origins 
of the Dominican Republic (New York: New York University Press, 2015);	Nick Nesbitt, Universal 
Emancipation: The Haitian Revolution and the Radical Enlightenment (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2008); David Scott, Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); David P. Geggus, Haitian Revolutionary Studies (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 2002); Matt Childs, The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle Against 
Atlantic Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).		58	Manuel	Barcia	Paz,	The	Great	African	Slave	Revolt	of	1825:	Cuba	and	the	Fight	for	Freedom	in	
Matanzas	(Baton	Rouge:	Louisiana	State	University	Press,	2012);	Jacob	Carruthers,	The	Irritated	
Genie:	an	Essay	on	the	Haitian	Revolution	(Chicago:	Kemetic	Institute,	1985);	Walter	C.	Rucker,	The	
River	Flows	On:	Black	Resistance,	Culture,	and	Identity	Formation	in	Early	America	(Baton	Rouge:	Louisiana	State	University	Press,	2006);	John	K.	Thornton,	Warfare	in	Atlantic	Africa,	1500-1800	(London:	UCL	Press,	1999).	
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descended. It finds that the political and economic practices of these African regions 
carried over to maroon communities throughout the Americas, including the loango 
community of Coro, which was involved in the rebellion. This dissertation argues that 
once plantation lands were encroaching on the lands of Coro’s black peasants, and once 
the enactment of taxes make the rebels’ ability to practice their autochthonous social 
systems untenable, Coro’s rebels reached a breaking point, which was expressed in the 
1795 insurrection. This revolutionary movement aimed to destroy Coro and to build a 
republic based on African social systems.  
 “The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance” also intervenes in histories 
of capitalism, by arguing that the Coro rebellion was shaped by the pre-capitalist order of 
the eighteenth-century Atlantic. Across the political spectrum, definitions of capitalism 
vary greatly, but because this dissertation uses a Marxist framework, it engages mostly 
with those ideas put forward by scholars who work within this tradition. “The Political 
Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance” utilizes a Marxist framework because the most 
empirically informed studies of capitalism have come from studies within this canon. In 
their studies on slavery, and the European conquest of the Americas, Marxist scholars of 
the global south have adhered to Marx’s ironclad definition, but have also tended to adopt 
one of the weaknesses in Marx’s analysis.59 This dissertation follows Joseph Inikori’s 
																																																								59	See,	for	example:	Samir	Amin,	Accumulation	on	a	World	Scale:	A	Critique	of	the	Theory	of	
Underdevelopment	(New	York:	Monthly	Review	Press,	1974);	Andre	Gunder	Frank,	Capitalism	and	
Underdevelopment	in	Latin	America:	Historical	Studies	of	Chile	and	Brazil	(New	York:	Modern	Reader	Paperbacks,	1969);	Cedric	J.	Robinson,	Black	Marxism:	The	Making	of	the	Black	Radical	Tradition	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2000);	Walter	Rodney,	A	History	of	the	Upper	Guinea	
Coast	(New	York:	Monthly	Review	Press,	1970);	Wallerstein;	Eric	Williams,	Capitalism	&	Slavery	(Chapel	Hill:	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	1994).		
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lead in expressing doubt in Marx’s periodization, which dated “the capitalist era” to the 
sixteenth century.60  
 Before discussing Marx’s definition of capitalism, it is important to first explain 
why a definition is needed. Liberal scholars of the “new” history of capitalism, such as 
Sven Beckert and Louis Hyman, have provided ambiguous definitions for capitalism 
and/or have outright refused to define capitalism because they find the effort to be 
“deductive.”61 This school of thought has raised the concern that because industrial 
capitalism and neoliberal capitalism have relied on, or at least exploited, peripheral 
production processes based on war, and forms of forced labor, such as slavery, then 
defining capitalism becomes a messy proposition. These scholars argue against the notion 
that wage labor is the defining characteristic of capitalism, and emphasize the importance 
of circulation and modes of production not based on wages.  
 However, failing to define capitalism can potentially lead to anachronistic 
conclusions. As generations of Marxist scholars have made clear, historians of the new 
history of capitalism are right in their assertions that capitalism has relied on, or in the 
very least exploited, what Samir Amin called “capitalist formations on the periphery.”62 
But capitalism, or the modern world’s economic system, is not the first political and 
economic system to invade rival polities, or to conduct long-distance trade, or combine 
modes of production. If these processes were to be considered the basis of capitalism, 																																																								60	Joseph	E.	Inikori,	Slavery	and	the	Rise	of	Capitalism	(Mona,	Jamaica:	Dept.	of	History,	the	University	of	the	West	Indies,	1993);	Joseph	E.	Inikori,	Africans	and	the	Industrial	Revolution	in	England:	A	Study	
in	International	Trade	and	Economic	Development	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002).			61	Sven	Beckert,	Empire	of	Cotton:	A	Global	History	(New	York:	Alfred	A.	Knopf,	2014);	Louis	Hyman,	
Debtor	Nation:	The	History	of	America	in	Red	Ink	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2011);	“Interchange:	The	History	of	Capitalism”	Journal	of	American	History	101:2	(September	2014):	517.			62	Amin.	
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then medieval Europe, as well as their contemporaries in Mesoamerica, the Andes, 
Ghana, and Benin should also be considered capitalist, as should ancient Greece, Rome, 
and Egypt. If everything is capitalism, then nothing is capitalism. But capitalism is a real 
political and economic system that was formed at a particular time and in a particular 
place; capitalism has a history.  
 For Marx, capitalism is a political and economic system whose foundation is the 
capitalist mode of production. The capitalist mode of production is a system of 
production in which the worker is divorced from the means of subsistence (i.e. food, 
housing, clothing, etc.) and the means of production (i.e. tools, machinery, raw materials, 
warehouses, etc.). Unable to work independently because the means of production have 
been usurped by a capitalist class, and unable to subsist because they have been removed 
from their land, workers are left with no choice but to sell their labor-power for wages in 
order to survive.63  
 For Marx and for scholars who work within his theoretical and methodological 
frameworks, this distinction between the capitalist and non-capitalist modes of 
production is of the upmost importance. Once the capitalist mode of production develops, 
it creates an environment of what Ernest Mandel called “generalized commodity 
production,” meaning that the means of subsistence, and of production, become 
commodities on the market.64 Because they have been divorced from their means of 
subsistence, workers are forced to purchase these means through the wages they earned 
from their employers. Generalized commodity production, or capitalism, is the most 																																																								63	See,	in	particular,	Chapter	6	in	Marx’s	Capital,	Vol.	1,	“The	Sale	and	Purchase	of	Labour-Power”	in	Karl	Marx,	Capital,	Volume	1	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	1990),	270-80.		64	Mandel	uses	the	term	“generalized	commodity	production”	in	his	introduction	to	Marx’s	Capital,	
Volume	1,	20.	
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dynamic system of economic expansion in human history. It has lead to the 
unprecedented growth of industry and technology, as well as unparalleled economic 
inequality and environmental devastation.  
 Scholars of the global south have generally stayed loyal to Marx’s definition of 
capitalism, as well as his timeline. Marx argued that the “first sporadic traces” of 
capitalism were found in western and southern Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, but that “the capitalist era” begins in the sixteenth century.65 Following this, 
scholars such as Eric Williams, André Gunder Frank, Cedric Robinson, and Immanuel 
Wallerstein have based their important studies of European imperialism on the 
assumption that capitalism was the dominant mode of production operating in early 
modern Europe.66 These scholars have then presumed that Europe’s imperial expansion 
into Africa and the Americas was guided by the logic of capitalism. European capitalism, 
then, was the driving force behind the conquest of the Americas and the trade in enslaved 
Africans. Although these scholars would contend that conquest and slavery were not 
proper modes of capitalist production, they argued that these modes of extermination and 
exploitation were implemented in order to meet the needs of European capitalists.  
 The research conducted for this dissertation supports the contention made by 
Inikori that capitalism emerged as the dominant mode of production in Europe much later 
than Marx had surmised. Following Marx’s timeline, Marxist scholars of medieval and 
early-modern Europe, such as Wallerstein, Maurice Dobb and Robert Brenner, have 
																																																								65	Ibid.,	876.		66	Williams;	Frank;	Robinson;	Wallerstein.		
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agreed that English agriculture was the first field of capitalist production in Europe.67 But 
Inikori has shown that it was not until 1801-3 that wage-laborers in agriculture began to 
exceed the number of farmers in England by a count of 340,000 families to 320,000 
families.68 As for manufacturing, this was not organized around the capitalist mode of 
production until at least fifty years later. As Inikori, among many others have shown, and 
as will be demonstrated in Chapter one, textile manufacturing was a non-capitalist 
enterprise confined mostly to peasant households before the mid nineteenth century.69  
 The logic of the eighteenth-century Atlantic’s political and economic system 
shaped eighteenth-century Coro and the 1795 rebellion. As Marx has shown, the mode of 
production that serves as the basis of every economic system is key in determining the 
productivity, structure, and contradictions inherent in these systems. During the 
eighteenth century in Europe, peasant production was the dominant mode of production. 
As will be shown in the first and second chapters of this dissertation, European industries 
were limited in their ability to expand, and capital was funneled into mercantile activities. 
Mercantile expansion could only come through the forcing open of new markets, as well 
as new zones of production, across the Atlantic. This extension into the Atlantic could 
only come through the establishment of joint-stock companies.  
 The eighteenth century was a precapitalist era, not just in Europe, but also in the 
Gold and Loango Coasts, as well as in Coro. In the Gold and Loango Coasts, a political 
and economic order based largely on communal agricultural practices, was encroached 																																																								67	Wallerstein;	Maurice	Dobb,	Studies	in	the	Development	of	Capitalism	(New	York:	International	Publishers,	1947);	T.H.Aston	and	C.H.E.	Philpin,	eds.,	The	Brenner	Debate:	Agrarian	Class	Structure	
and	Economic	Development	in	Pre-Industrial	Europe	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1987).		68	Inikori,	Africans,	45.		69	Inikori,	Slavery.	 
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upon by the slave trade, but it was not eliminated. In Coro, the primary economic activity 
was agricultural production and livestock rearing. Peasants did the vast majority of this 
work and they also provided for themselves via these activities. This peasant economy 
was complemented by slavery and/or day labor on plantations and haciendas.  
 Therefore, as will be seen in the third and fourth chapters, eighteenth-century 
merchant capital was powerful enough to slaughter and enslave, but it was unable to grab 
complete control of the political and economic systems of indigenous peoples across the 
Atlantic. Although certainly encroached upon and altered by European imperialists, the 
structure of indigenous peasant production in Coro, and the Gold and Loango Coasts, was 
not yet fully replaced by an alternative formation. These autochthonous political and 
economic practices were the bedrock for the moral economy of Coro’s African and native 
American peoples, and the 1795 rebels. 
 “The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance” aims to bridge the fields of 
capitalism studies with histories of enslaved peoples resistance movements in the 
Americas. It intervenes in the literature on antislavery rebellions in the Americas by 
providing the first book-length case study for an important, yet understudied insurrection 
during the Age of Revolution. This dissertation argues that the Coro rebellion was shaped 
by the political economies of the Atlantic, and that this economy informed rebel 
ideology. “The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance” also engages the literature 
on the history of capitalism by revising scholarship on the European world system. It 
argues that the emergence of this system, and the international division of labor, actually 
predated capitalism, and was thus shaped by the laws of peasant production and merchant 
capital.  
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Methods, Theories, and Outline 
 
 “The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance” utilizes the methods and 
theoretical frameworks employed by scholars of diverse specialties. The dissertation is 
comprised of four chapters, plus an introduction and a conclusion that is based on 
secondary sources, archival research, and eighteenth-century publications. All four 
chapters begin and end with episodes from the Coro rebellion that touch on a particular 
aspect of the Atlantic’s political economy, while the bodies of each chapter examine 
these topics in depth. The chapter titles are based on the primary commodity that is under 
investigation. This dissertation uses the methods employed by historians of anti-colonial 
resistance to read archival documentation related to violent insurrections of colonized 
people. The chapters also borrow from the methods employed by scholars who study the 
intersection between materiality and ideology, as well as the relationship between race, 
gender, and political economy. “The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance” also 
contributes to the advancement of theoretical frameworks relating to these themes, as it 
provides evidence for some theories while slightly altering others.  
 The narratives that begin and end each chapter are based on colonial archival 
sources relating to the Coro rebellion. To read these documents, I employ methods by 
historians who have studied resistance by colonized people, particularly Aisha Finch and 
Ranajit Guha.70 These scholars have pointed out that colonial archives relating to 
insurrection can only exist because of the actions taken and the words deployed by the 
rebels themselves. These “rebel utterances,” to use Guha’s term, are interspersed between 																																																								70	Finch;	Ranajit	Guha,	Elementary	Aspects	of	Peasant	Insurgency	in	Colonial	India	(Delhi:	Oxford,	1983).	
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the sea of hate, fear, and paranoia that dominate the records produced by colonial 
authorities.71 This dissertation utilizes these records with care, and is skeptical of official 
narratives because they are always warped by the biases of Spanish and white 
Venezuelan officials charged with administrating and policing a violent society. In 
eighteenth-century Venezuela, white elites were only very loosely constrained by law and 
custom in regards to violence and corruption, and even these mores did not stop these 
individuals from routinely ignoring them. Nevertheless, as Finch and Guha point out, 
colonial documents relating to resistance are still, at least partly, informed by the rebels 
themselves, and this dissertation is inspired by a duty to extract rebel words, actions, and 
ideologies from these documents.  
 “The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance” conceives of ideology as a 
system of thought that informs political and economic ideas and actions. Following 
Antonio Gramsci, Louis Althusser, V.N. Vološinov, and Stuart Hall, this dissertation 
recognizes that ideologies both inform, and are informed by political and economic 
conditions.72 This dissertation argues that the anti-slavery and anti-tax ideology of Coro’s 
rebels was informed by their moral economy. As mentioned above, this moral economy 
was based on the communalist political and economic customs the rebels were 
accustomed to practicing in Africa and in the Americas. As will be seen in the third 
chapter, it is likely that Coro’s rebels planned to instill these communalist practices if 																																																								71	Guha,	16.		72	Antonio	Gramsci,	Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks	of	Antonio	Gramsci	(New	York:	International	Publishers,	1971);	Louis	Althusser,	For	Marx	(London	and	New	York:	Verso,	2005);	Stuart	Hall,	“The	Problem	of	Ideology—Marxism	without	Guarantees.”	Journal	of	Communication	Inquiry,	10:2	(1986):	28-44;	Stuart	Hall,	“Gramsci’s	Relevance	for	the	Study	of	Race	and	Ethnicity.”	Journal	of	Communication	Inquiry,	10:6	(1985),	5-27;	V.N.	Vološinov,	Marxism	and	the	Philosophy	of	Language	(Cambridge,	Ma.	and	London:	Harvard	University	Press,	1973).		
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they had taken control of the region, in ways similar to that of maroon communities in the 
Americas. Therefore, Coro’s rebels did not necessarily need Enlightenment ideas of 
liberty and equality; they, and/or their ancestors, experienced these values themselves.  
 “The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance” also utilizes methods 
borrowed from scholars who study the intersection of race and political economy. This 
dissertation does not use Martin Legassick and David Hemson’s term “racial capitalism,” 
which was popularized in Robinson’s Black Marxism, because it argues that the period 
under question was not capitalist.73 However, this dissertation is in tune with these 
works’ analysis of the overlap between race and class, and the intersection between racial 
formation and capital accumulation. The dissertation provides evidence for Robinson’s 
notion that racialized divisions of labor predated the emergence of capitalism, and that 
this custom continued under Europe’s modern political and economic system.74 As this 
dissertation demonstrates, the eighteenth-century Atlantic was an organic political and 
economic unit in which roles in the European world system, often shaped by “race” 
and/or place, were clearly designated. The indigenous people of the Gold and Loango 
Coasts were consumers of European cloth and exporters of enslaved human beings. 
These enslaved people were sent to toil in Coro—a region used to produce cheap 
																																																								73	Martin	Legassick	and	David	Hemson,	Foreign	Investment	and	the	Reproduction	of	Racial	Capitalism	
in	South	Africa	(London:	The	Anti-Apartheid	Movement,	1976);	Robinson.			74	But	the	dissertation	refutes	Robinson’s	notion	that	“race”	was	operating	in	medieval	Europe,	mostly	because	of	the	importance	of	skin	color	to	the	modern	notion	of	race.	It	therefore	concurs	with	scholars	such	as	Anibal	Quijano	who	point	out	that	markers	of	difference	took	political	and	economic	shape	in	the	Atlantic	after	1492	and	the	creation	of	a	truly	global	economy.74	It	is	my	contention,	then,	that	this	global	division	of	labor	was	established	before	the	advent	of	capitalism,	but	that	the	modern	world’s	political	and	economic	system	hardened	and	exacerbated	these	racialized	divisions.	See:	Anibal	Quijano,	“Coloniality	of	Power:	Eurocentrism	and	Latin	America”	Nepantla:	Views	from	the	South	1:3	(2000):	533-580.	
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agricultural commodities, which served as raw material for other European industries in 
the circum-Caribbean and in the metropole.    
 Gender is key when studying racialization and capital accumulation in the 
Atlantic. This dissertation follows Hilary Beckles and Jennifer Morgan in recognizing the 
significance of black women to the political economy of societies with enslaved people.75 
Enslaved and legally free black women were crucial to the functioning of Coro’s 
plantation society, both as plantation workers and through the literal reproduction of 
capital, as their bodies were often used as vessels to bring commodified human beings 
into the world. “The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance” also follows Finch’s 
work on enslaved women in the Escalera Conspiracy, as it seeks to uncover the “hidden 
labors of rebellion” that Coro’s women rebels were responsible for.76 The women rebels 
of Coro sang seditious songs on the eve of the insurrection, escaped plantations and 
sacked masters’ quarters, hid loot from colonial authorities, and attempted to break their 
partners out of jail.  
 These hidden labors are prominent in the dissertation’s first chapter, “‘Precious 
Objects,’” which utilizes the above methods and frameworks, as well as others, to 
investigate cloth manufacturing in Europe and the material and symbolic value of these 
textiles in Coro. The chapter begins with a recounting of the significance of European 
cloth during and after the May 1795 insurrection. Following the work of scholars such as 
Hall and Vološinov, regarding language, representation, and materiality, it argues that 																																																								75	Hilary	Beckles,	Natural	Rebels:	A	Social	History	of	Enslaved	Black	Women	in	Barbados	(New	Brunswick,	NJ:	Rutgers	University	Press,	1989);	Jennifer	L.	Morgan,	Laboring	Women:	Reproduction	
and	Gender	in	New	World	Slavery	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2004);	Jennifer	L.	Morgan,	"Partus	Sequitur	Ventrem:	Law,	Race,	and	Reproduction	in	Colonial	Slavery."	Small	Axe.	22.1	(2018):	1-17.			76	Finch,	7.	
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these textiles and clothes both informed and represented racial and class status in 
eighteenth-century Coro.77  
 The first chapter utilizes primary and secondary source material to examine cloth 
production in the European manufacturing enclaves of Flanders, Brittany, and Devon. 
Using archival sources from the SSC, the WIC, and the RCG, the chapter first establishes 
that these regions were some of the principal cloth providers for eighteenth-century Coro, 
as well as those textiles used to procure enslaved people in Africa. It then examines the 
manufacturing processes in Flanders, Brittany, and Devon, showing that peasant 
production formed the basis of cloth assembled, which limited the growth potential for 
these industries. The chapter concludes that the manufacturing process of these enclaves 
ensured their high exchange value in Coro, therefore largely influencing the textiles’ 
symbolic value.  
 The second chapter, “Joint-Stock Company Capital,” examines the three 
companies that were responsible for molding eighteenth-century Coro: the SSC, the WIC, 
and the RCG. The chapter begins and ends with an introduction into the African-born 
communities of Coro through a study of the circulation of abolition rumors in the years 
leading up to the rebellion, as well as scandalous songs sung in the nights preceding May 
10, 1795. Using firm records and recent biographies of the companies, the chapter then 
demonstrates how they were responsible for establishing Coro’s African character, as 
well as creating the region’s plantations and haciendas.  
 The second chapter employs theories regarding white supremacy, the interplay 
between racial formation and capital accumulation, as well as interpellation, to tell the 
history of the SSC, the WIC, and the RCG. It adopts Charles Mills’s framing of “white 																																																								77	Hall;	Vološinov.	
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supremacy,” to explore how this Atlantic political, economic, and cultural order was 
forged historically, in the eighteenth century, by joint-stock companies such as the SSC, 
the WIC, and the RCG.78 The chapter’s investigation into the joint-stock companies also 
utilizes the research methods of Legassick and Hemson and Peter Hudson, who in their 
research on racial capitalism have traced racial formation by identifying political and 
economic actors, as well as institutions, that have shaped the racial and class conditions 
in the societies in question.79 Following the work of Louis Althusser on interpellation, 
this chapter concludes that varying interests and processes were at work to establish these 
companies and to carry out their practices, even though these interests all intersected with 
the desire and/or need to accumulate capital and subordinate non-European peoples.80  
 The third chapter, “The People,” continues the study of Coro’s African 
communities through an investigation into the social systems of the Gold Coast, the 
Loango Coast, and maroon settlements across the Americas during the eighteenth 
century. The chapter begins and ends with an inquiry into Coro’s loango community and 
their involvement in the 1795 rebellion. Recognizing Walter Rodney’s determination that 
eighteenth-century Africa was a proto-colonial, rather than a pre-colonial space, this 
chapter nevertheless discerns that the communalist customs of the peoples of the Gold 
and Loango Coasts continued to be practiced in the eighteenth century, much as they had 
before the fifteenth-century invasion. The third chapter uses the autobiographies of 
formerly enslaved people, eighteenth-century European traveller accounts, and secondary 
																																																								78	Mills.		79	Legassick	and	Hemson;	Peter	James	Hudson,	Bankers	and	Empire:	How	Wall	Street	Colonized	the	
Caribbean	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2017).			80	Althusser.		
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literature to study these autochthonous political and economic practices, and demonstrate 
how they were carried over to maroon communities across the Americas, including the 
loango settlement in Coro. As has been stated earlier, this chapter argues that the moral 
economy of much of Coro’s rebels was based on this African political economy.  
 The fourth chapter, “Indigenous Labor-Power,” studies the role played by native 
American people in the Coro rebellion and in the Spanish Crown’s counter revolution, 
alongside the regimes of taxation that largely determined the involvement of legally free 
people. The chapter uses secondary sources and eighteenth-century documents relating to 
indigenous labor and taxation in Coro to recreate the lives of Coro’s indigenous peoples 
before and after the conquest. The fourth chapter determines that, similar to the 
indigenous people of the Gold and Loango Coasts, those people indigenous to Coro 
practiced a communalist political and economic system, which although not free of 
hierarchy or exploitation, was based on collaborative subsistence practices and 
decentralized political authority. The chapter also demonstrates that—despite the 
brutality of colonialism—legally free people in Coro, including the indigenous peoples 
there, continued these practices as they lived and worked as peasants. It argues that a 
dramatic increase in taxation in the years leading to the 1795 rebellion made these 
customs untenable, violating the moral economy of Coro’s indigenous population, and 
leading some to seek relief through revolution, while others sought for it through loyalty.  
 A final note should be made about this dissertation’s reading of eighteenth-
century sources. This dissertation utilizes economic data collected from Dutch, English, 
and Spanish colonial sources. Given the prevalence of contraband during the eighteenth 
century, particularly in regards to the trades under investigation here, this dissertation 
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recognizes that these numbers cannot be taken at face value. Nevertheless, the data does 
reveal certain trends, particularly in regards to exports from Coro, which were not 
previously available. Therefore, even though the information may be flawed, it does 
reveal important insight into the functioning of Coro’s economy and its role in the 
Atlantic trades. A similar dilemma is present when studying eighteenth-century 
autobiographies written by formerly enslaved people and contemporary travel narratives 
written by Europeans. This dissertation reported only those statements that seemed most 
logical, and which could be cross-verified through other sources.  
 “The Political Economy of Anti-Slavery Resistance” examines the Coro rebellion 
alongside the Atlantic world that gave rise to it. It aims to bridge the gap between works 
on violent antislavery resistance movements and the history of capitalism by intervening 
in both of these fields. It argues that the Coro rebellion was a product of the precapitalist 
Atlantic economy of the period, which was based on a mode of production in Europe that 
combined peasant production and feudal land tenures. During this period, the legally free 
indigenous peoples of Coro and the Gold and Loango Coasts would continue to practice 
their political and economic customs, despite colonial exploitation and the enslavement 
of their friends and family members. Once their autochthonous lifestyles became 
untenable, however, these peoples took up arms in May of 1795. This is the story of how 
the yin of European imperialism, conquest, and slavery confronted the yang of 
communitarian societies in Africa and in the Americas. This is the history of capitalism.  
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Chapter One: ‘Precious Objects’ 
 
 Soon after Don Juan Estevan de Valderrama arrived in Coro to lead an 
investigation into the Coro rebellion, he uncovered details about a conspiracy, which 
rocked long established hierarchies, and revealed the operations of race and class through 
the prism of European cloth.81 Valderrama, the Lieutenant Governor of the Captaincy 
General of Venezuela, arrived on the night of October 3, 1795; sent from his post in 
Maracaibo to Coro by Venezuela’s Governor and Captain General, Don Pedro Carbonell. 
Carbonell called for Valderrama’s assistance about six weeks before, on August 17, 
because he considered that local authorities in Coro had “grave difficulties” in accurately 
informing him of what transpired during the rebellion.82 According to Carbonell, this 
poor record of communication had the dangerous potential of “confusing the innocent 
with the true criminals of this case, unless it is conducted by an outsider of that 
jurisdiction, of known integrity, expertise, maturity and advice.”83 Carbonell seems to 
have distrusted Coro’s authorities, particularly its Justice Major Don Maríano Valderraín, 
who would be substituted for Valderrama. Valderrama’s job, then, would be to determine 
who was involved in the rebellion, who was not, and who was being unfairly scapegoated 
by Coro’s biased officials.  
																																																								81	“Expediente	sobre	la	insurrección	de	los	negros,	zambos	y	mulatos	proyectada	en	el	año	1795	a	las	inmediaciones	de	la	ciudad	de	Coro,	Provincia	de	Caracas,”	1795,	Caracas,	426,	Archivo	General	de	Indias,	Seville,	ff.	193.		82	Ibid.,	116;	“graves	dificultades.”		83	Ibid;	“de	confundir	los	inocenttes	con	los	verdaderos	reos	de	esta	causa,	sino	se	pone	la	substtanciacion	de	ella	a	cargo	de	persona	forastera	de	aquella	jurisdicion	y	de	conocida	provedad,	ciencia,	madures	y	consejo.	
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 In order to discern who was truly guilty or innocent, Valderrama questioned 
witnesses and suspected rebels on the whereabouts of European textiles and luxurious 
clothes, which were stolen from local elites during the rebellion. As was the case 
throughout the Atlantic, European textiles held a great deal of material and symbolic 
value in eighteenth-century Coro. These textiles were imported to manufacture clothes, 
which served as markers of elite racial and class status. From the very start of the 
rebellion, clothes, clothing articles, and other valuables were stolen from plantations, and 
even off of the corpse of one of the rebels’ victims. Scores of witnesses and accused 
rebels were called to testify before Valderrama during the months that he was leading the 
investigation. Many of them were asked about the status of textiles, clothes, and other 
valuables that had been looted. Some deponents had been incarcerated since the earliest 
days of the rebellion. Others were called into court by local officials for questioning, and 
showed up voluntarily.  
 One person who arrived to court on her own volition was 45-year-old María de 
los Dolores Chirino. Chirino was married to José Leonardo Chirino, the alleged leader of 
the May rebellion. María de los Dolores Chirino was born enslaved—the legal property 
of the landowner, merchant, and Crown bureaucrat Joséph de Tellería. Although her 
husband was legally free, her three children were, like her, born enslaved because slavery 
was inherited by way of the mother in Venezuela, as it was throughout the Americas.84 
Evidence suggests that Chirino and her family were close to the Tellería family. They 																																																								84	Most	historical	analysis	on	the	role	of	women’s	bodies	in	reproducing	enslaved	labor	has	focused	on	Anglophone	America.	These	insights	are	easily	applicable	to	the	rest	of	the	continent,	however.	See:	Hilary	McD.	Beckles,	Natural	Rebels:	A	Social	History	of	Enslaved	Black	Women	in	Barbados	(New	Brunswick,	New	Jersey:	Rutgers	University	Press,	1989);	Angela	Y.	Davis,	Women	Race	&	Class	(New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1983);	Jennifer	L.	Morgan,	Laboring	Women:	Reproduction	and	Gender	in	New	
World	Slavery	(Philadelphia:	University	of	Pennsylvania	Press,	2004);	Jennifer	L.	Morgan,	"Partus	Sequitur	Ventrem:	Law,	Race,	and	Reproduction	in	Colonial	Slavery."	Small	Axe.	22.1	(2018):	1-17.		
45	
lived inside of the master’s quarters at El Socorro, one of the two plantation homes 
owned by Tellería in Coro’s sierra, and the plantation that birthed the May rebellion. 
 On October 23, 1795, Chirino testified that on the night of May 10, she was 
serving dinner to Don Joséph Nicolas Martínez, a houseguest of the Tellería family. She 
said that a child interrupted her work, by telling her that people were fighting outside. 
Chirino said that she asked the child if her husband was involved, and that the child 
responded that she did not know. As Chirino kept attending to Martínez, the child 
interrupted two more times. It was during the third interruption that Chirino decided to 
investigate for herself. Chirino stated that she found her husband outside drunk. She 
scolded him, “is it possible that you are this way when you must leave at dawn to receive 
my master Don Joséph Tellería.”85 Chirino returned to the kitchen and served Martínez 
his food, telling him that she did not dare, “bring him the coffee because with Leonardo 
being in the disposition that he is in, she distrusted to go out for it.”86 
 Chirino then stated to Valderrama and the court that she waited in a bedroom for 
some time when she suddenly saw her husband standing next to the door, accompanied 
by six men, and holding an unsheathed sword. Chirino said that she ran out of the house 
to hide, when a mortally wounded Martínez approached her, telling her to escape to 
Tellería’s other plantation, La Asunción. According to Chirino, Martínez stated that he 
																																																								85	“Expediente,”	ff.	303.;	“es	possible	estés	de	esa	manera	deviendo	salir	de	madrugada	a	recivir	a	mi	amo	Don	Joséph	Tellería.”		86	Ibid;	“a	traerle	el	café	por	que	estando	Leonardo	en	la	disposicion	que	se	hallava	se	recelava	salir	por	el.”		
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could not escape with her because “he was already injured, that he could not.”87 Chirino’s 
next recorded statement would seal her fate:  
the insurgents had just taken the life of Martínez, as the declarant witnessed, in the same 
place where he was left, and Leonardo divided up his clothes amongst themselves, but 
she does not know whether [they also divided up] the clothing articles or money that he 
had, because in regards to this, she does not know what was done with them.88 
 
 Chirino went home after this initial testimony, but she would be arrested two 
weeks later, as Valderrama accused her of lying before the court. Valderrama’s 
suspicions arose on November 7 when Don Juan Francisco Santaliz, a white landowner in 
Coro’s mostly indigenous village of Pedregal, gave his testimony. Santaliz stated that in 
the aftermath of the rebellion, he found Chirino and her three children, and pressured her 
to tell him where her husband was hiding. Santaliz added that he threatened to whip 
Chirino and her daughter if they did not reveal where he was. Santaliz did not say 
whether or not he beat Chirino or her children, but he revealed that he had confiscated a 
host of stolen goods from her, which included textiles and clothes.89   
 Two days later, Chirino was arrested and confronted with Santaliz’s testimony, 
and Valderrama accused her of being part of the rebellion. Valderrama believed that the 
truth behind the extent of her involvement lied in her suppression of key details. Why had 
Chirino neglected to mention that her husband had given her some of Martínez’s clothes 
after he was killed? Why did she also say that she had no idea if José Leonardo had 
																																																								87	Ibid;	“ya	estaba	herido	que	no	podia.”		88	Ibid;	“los	insurgentes	acabaron	de	quitar	la	vida	a	Martínez	como	lo	vió	la	que	declara	en	el	mismo	parage	en	donde	lo	dejó,	y	entre	ellos	repartió	sus	bestidos	Leonardo,	pero	no	save	si	tambien	las	prendas	o	dinero	que	tendria,	pues	de	esto	no	esta	entendida	que	se	hizo.		89	“Expedientes,	sublevacion	de	esclavos	en	la	sierra	de	Coro,	1795,”	1795,	Judiciales,	A16-C54-D11183,	Academia	Nacional	de	Historia,	Caracas,	ff.	1-3.	
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distributed linens or other articles of clothing, when she had some in her possession just 
days after the rebellion?90  
 Chirino was not the only person whose testimony about stolen textiles landed 
them in hot water. Juan de Jesus de Lugo, an indigenous man from the tribute-paying 
town of San Luís de Pecaya, had been jailed in the aftermath of the rebellion, implicated 
by José Leonardo Chirino and other rebels. The thirty-one year old Lugo had been 
incarcerated for five months before he testified before Valderrama. Like Chirino, Lugo 
denied being involved in the rebellion. In fact, the opposite was true. Coro’s rebels tried 
to kill him, Lugo claimed, because they accused him of fighting “in defense of the 
whites.”91  
 Lugo stated to Valderrama that he left home for work on the morning of May 11. 
While on his way, Lugo ran into Juan del Carmen Rivero, a man racially classified as 
pardo, who told him to go back home because “the blacks are revolting.“92 Lugo stated 
that soon after he returned home, he came across the rebels who beat him severely before 
he managed to escape by entering the home of an elderly landowner, Doña Concepción 
Suárez. Lugo added that the rebels wanted to kill Suárez and steal her belongings. In 
response, Lugo testified, he and Suárez grabbed a hammock, all the items of clothing and 
other goods that belonged to her, and hid them outside of Lugo’s home.93  
 Lugo attested that he then went to notify another elderly landowner who lived 
nearby, Doña Ana Vera, of what was happening. Lugo stated that he did this so that she 																																																								90	Ibid.,	ff.13-14.		91	Ibid.,	186.;	“en	defensa	de	los	blancos”		92	Ibid.,	184;	“los	negros	estan	sublevados.”		93	Ibid.	
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could escape and hide her clothes, textiles, and other valuables from the rebels. When 
Lugo arrived, however, the rebels had already “sacked the house.”94 Lugo testified that 
Vera gave him a large bag and asked him to go to her home in San Luís and to try to 
recover whatever goods he could find. When Lugo arrived to Vera’s home, however, 
Cristóbal Acósta, an infamous rebel who authorities considered to be José Leonardo 
Chirino’s “captain,” was already distributing Vera’s clothes and other goods to his rebel 
contingent. Lugo said that when he realized that these were Vera’s belongings, that he 
stuffed them into the bag that she had given him.95 Valderrama was suspicious of Lugo’s 
testimony, and he called a number of witnesses to testify as to whether or not Lugo was 
involved in the rebellion, and to find out what happened to the clothes and clothing 
articles he had had in his possession.  
 The interrogations of Chirino and Lugo reveal the significance that clothes and 
clothing articles had for Coro’s rebels. From the instance that the rebellion was launched 
on the night of May 10, Coro’s rebels, led by José Leonardo Chirino, stole Martínez’s 
clothes, textiles, and other valuables after they killed him. As María de los Dolores 
Chirino testified, her husband then distributed these goods to the six men who were with 
him. As would later be made clear, Chirino also gave some of Martínez’s valuables to his 
wife, María de los Dolores, to keep safe. Likewise, Lugo’s testimony reveals how rebels 
in San Luís, led by Chirino’s “captain” Acósta, stole clothes while sacking the homes of 
white elites. Like Chirino, Acósta, distributed these luxury items to the rebels he was 
with.  
																																																								94	Ibid.,;	“saqueado	la	casa.”		95	Ibid.,	187.	
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 Coro’s rebels recognized the social and material value of European textiles. They 
were also morally indignant at the racial and class differences of the world they lived in. 
They saw textiles as one of the ways in which these differences were manifested. For the 
rebels, Martínez was an embodiment of their oppressor. He was an elite white man who 
held the privileges of men of his caste; the ability to live comfortably, be attended to by 
servants, bark orders, and whip whichever enslaved person he wished. As poor people of 
African and native American descent, Coro’s rebels were trapped in a life in which they 
worked for men like Martínez, and suffered the humiliation and abuse of horrid working 
conditions and terrible inequities. When the rebels killed Martínez, they felt they were 
killing Coro’s entire racial and class structure. When the rebels stole his clothes, they 
continued in the unraveling of Coro’s society. Martínez’s clothes, his textiles, his luxury 
items were the bedrock of a plantation economy that sustained these inequities. By 
stealing these clothes, Coro’s rebels were upending society; making what was his, theirs. 
By distributing these goods amongst themselves, Chirino, Acósta, and Coro’s rebels were 
further chastising Coro’s socioeconomic structure. The act of redistribution was also the 
symbolic declaration of their own moral code, which was the opposite of that of their 
oppressors. This redistribution also served to catalogue this moral code, which would 
serve as the foundation of their new society. This new moral regime would do away with 
the inequities that defined Coro; each person would receive the fruits of his or her own 
labor.  
 Surviving records of the Coro rebellion also reveal an obsession with textiles and 
clothes on the part of Valderrama and other colonial authorities. For white elites, 
European textiles and luxurious clothes were a means to an end; status symbols that one 
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dedicated their lives to accumulate and to display. Likewise, opulent clothes made of 
European textiles were a marker of whiteness, a resource that was simultaneously 
prodigious and scarce in Coro.96 When Santeliz discovered European textiles, clothes, 
and other valuables in the possession of María de los Dolores Chirino, he confidently 
confiscated them, knowing that these magnificent items could not belong to a black slave. 
When Santeliz threatened to whip Chirino if she did not reveal where her husband was 
hiding, he was threatening to punish her for her record as a rebel. In Santeliz’s eyes, 
Chirino’s possession of European textiles and other valuables was a crime in of itself. It 
was an act of subversion that threatened to blur the line between the powerful and the 
powerless. When Valderrama had Chirino arrested for lying under oath, it was her 
temporary possession of clothes, and her hiding them from authorities, that threatened the 
hegemonic order just as much as her lying in court did.97  
 The importance of European textiles during the Coro rebellion points to the 
complex network of production and consumption, semiotics and political economy, 
which created the hierarchal social worlds of the eighteenth-century Atlantic. This 
chapter explores the material reality that interfaced with the language of European 
cloth.98 The clothes and textiles that Coro’s rebels stole and hid, and the ones that 
																																																								96	For	a	theoretical	discussion	of	whiteness	as	a	form	of	property,	see:	Cheryl	I.	Harris,	"Whiteness	As	Property."	Harvard	Law	Review.	106.8	(1993):	1707-1791.			97	For	hegemony,	see	Gramsci’s	definition	in	Quintin	Hoare	and	Geoffrey	Nowell	Smit,	ed.,	trans,	
Selections	from	the	Prison	Notebooks	of	Antonio	Gramsci	(New	York:	International	Publishers,	1971),	12.		98	This	position	is	inspired	by	many	works,	including	the	following:	Louis	Althusser,	For	Marx	(London	and	New	York:	Verso,	2005);	Stuart	Hall,	“The	Problem	of	Ideology—Marxism	without	Guarantees.”	Journal	of	Communication	Inquiry,	10:2	(1986):	28-44;	Stuart	Hall,	“Gramsci’s	Relevance	for	the	Study	of	Race	and	Ethnicity.”	Journal	of	Communication	Inquiry,	10:6	(1985),	5-27;	V.N.	Vološinov,	Marxism	and	the	Philosophy	of	Language	(Cambridge,	Ma.	and	London:	Harvard	University	Press,	1973).	
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authorities were obsessed to find, were one of the pillars of an Atlantic economy that 
connected European peasants to merchants, and these merchants to producers in Africa 
and the Americas. This chapter examines textiles in Coro through an investigation into 
their manufacture in two regions, which were principal providers of cloth there: Flanders 
and Brittany. This chapter will then examine woolen cloth production in Devon during 
the first half of the eighteenth century. Devon was the production center for most of the 
textiles that were used to purchase the ancestors of Coro’s rebels in West and West 
Central Africa. This chapter shows that textile production in eighteenth-century Europe 
was a slow, assorted process that involved thousands of workers, most of whom were 
peasants. The high costs incurred in this non-capitalist production process helped ensure 
that textile prices in Coro would be out of reach for most people, who were poor, and of 
African and native American descent. European textiles, infused with a multiplex of 
social relations, helped shape the nature of race, class, and revolution in eighteenth-
century Coro. 
  
Textiles and Clothing in Eighteenth Century Coro 
 
 One morning in 1774, María Francisca de la Peña and her daughters, all of whom 
were racially classified as mulatas, went to church in the city of Coro.99 They attended 
church in their most extravagant attire, wearing alfombras, elegant sheets made of silk 
and wool, which covered their heads, draped over their shoulders, and engulfed their 
																																																								99	Neruska	Rojas,	“Las	criollas	y	sus	trapos:	matices	de	la	moda	femenina	caraqueña	durante	la	segunda	mitad	del	siglo	XVIII,”	in	Se	ataca	pero	no	se	cumple:	historia	y	sociedad	en	la	Provincia	de	
Caracas	(siglo	XVIII),	edited	by	Neller	Ramón	Ochoa	Hernández	and	Jorge	Flores	González,	275.		
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torsos.100 But because they were caught wearing alfombras, de la Peña and her daughters 
were arrested and would soon face trial. According to the Leyes de las Indias, women of 
African descent were not allowed to wear expensive jewelry, blankets, or any other 
luxury items of clothing, unless they were married to a Spaniard.101  
 During the trial of de la Peña and her daughters, a local lawyer for the Crown 
expressed his concern about African people wearing European clothes. His principal 
concern was that it blurred hierarchies of race and class, but he also critiqued, what in his 
mind, was the deterioration of European style: 
The competing mulatas abrogate the grace of the alfombra during the day, and because it 
would look very bad with a wool skirt, a primitive garment in our laws for certain roles; 
out comes the haggler with the hieroglyph of a necklace, gold bracelets, pearls, or 
precious stones with the most decorated velvet overskirt, slippers made of fabric, etc.102 
 
Coro’s authorities wanted to make an example out of de la Peña and her daughters. 
Although the outcome of their trial is unknown at this time, the scandal did result in an 
attempt to harden the enforcement of the law that prohibits people of African descent 
from wearing luxurious clothes. Officers soon posted a notice in Coro’s central plaza, 
stating that the breaking of this law would result in a 25 peso fine for a first offence. A 
second offence would result in another 25 peso fine, plus six months of hospital service, 
and any other penalty deemed appropriate by local officials.103 
																																																								100	“Alfombra,”	in	Real	Academia	Española,	Diccionario	de	la	lengua	castellana,	1791.		101	Cited	in	Rojas,	250;	Leyes	de	Indias,	Tomo	VII,	Título	Quinto.	De	los	Mulatos,	Negros,	Berberiscos,	é	hijos	de	Indios,	“Ley	xxviii.	Que	las	Negras,	y	Mulatas	borras	no	traigan	oro,	seda,	mantos,	ni	perlas.”		102	Ibid.,	276.	Las	mulatas	a	competencia	se	abrogan	en	el	dia	la	gracia	de	la	alfombra,	y	como	pareceria	muy	mal	con	una	saya	de	lana	un	traje	privativo	en	nuestras	leyes	a	determinados	papeles;	sale	la	regatona	con	el	gerolifico	de	punta,	collar,	manillas	de	oro,	perlas,	o	piedras	preciosas	con	los	mas	atavios	de	basquina	de	terclopelo,	chapines	de	tela,	etc.”			103	Ibid.		
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 Luxurious clothes were a marker of whiteness and elite status in eighteenth-
century Coro. The production of cacao grew rapidly throughout the eighteenth century. 
As cacao production expanded, trade increased, along with the purchasing power of 
elites, who squandered much of their wealth on ostentation.104 This ostentation was 
buttressed by the Spanish Crown’s transition from the Hapsburg dynasty to that of the 
Bourbons at the turn of the century. At this time, the flamboyant style of French elites 
became a fad in the Spanish Atlantic, replacing the more spartan clothing of the previous 
centuries.105 Consumption of French and other European textiles in Venezuela grew 
further after the establishment of the Real Compañia Guipozcoana (RCG) in 1730, which 
was able to provide a steady influx of European products during the fifty-five years in 
which it operated.106  
 As was also the case throughout the Spanish colonies in America, European 
travellers were impressed with the clothing of Venezuelan elites. Some years after the 
1795 rebellion, Frenchman F. Depons noted, “Laces also form a part of the Spanish 
dress; those of Flanders obtain the preference.”107 Depons later added, “there are few 
whites who are not dressed in ash coloured or blue casimere.”108 Another French visitor, 
Louis Alexandre Berthier noted in 1783, “’first class men’ were ‘dressed as in Spain.’”109 
Berthier gushes over the beauty and “sumptuousness” of elite Venezuelan women whose 																																																								104	Carlos	F.	Duarte,	Historia	del	traje	durante	la	época	colonial	venezolana	(Caracas:	Armitano,	1984),	58.		105	Ibid.,	57.		106	Ibid.			107	Ibid.,	332.		108	Ibid.,	333.		109	Ibid.,	124;	”los	hombres	de	primera	clase’	estaban	‘vestidos	como	en	España.’”	
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wealth and sense of fashion allow them to wear as many as three outfits in one day: one 
in which they go to church, one they wear while at home, and another with which they go 
dancing.110 
 The clothes worn by people of African and native American descent were more 
modest. Berthier mentioned that there were three classes of people below “pure-blooded” 
Spaniards in Caracas: the second class was mestizos, the third was indigenous and the 
fourth was of African descent. Mestizos, Berthier noted, dressed similarly to Europeans, 
although their outfits were made of less expensive textiles. Indigenous people tried to 
imitate mestizos the best they could, according to Berthier, but they were not allowed to 
wear black shawls to church, they could only wear white veils. The fourth class, people 
of African descent, only wore a shirt, a skirt, and a handkerchief on top of their heads. 
The wealthier black people would wear large gold earrings.111 According to Duarte, 
enslaved people wore few items, usually made of cotton or animal skins.112 
 This is not to say, however, that people of African and native American descent 
did not ignore law and custom and wear flamboyant European clothes. For eighteenth-
century Mexico, Peru, and Saint-Domingue scholars such as Rebecca Earle, Tamara 
Walker, and Joan Dayan have shown that European visitors were appalled to see people 
of African and native American descent wearing the same clothes worn by elites of 
European descent.113 Historians have also shown that European dress could be used as a 																																																								110	Ibid.,	134.		111	Ibid.,	135-6.		112	Ibid.,	201.		113	Rebecca	Earle,	“Luxury,	Clothing	and	Race	in	Colonial	Spanish	America,”	in	Luxury	in	the	
Eighteenth	Century:	Debates,	Desires	and	Delectable	Goods,	edited	by	Maxine	Berg	and	Elizabeth	Eger	(New	York:	Palgrave,	2003);	Tamara	J.	Walker,	Exquisite	Slaves:	Race,	Clothing,	and	Status	in	Colonial	
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means of social mobility for nonwhite people. It is most likely that Venezuelan 
authorities could not completely control the use of luxurious clothing by people of 
African and indigenous descent, particularly those who made up the vast majority of the 
middling classes of colonial society. As seen with the episode with de la Peña and her 
daughters, however, white elites could—and did—enforce this law when they found it in 
their interest to do so.  
 Textiles were imported into Venezuela from Europe, but clothes were 
manufactured locally. Clothes were made in tailor’s shops, which were owned by master 
tailors; usually men of African descent who employed enslaved apprentices. In the largest 
tailor shops, there would be a master tailor, five other tailors and two enslaved 
apprentices.114 To become a tailor, one had to register with the local tailor’s guild, pay a 
registration fee, and pass examinations.115 Elites would meet with their tailor after they 
had purchased their textiles at the market or in a local store. They would then tell the 
tailor what kind of clothes they wanted made. The tailor would offer his expert advice, 
but it was ultimately the client that made final decisions as to how their clothes would be 
designed.116  
 Prices at tailor’s shops were high. In 1770 Caracas, for example, some of the 
products stolen by Coro’s rebels were produced for about 1 peso and 2 reales a piece.117 
This equaled about 10 days of fieldwork for most laborers, which ensured that hiring a 																																																																																																																																																																					
Lima	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2017);	Joan	Dayan,	Haiti,	History,	and	the	Gods	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1995),	170-82.		114	Duarte,	228.		115	Ibid.,	233.		116	Ibid.,	227.		117	Ibid.,	228-9.	
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tailor was out of reach for most people of African and native American descent.118 Most 
of these workers probably made their own clothes from imported textiles, or from textiles 
that were produced by local artisans.119  
 Clothing in eighteenth-century Coro reflected the intertwined hierarchies of race 
and class in colonial society. Clothing contributed to defining elite status because local 
landowners and merchants accumulated capital in order to spend it on luxury items, such 
as clothing. This clothing served as an announcement of European elites’ race and class. 
The middling classes in Coro—most of whom were of African and/or native American 
descent—could use their limited acquisitive powers to emulate European landowners and 
merchants. Clothes, therefore, had the power to help these populations ascend the racial 
hierarchy, from indio to mestizo or mulato to pardo. Those with dark skin, however, had 
little hope of accomplishing this. A further obstacle to racial ascension through wearing 
attire was that middling classes ran the risk of serious consequences for violating clothing 
laws, as was seen with de la Peña and her daughters.  
 Much of the money elites allocated to clothes, however, was spent before they 
arrived at the tailor’s shop. The reason why lies in the manufacture of textiles in Europe. 
 
Flanders 
 
 In November of 1787, two local officers discovered 22 bales of contraband goods 
in Cumarebo, a Caquetio town northwest of the city of Coro. The officers found the bales 
																																																								118	For	wages	in	eighteenth-century	Venezuela,	see:	Otilia	Rosas	González,	El	tributo	indígena	en	la	
Provincia	de	Venezuela	(Caracas:	Historiadores	SC,	1998),	21		119	Rojas,	235.		
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on a nearby beach, stashed in a crevice that lay between two massive rocks. 120 The 
discovery was not an uncommon one. Contraband trade in European commodities was a 
ubiquitous feature of life in Coro at the time. Most contraband came via Curaçao and was 
exchanged for Coro’s cash crops and livestock.  
 The haul from Cumarebo was valued at over 1,050 pesos. Besides four small 
barrels of gunpowder, and two pounds of incense, the 22 bales of contraband were 
exclusively made up of European textiles. About 452 pesos worth of these textiles—over 
43% of the shipment’s overall value—were manufactured in Flanders.121 Before being 
sold in Coro, some of these cloths may have first been stored in the Dutch West India 
Company’s (WIC) warehouse in Curaçao. Records from the last quarter of the eighteenth 
century usually show just two types of textiles housed there: linen from Flanders, and 
Osnaburgs, which were made in Scotland and mostly used to clothe enslaved people. 
During this period, the presence of Flemish linen in the WIC warehouse reached a high of 
977.5 yards in 1773. Although the yearly balance of Flemish linen in the WIC warehouse 
vacillated during this period, it never fell below 250 yards of fabric.122  
 Flemish linen also entered Coro through legal means, by way of the RCG. 
Although exact numbers of Flemish textile imports into Venezuela are not possible at this 
time, it is clear that Flemish manufacturers accounted for a large share of RCG imports. 
In 1779, for example, five RCG ships exported textiles to the Province of Venezuela, and 
all of them carried cloth manufactured in Flanders. All together these ships exported 																																																								120	“1787:	Autos	formados	con	motivo	del	apresamiento	de	varios	efectos	de	contraband,	ejecutado	por	el	Guarda	Tomás	Manuel	Barbera	en	los	montes	de	Pichibrea,	costa	del	mar	arriba,”	Comisos	XXXV,	Archivo	General	de	la	Nación,	Caracas,	ff.	308-332.		121	Ibid.		122	“Ingekomen	bijlagen	van	Curaçao,	met	tafels,”	WIC	609-16,	Nationaal	Archief,	The	Hague.	
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2,803 pieces of presilla, linen used to make shirts, trousers, and veils, for a value of 
23,618 pesos. They also exported a total of 627 pieces of bramantes, a textile made of 
cotton but thread with flax, for a value of 6,747 pesos. In addition, the RCG exported 104 
pieces of Flemish textiles with line patterns for a value of over 2,991 pesos. The RCG 
exported an additional 50 linen pieces from Flanders that year, but their value was not 
given.123   
 Although Flemish linen was a recognized commodity in eighteenth-century Coro, 
most inhabitants probably knew little about Flanders itself. Today, Flanders spreads 
across the countries of The Netherlands, France, and Belgium. During most of the 
eighteenth century, however, Flanders was politically divided between France and 
Austria. Maritime Flanders, to the north of the region, extended from Dunkirk to Zeeland. 
The interior of Flanders, where the vast majority of the population lived, ran south of the 
Maritime region, extending west of Lille, and southeast of Alost. The region’s land is 
characterized by its low altitude, flat terrain, and natural waterways.124    
 Manufacture in French Flanders was geared towards the French market, while 
production in Austrian Flanders was almost exclusively made for consumers in Spain’s 
American colonies.125 Flanders had been famous for its textile production since the 
ancient Roman period. During this time, wool was exported to the rest of the Roman 
Empire. This trade continued, and by the twelfth century Flanders had become the most 																																																								123	Franklin	Mendels	signals	the	Spanish	names	given	to	certain	forms	of	Flemish	textiles.	See:	Franklin	F.	Mendels,	Industrialization	and	Population	Pressure	in	Eighteenth-Century	Flanders	(New	York:	Arno	Press,	1981),	72.	Also	see	Duarte.	Data	is	from:	“Expedientes	de	la	Compañía	Guipuzcoana	de	Caracas,”	Caracas,	934B,	AGI,	ff.	628-30;	“Expedientes	de	la	Compañía	Guipuzcoana	de	Caracas,”	Caracas	935C,	AGI,	ff.	30-34,	61-89.			124	Mendels,	51-55.		125	Ibid.,	182.		
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industrialized part of Western Europe. Land-holding structure and labor patterns 
remained similar from the medieval period through the mid nineteenth century. In the 
maritime zone, large farms produced food for the region and for export. Workers in this 
region were paid a wage, although they were not required to purchase commodities for 
their subsistence. Farmers would sometimes pay for the lodging and board of these 
workers, and they may have been provided food as well. The vast majority of Flanders’s 
population, though, lived in the sandy interior, where large-scale farming was at a 
disadvantage, and where small-scale peasant economies developed early.126  
 Peasants dominated linen production in eighteenth-century Flanders. Although 
big cities such as Ghent and Bruges had been the epicenter of production previously, as 
demand spread for Flemish linen, production expanded in the countryside, while 
production in the cities deteriorated. Although Flanders’s peasants did grow much of 
their own food, they could not completely sustain themselves from their land because of 
its poor quality. This led many to industrial production during the medieval period. 
Flemish peasants purchased a part of their diet with the cash that they earned from 
manufacturing textiles.127 The vast majority of Flemish peasants owned their own looms 
and wheels. In one region of Flanders, peasants rented only 2.7% of looms in the years 
1700-19, and this number fell to .4% in 1780-96.128 A turning point for Flemish 
manufactures came during the last half of the seventeenth century when taxes and rents 
were increased dramatically, and the local population became more dedicated to textile 
																																																								126	Ibid.,	64-82.		127	Ibid,	182.		128	Ibid.,	181.	
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production as a result.129 This increase in taxes coincided with the growth of Spanish 
American markets. 
 Therefore, most linen producers in Flanders provided much of their own 
subsistence, and they owned the tools with which they worked. This system of production 
limited the growth potential of the industry. Exports of linen grew from about 120,000 
pieces in 1700 to about 175,000 in 1775. This expansion came, not through innovation in 
the system of production, but through the spread of manufacturing to new towns, and 
through demographic growth.130   
  Linen production in Flanders was a complex system that involved many workers 
in towns and cities throughout the region. Most flax was produced commercially in large 
fields in the northeast of Flanders, although some peasants grew their own flax on their 
plots of land.131 After the flax was planted, it was pulled after maturing at 100 days. After 
being pulled, the flax was left in bundles in a field to dry. The flax was then usually taken 
to the weekly town markets that served as an intermediary between producers and 
merchants. Linen producers would purchase the flax at the market and take it home to be 
processed by the male head of the household, who employed his wife and children. The 
first step in production was to deseed the flax by beating it. The producer would then ret 
the flax to rid it of the components that do not contain fiber. The manufacturer would 
																																																								129	Christiaan	Vandenbroeke,	“Proto-industry	in	Flanders:	A	Critical	Review,”	in	European	Proto-
Industrialization,	edited	by	Sheilagh	C.	Ogilvie	and	Markus	Cerman	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1996),	111.		130	Christiaan	Vandenbroeke,	“Le	cas	flamand:	évolution	sociale	et	comportements	démographiques	aux	XVIIe-XIXe	siècles.”	Annales	39:5	(1984):	928.		131	Mendels,	191-2.	
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then press the flax to remove the stalk’s bast. The flax would then be dried and dressed. 
The last preparatory action was combing the flax to separate its fibers.132 
 Most spinning and weaving of the flax’s fibers was conducted by families in their 
homes. The mother and her children span the flax into yarn, although yarn was 
sometimes purchased at local markets. The male head of the household would do the 
weaving. Spinning and weaving was done part time, as a supplement to subsistence 
farming. This production was usually done during winters and in evenings, depending on 
the needs of the family. The finished product would usually be taken to the weekly 
market for sale to a local merchant. Sometimes, however, rural producers would sell their 
product to a middleman referred to as a “kutser” who would purchase the linen at a 
discount, saving the local producer from a trip to the urban market.133   
 Merchant-manufacturers were responsible for dying the linen produced by 
peasants and small farmers, and for selling them abroad. Most often, merchants would 
purchase linen directly from the rural producers at the weekly market. These merchants 
would then bleach the linens, probably from their own homes in the large cities.134 
Merchants would then start a complex shipping system in which they may not see any 
returns for years. Merchants would send their goods aboard a ship to a port in Spain 
(usually Cádiz) under the care of a Spanish recipient. This Spanish recipient would then 
send the Flemish merchant’s goods to the Americas, where it would be sold for cash or—
more likely—traded for agricultural goods. These goods would then return to Spain, be 
																																																								132	Ibid.,215-17.		133	Ibid.,,	181-204.		134	Ibid.,	180.	
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re-shipped to Flanders, and sold to other European merchants. Because of the long wait 
times required to see returns, only the extremely wealthy could become merchants. 135 
 Flemish textile manufacturers enjoyed high living standards during much of the 
eighteenth century. According to historian Christian Vandenbroeke, a weaver had to 
work a high of about 270 days a year to support his family in 1710, but the number of 
days of work required decreased greatly over the course of the century. Just five years 
later, this number decreased dramatically to about 140 days of work a year. This number 
reached 120 days a year in 1740, and reached an all time low of 110 days a year in 1775-
80.136 Health conditions increased as a result of this prosperity and the region’s 
population ballooned.137 Population in the manufacturing zones of the south and east of 
Flanders increased by as much as 160% during the eighteenth century. These regions as a 
whole grew at just over 94% during this period.138  
 Industrial production in Flanders was not a capitalist enterprise, and this 
contributed to the high costs they sold for in Coro. The vast majority of manufacturers 
owned much, if not all, of the means of production, and they provided much of their own 
subsistence through farming. They were not, therefore, wholly dependent on a capitalist 
employer in order to survive. The growth of cloth production in eighteenth-century 
Flanders came as a result of the expansion of textile production to new villages, rather 																																																								135	Hilda	Coppejans-Desmedt,	Bijdrage	tot	de	studie	van	de	gegoede	burgerij	te	Gent	in	de	XVIIIe	eeuw:	
de	vorming	van	een	nieuwe	social-economische	stand	ten	tijde	(Brussels:	Paleis	der	Academiën,	1952),	27-8.		136	Vandenbroeke,	“Proto-industry,”	113.		137	Herman	Van	der	Wee	and	Peter	D’Haeseleer,	“Proto-Industrialization	in	South-Eastern	Flanders:	The	Mendels	Hypothesis	and	the	Rural	Linen	Industry	in	the	‘Land	van	Aalst’	During	the	18th	and	19th	Centuries,”	in	Proto-industrialization:	Recent	Research	and	New	Perspectives	in	Memory	of	Franklin	
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than through any technological improvement. Because Flemish manufacturers were not 
wholly dependent on manufacturing for survival, production was limited to small-scale, 
part-time producers. This limited the number of items that could be manufactured, which 
in turn, kept the prices of Flemish clothing out of reach for Coro’s poor majority.  
  
Brittany 
 
 Six months after the Coro rebellion, sixty-year-old José Manuel de la Cruz 
Castillo was called to testify about the cache of stolen clothes, jewelry and textiles that he 
discovered in the sierra. In the aftermath of the rebellion, de la Cruz Castillo led a 
contingent of militia members and volunteers to arrest suspected rebels and to recover 
stolen goods. Among the dozens of items recovered by de la Cruz Castillo and his team 
were “two sheets, from Brittany, already worn-out.”139De la Cruz Castillo testified that he 
had handed the items, including the worn-out Brittany sheets, to his superiors, but that he 
did not know where they currently were.  
 De la Cruz Castillo’s mention of Brittany sheets is the only time a cloth’s place of 
origin is included in testimonies related to the Coro rebellion. This is fitting because 
bretañas may have been even more celebrated in eighteenth-century Coro than textiles 
from Flanders were. Brittany cloth was famous in Venezuela for its rippled look and feel, 
which was unique, and came to be seen as a sign of opulence and panache.  
 Although the bretaña design was distinctive, their dissemination was wide. There 
are only four cases of contraband available in surviving documents from eighteenth-
century Coro that include the place of origin for textiles. Of these four cases, three 																																																								139	“Expedientes,”	ff.	131;	“dos	Sabanas,	de	Bretaña,	ya	usadas.”	
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include a shipment of Brittany cloth. Six pieces of Brittany cloth valued at 2 pesos apiece 
were among the goods confiscated in Tucacas in 1715.140 More than 70 years later, in 
1787, 6 ¾ yards of bretaña worth 1 peso and 7 reales were confiscated in El Trapichito, 
and that same year, 13 pieces of Brittany cloth, worth 26 pesos was confiscated in 
Pichibrea.141 The number of bretañas found in the records of confiscated contraband in 
Coro pale in comparison to those imported by the RCG, however. In the sample year of 
1779, two RCG ships carried Brittany cloth to the Province of Venezuela, totaling 4,809 
pieces for a value of over 22,000 pesos.142  
 The region of Brittany, and its population, was as idiosyncratic as the cloth they 
produced. Located across the English Channel in northwestern France, the people of 
Brittany descended from the Britons who settled what would later be known as Britain. 
Partly because of this, Brittany’s inhabitants were considered culturally distinct to the rest 
of France. In addition, most Britons practiced Protestantism in what was officially a 
Catholic country.143  
 Brittany also set itself apart through its world-renowned textile industry. The 
earliest records of the industry are from 1430, and from the start, linen production in 
Brittany was geared almost exclusively to Spanish markets.144 These markets would soon 																																																								140	“1715:	Autos	sobre	el	comiso	hecho	en	las	playas	de	las	Tucacas	por	el	Sargento	Mayor	Don	Luís	Francisco	de	Castro,”	Comisos	II,	AGN.		141	“1787:	Autos	sobre	la	aprehensión	que	hizo	Don	Juan	Antonio	Barbera,	Cabo	de	Resguardo,”	Comisos	XXXV,	AGN;	“Autos	formados.”		142	Expedientes	de	la	Compañía	Guipuzcoana	de	Caracas.”		143	Nancy	Locklin,	Women’s	Work	and	Identity	in	Eighteenth-Century	Brittany	(Burlington,	VT:	Ashgate	Pub.,	2007),	9.		144	Jean	Martin,	Toiles	de	Bretagne:	la	manufacture	de	Quintin,	Uzel	et	Loudéac,	1670-1850	(Rennes:	Presses	Universitaires	de	Rennes,	1998),	chap	1,	para.	12-17,	https://books.openedition.org/pur/21844.	
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include the Americas, and with the conquest and settlement of the region, Brittany’s 
industry grew. As was the case in Flanders, textile production was adopted largely 
because of the lack of agricultural options available to rural producers. The land in much 
of the region did not allow for people to subsist solely on cultivation.145  
 Flax production usually started with the import of seeds from Eastern Europe and 
New Zealand. Peasants there would produce flax seeds and sell them to merchants at 
their local markets. These local merchants would then either resell the seeds to foreign 
merchants or ship them themselves. The trade in flaxseed was massive. In 1750, for 
example, 12,000 barrels of seeds were imported into Brittany’s port of Roscoff.146 The 
trade was also a lucrative one for merchants, as the price per barrel of seed was about 35 
livres at Roscoff, twice as much as it cost in the Baltic.147 
 Unlike in Flanders, where paid workers produced flax on large farms, peasants 
grew and pulled the flax in Brittany. It took a barrel of seed to plant half a hectare. Flax 
was planted in May and harvested in July, when the stem had reached two to five inches 
high. Peasants tore the flax out manually in order to make it longer. The flax was then 
placed in a vat and retted at the base of a fountain on the peasant’s property or on the 
course of a natural, nearby stream of water. The retting process took between one and 
two weeks. The flax was then taken out of the water and put to dry outside during the day 
for eight to ten days, and sheltered in a barn at night. Finally, the peasants would take the 
flax to the local market at Tregor. More often, however, small merchants known as les 
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linotiers would collect the flax from its cultivators in the countryside and take them to 
local markets for a commission.148  
 Les linotiers transported the flax from Tregor to markets throughout the region. 
Each horse could carry 60 kilos worth of flax, which became 10-15 kilos of yarn. These 
small merchants then sold the flax to larger merchants at local markets. The linotiers 
could also serve spinners and weavers with flax directly. It was common for them to tour 
the countryside to deliver flax, particularly to widowed and other single women, who 
were less likely to travel to urban markets.149  
 As in Flanders, spinning and weaving was done within the households of 
peasants. Official data on eighteenth-century weavers is currently unavailable, but 
records from the first quarter of the nineteenth century shine light on the eighteenth 
century’s labor market. In 1825, there were 5,441 weavers in the three largest linen 
markets. 3,289 of these workers, or just over 60%, were classified as farmer/weavers, 
meaning that they were part time workers who also had access to land. Fewer than 40% 
of weavers were classified as full time workers; these are probably those that lived in the 
urban areas.150 Although indicative of general patterns, these figures likely underestimate 
the percentage of peasant/weavers in the eighteenth century. The peak of Brittany’s linen 
industry was in the mid 1770s, and production dropped greatly after 1779.151 Because the 
linen industry’s expansion was primarily in the countryside, most of those who stopped 
production after 1779 probably lived in rural areas. Also, the 1825 figures do not include 																																																								148	Ibid.,	para.	3-20.		149	Ibid.,	para.	21-30.		150	Ibid,	chap	5.		151	Jean	Martin,	“Les	toiles	bretagnes	dans	le	commerce	franco-espagnol	de	1550	à	1830,”	Annales	de	
Bretagne	et	des	Pays	de	l’Ouest,	119:1	(2012),	31-60.		
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other linen producing regions, which were primarily rural. Nevertheless, the fact that over 
60% of weavers in three large linen producing areas were classified as landowners in 
1825 indicates that peasants made up the majority of spinners and weavers.  
 The man’s wife and their children span the flax in order to create the thread, 
which was woven by the male head of the household. Spinning consisted of several 
related operations. First, the flax was cleaned in order to rid it of impurities. Next, the 
spinner used a braie (a tool that resembled a bench, and which was created by the 
workers themselves) to separate the tow from the woody part of the plant. The spinner 
would then grind the flax using a tool called le péseau, which was made up of two boards 
that formed at a right angle. Finally, the spinner would comb the flax by using a 
bressage, which would prepare the flax for spinning. After all these preparations, the 
women and children of the home would use a spinning wheel, which they owned, to spin 
the flax string into yarn.152  
 As was the case in Flanders, weavers in Brittany owned their own looms, whether 
they were part time or full time workers. The loom was often kept in a separate room or 
in a barn. To become a weaver, one had to join the local guild and serve as an apprentice, 
which lasted between 18 months to three years. Apprentices lived with their master. In 
some places, such as Allineuc, employers paid for the apprentices’ room and board. In 
more urbanized areas, such as Quentin, however, families had to pay the employer for the 
time spent in his home. After the flax yarn was spun, weavers would weave their product 
and sell it at their local weekly market. Sometimes, however, weavers would have 
contracts with local merchants. In 1759, for example, François Rabet agreed to produce 
linens for the merchant François Lalleton for four years. Rabet agreed that his wife would 																																																								152	Martin,	Toiles,	chap	5:	31-43	
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spin the flax into yarn, and that he would weave the yarn into cloth for 4 sous per yard of 
cloth produced. Peasant-weavers appear to have been better off than their full-time, 
urbanized counterparts. According to historian Jean Martin, peasant-weavers were worth 
an average of 1000 livres at the time of their death, while their urban counterparts were 
worth about 300 livres.153 
 After bretañas were weaved, specialists bleached them. Some merchants took 
care of the bleaching process themselves, but most often, small farmers and their families 
bleached the cloths on their land. Typical bleachers rented a house and a barn with a 
straw cover. Besides land to grow crops, these properties also contained one hectare of 
uncultivated land on which the cloths were dried. Bleachers would first put the linens to 
soak in large wooden vats for three to four weeks. Here, the flax would soften in a mix of 
rye, buckwheat flour, and water. The linens were then beaten and placed on a drying 
rack. This process was repeated for two to three days. The cloths were then leached by 
being placed in vats. A bag filled with wood ash was placed on top of the pile, and 
boiling water was then poured over the bag of ash. This process was repeated for all 
pieces of cloth between 8 and 12 times. After being washed, the linens were starched. 
The bleaching process required many workers, so people would live on these properties 
with their families and extended families, which equaled between eight and 12 people.154  
 After being bleached, the textiles were returned to the merchants for storage and 
further preparation. First, workers hired by the merchant removed the folds from the 
textiles. Then, the workers pounded the cloths with wooden mallets. This gave the linen 
the rippled look, which made it so popular in Venezuela and across the Atlantic. The 																																																								153	Martin,	Toiles,	chap	6.		154	Ibid.,	chap	7.	
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cloths were then folded in the shape of an accordion. The goods were then subject to a 
softer pounding called a pilotage. A specialist then intervened to turn the folded pieces 
into a piece of 12 layers. The cloth was then ironed around the edges of the layers in 
order to make the edges sharper. Finally, the layers were pressed to preserve their form.  
 The bretañas were then packaged; first wrapped in gray paper and then covered 
with a protective cloth. The merchant then labeled the package with his name, the name 
of the launderer, the number and quality of the linens, and the total length enveloped. 
Each package weighed between 78 and 100 pounds. This final mode of preparation took 
a worker about 12 days to complete. Workers were paid twelve sous a day in the mid 
eighteenth century, but it is unclear at this time if these workers were peasants or full-
time workers.155  
 Merchants were key in the production process in Brittany, and their numbers 
increased over time, as did their wealth. At Brittany’s central textile market, Quentin, the 
number of merchants grew considerably, from 45 merchants in 1687 to 67 merchants in 
1736 and 118 in 1781-91.156 Houses built by merchants grew from 66 in the seventeenth 
century to 133 in the eighteenth century.157  
 There were four principal ports in Brittany, but nearly 80% of the textiles 
produced between 1748 and 1788 were exported out of Saint-Melo. The merchants hired 
carriers to take the material to the ports. Once the goods arrived at the port, local 
authorities inspected them, although it was impossible for authorities to inspect all the 
																																																								155	Ibid.			156	Ibid.,	chap	8.		157	Ibid.,	chap	10.	
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textiles that arrived.158 As the vast majority of textiles were exported to Cádiz, to be later 
shipped to the Americas, French merchants from Brittany settled in Andalucía during the 
eighteenth century. One hundred French merchants were registered as living in Andalucía 
in 1771, and it has been estimated that about one-fourth of them were from Brittany. 
These French merchants owned warehouses in Andalucía where bretañas and other 
products were stored.159  
 As in the case of Flanders, textile production in Brittany was done by independent 
craftspeople, most of who were peasants who produced textiles part time. The vast 
majority of workers owned their own tools, which were needed for the production of 
yarn, the weaving of cloth, and its bleaching. The only segment of the workforce that 
may have been proletarianized (wholly dependent on the capitalist class for survival) 
would be the workers hired by the merchants in the final stages of the production process. 
It is unclear at this time, however, whether this was a part-time or full-time job, and if 
they had some access to land and crops. Even if these workers were fully proletarianized, 
which seems unlikely, they were a small minority of the overall textile workforce. As was 
the case with Flanders, textile production in Brittany could only increase through 
demographic growth or the geographical expansion of industrial production. This mode 
of production resulted in high production costs, which contributed to the high real and 
symbolic value of bretañas in eighteenth-century Coro.  
 
Devon 
 																																																								158	Ibid.			159	Ibid.,	chap	2.		
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 Although many of Coro’s rebels were conscious of the connection between 
European textiles and their labor, perhaps less were thinking of the fact that their very 
existence was largely due to the manufacture of these products. Most of Coro’s rebels 
were born in Coro, but their parents and/or grandparents were born in West and West 
Central Africa.160 The rebels’ forebears had been enslaved in Africa and exchanged for 
European commodities, most of which were textiles. Some of the rebels’ ancestors had 
been purchased by England’s South Sea Company (SSC), which held a monopoly on the 
Spanish slave trade for much of the eighteenth century, and which held a factory at 
Caracas. The SSC imported 5,240 enslaved Africans into Caracas between 1715-1739.161 
Many of these enslaved people were taken to work, live, and die in Coro.  
 The SSC purchased their textiles from British merchants, and most of these 
products were produced in Southwestern England, in the region of Devon.162 The prolific 
writer and businessman, Daniel Defoe, toured Devon in 1724, at the height of woolen 																																																								160	Although	it	is	difficult	to	determine	exactly	where	in	Africa	the	populations	of	Coro	descended	from,	based	on	historical	trends	it	is	probable	that	most	came	from	the	outskirts	of	the	Gold	and	Loango	Coasts	of	West	and	West	Central	Africa.	The	largest	share	of	people	purchased	by	the	SSC	in	1715-39	came	from	the	Gold	Coast,	who	provided	39%	of	enslaved	people	during	the	time.	After	1739,	the	English	continued	to	supply	Venezuela	with	enslaved	people—albeit	illegally.	The	Gold	Coast	had	lost	its	ground	as	holding	the	largest	share	of	British	shipments,	but	it	still	accounted	for	24%	of	enslaved	people	acquired	by	British	companies.	It	is	most	likely,	however,	that	the	Dutch	provided	most	enslaved	people	to	eighteenth-century	Coro.	After	the	English	asiento,	33%	percent	of	enslaved	people	purchased	by	the	Dutch	were	from	the	Gold	Coast,	while	37%	were	from	the	Loango	Coast.	The	French,	who	also	illegally	provided	enslaved	people	to	Coro,	received	many	enslaved	people	from	the	Loango	Coast	as	well—approximately	30%	of	all	of	their	enslaved	victims.	The	preceding	data	comes	from	Alex	Borucki,	“Trans-imperial	History	in	the	Making	of	the	Slave	Trade	to	Venezuela,	1526-1811.”	Itinerario	36:2	(2012):	29-54.		161	Colin	Palmer,	Human	Cargoes:	The	British	Slave	Trade	to	Spanish	America,	1700-1739	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	1981),	107.		162	Although	official	figures	are	lacking,	it	is	clear	that	Devon	was	the	largest	cloth	producer	for—at	least—	the	first	quarter	of	the	eighteenth-century.	Cloth	produced	in	the	Southwest	of	England	accounted	for	16%	of	everything	exported	out	of	Britain	in	1710.	See:	“How	the	Regions	became	Peripheral:	A	Complex	Long-Term	Historical	Process,”	by	Michael	Havinden,	Andre	Lespagnol,	Jean-Pierre	Marchand	and	Stephen	Mennell	in	Centre	and	Periphery:	Brittany	and	Cornwall	&	Devon	
Compared,	eds.	M.A.	Havinden,	J.	Quéniart,	and	J.	Stanyer	(Exeter:	University	of	Exeter	Press,	1991),	14.		
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cloth production and its trade. The author of Robinson Crusoe gushed about the state of 
the region:  
Devonshire, one entire county, is so full of great towns, and those towns so full of people, 
and those people so universally employed in trade and manufactures, that not only it 
cannot be equaled in England, but perhaps not in Europe.163  
Indeed, Devon was the third most populous area in England at the time, and it was 
regarded as England’s premier manufacturing region. Devon’s principal port, Exeter, was 
synonymous with the country’s growing international trade in woolen cloth.164 Writing of 
Exeter, Defoe recommended that all travelers visit its market, “The serge market held 
here every week is very well worth a stranger’s seeing, and next to the Brigg market at 
Leeds, in Yorkshire, is the greatest in England.”165 
 One regular visitor to Exeter’s market was the London merchant Nicolas 
Cholwell. Although he lived in London, Cholwell held land and homes in Woolston, an 
aptly named town in the Parish of West Abington and the County of Devon.166 Cholwell 
served markets in the Mediterranean, which along with Holland, were the principal 
markets for Devon cloth.167 Cholwell also sold a significant amount of Devon cloth to the 
SSC. In the same year that Defoe visited Devon, Cholwell sold over £13,114 worth of 
																																																								163	Daniel	Defoe,	“A	Tour	Through	Great	Britain	(1724),”	in	Early	Tours	in	Devon	and	Cornwall,	edited	by	R.	Pearse	Chope	(Devon:	David	&	Charles,	1967),	145-6.		164	W.G.	Hoskins,	Industry,	Trade	and	People	in	Exeter,	1688-1800	(Exeter:	University	of	Exeter,	1968),	16.		165	Defoe,	147.		166	“Will	of	Nicholas	Cholwell,	Merchant	of	London,”	PROB	11/610/437,	The	National	Archives-Prerogative	Court	of	Canterbury,	United	Kingdom.			167	Defoe,	147-8.	Cholwell	was	involved	in	a	legal	case	relating	to	his	trade	in	the	Mediterrean.	See:	Andrea	A.	Addobbati,	“When	Proof	is	Lacking:	A	Ship	Captain’s	Oath	and	Commercial	Justice	in	the	Second	Half	of	the	Seventeenth	Century”	Quaderni	Storici	153	(2016),	727-52.	
73	
cloth to the SSC, the most of any merchant that year.168 According to historian Marion 
Johnson, total English exports to Africa equaled £91,150 in 1724.169 If this is correct, it 
means that the cloth Cholwell sold to the SSC in 1724, which was manufactured by 
peasants and farmers in Devon, provided over 14% of the total exports of British 
products to Africa that year. It was this cloth that was used to purchase the African 
ancestors of Coro’s rebels.  
 As was the case in Flanders and Brittany, the vast majority of spinning and 
weaving was done part time by peasants who were unable to subsist without producing 
cloth.170 Because land conditions were not conducive to agricultural production in Devon, 
small farming was largely complemented by stock raising since the Middle Ages.171 
About 24% of Devon’s land was still held in common during the eighteenth century, but 
this land was mostly used to house livestock.172 These agricultural conditions encouraged 
small producers to engage in manufacturing as an ancillary activity, which enabled some 
to consume at a level above subsistence.173 
																																																								168	“South	Sea	Company	Papers,”	Manuscripts	25502,	British	Library,	London,	England,	United	Kingdom.		169	Marion	Johnson,	Anglo-African	Trade	in	the	Eighteenth	Century:	English	Statistics	on	African	Trade,	
1699-1808	(Leiden:	Centre	for	the	History	of	European	Expansion),	94.		170	Joyce	Youings,	“The	Economic	History	of	Devon,	1300-1700,”	in	Exeter	and	its	Region,	edited	by	Frank	Barlow	(Exeter:	University	of	Exeter),	168.		171	Ibid.,	165-6.		172	Robin	Stanes,	“Devon	Agriculture	in	the	Mid-Eighteenth	Century:	The	Evidence	of	the	Milles	enquires”	in	The	South-West	and	the	Land,	edited	by	Michael	Ashley	Havinden	and	Celia	M.	King	(Exeter:	University	of	Exeter,	1969),	45;	Harold	S.A.	Fox,	“Outfield	Cultivation	in	Devon	and	Cornwall:	A	Reinterpretation,”	in	Husbandry	and	Marketing	in	the	South-West,	1500-1800,	edited	by	Michael	Havinden	(Exeter:	University	of	Exeter	Press,	1973),	19-38.		173	David	Levine,	Family	Formation	in	an	Age	of	Nascent	Capitalism	(New	York:	Academic	Press,	1977),	105.	
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 Commercial wool production was a profitable enterprise in England throughout 
the Middle Ages, but this production did not begin in Devon until the mid fourteenth 
century. At this time, production continued to be done at the household level, but it began 
to create a surplus, which was used to supply local markets. A century later, Devon began 
exporting woolen cloth, and by 1501-2 Devon cloth was providing 10% of the country’s 
overall exports.174 During this period, wool produced from local sheep provided the raw 
material needed to spin yarn and weave cloth.  
 By 1700, the vast majority of the wool used to produce Devon cloth was 
imported. This is because, as cloth production expanded, local wool supplies were unable 
to cover manufacturing needs. Evidence suggests that farmers lived a comfortable life 
and were not interested in expansion. Expansion through the hiring of wage labor was 
also difficult because peasants were uninterested in working for wages, making labor 
expensive.175 Almost all of the wool imported into Devon came from Ireland in the early 
eighteenth century. During the Devon industry’s peak years of the 1720s, however, the 
trade in Irish wool declined and imports of Irish yarn increased. By 1745, yarn imports 
were three times that of wool.176  
 When yarn was not imported, Irish wool was imported by local merchants at 
Exeter and sold to spinners and weavers at Exeter’s weekly market. The vast majority of 
spinners and weavers travelled a great distance to arrive to the weekly market at Exeter. 
Devon’s strongest manufacturing region, centered around Tiverton, was 14 miles away. 
When raw wool needed to be spun, weavers would employ their wives and children to do 																																																								174	Youings,	169.		175	Youings,	167.		176	Hoskins,	30-1.	
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the spinning. Weavers needed about eight spinners, however, and so weavers would 
sometimes hire out. Middlemen, known as “yarn jobbers” would arrange the weaver’s 
wool to be spun by nearby workers.177 Once the wool was spun into yarn, weavers would 
use their own looms to weave the yarn. This was not always the case, however, as 
eighteenth-century Devon may have had more production warehouses than were seen in 
Brittany or Flanders. In 1754, for example, one manufacturer owned over 100 of the 700 
looms in the town of Modbury.178 The vast majority of weavers worked on their own 
account, however, and sold their finished product to merchants at the weekly serge 
market. From there, merchants would arrange for the woven cloth to be finished and 
dyed.  
 Unfortunately, little is known about the finishing processes in Devon during this 
period, but by using the few details available for Devon and supplementing these with the 
processes in Yorkshire, a fuller picture emerges. In Yorkshire, fullers and their families 
handled the bulk of the finishing processes. There, local lords owned the fulling mills, but 
leased the land and the equipment to workers and their families. Fulling mills in 
Yorkshire were located on arable land and included several homes for immediate and 
extended families.179 Ample space was necessary because the finishing processes 
required large machinery, a still larger workforce, and crops and livestock to feed the 
working families.   
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 In order to work as a fuller in Devon, men had to serve for seven years as an 
apprentice for the Gild of Weavers, Fullers, and Shearmen of the City and County of 
Exeter.180 Technically, every man who worked in the cloth industry of Devon had to 
belong to this guild, but given the decentralized nature of spinning and weaving, this was 
untenable. Although the vast majority of workers in the cloth industry were weavers and 
spinners, most members of the Gild were fullers.181 Fulling mills had to be settled on a 
body of water, because this provided the power for the fulling machinery. There were 
dozens of fulling mills sprawled across the county of Devon in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries.182  
 Before being fulled, the woolen cloths were burled; knots and other impurities 
were removed. In Exeter, the wives and children of Gild members did this work. The 
wives and children of rural fullers—who made up the vast majority of fullers in Devon—
probably carried out this work as well. The cloths were then fulled; heavy wooden 
hammers, powered by water, pounded the wet cloths. Next, the fabrics were sheared by 
an expert shearman who cut away any loose strands. The cloths were then given to a 
drawer who repaired any remaining impurities. The drawer then moved the cloth to a 
pressman, who pressed the cloths in between wooden plates.183 It appears that each of 
																																																								180	Beatrix	F.	Cresswell,	A	Short	History	of	the	Worshipful	Company	of	Weavers,	Fullers	and	Shearmen	
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these services were handled by different specialists in Exeter, but the vast majority of the 
finishing processes were probably handled by rural fullers and their families.184  
 Once the fullers handled the bulk of the finishing processes, the cloths were 
returned white to merchants and then dyed in either London or Exeter. The SSC, for 
example, often arranged for the cloths they purchased to be dyed by professional dyers in 
London, who were paid a fee.185 By the early eighteenth century, however, the vast 
majority of Devon cloth was dyed and shipped out of Exeter. In 1701, for example, just 
over 83,000 pieces were sent to London from Exeter, although at least three times this 
amount was produced that year.186 Once dyed, the cloths were returned to the merchant 
who exported them.   
 Like eighteenth-century Flanders and Brittany, production in early eighteenth-
century Devon was done mostly on the household level, by artisans and their families. 
Feudal lords owned the land in Devon and required some type of payment in exchange 
for people’s settlement there. Unfortunately, little is known at the time about what this 
compensation looked like. What is known for certain, however, is that production in 
Devon was a complicated process, involving thousands of workers, the vast majority of 
whom worked from home, owned their own tools, and worked at their own pace.187 Most 
workers also controlled their own subsistence needs. When British merchants purchased 
enslaved people in Africa with textiles, this was the labor process embodied in the cloth.  																																																								184	Celia	Fiennes	(1695)	observed	that	all	finishing	processes	are	carried	out	in	fulling	houses,	although	she	cites	only	the	case	at	Exeter.	See:	Celia	Fiennes,	“Through	England	on	a	Side	Saddle,”	in	
Early	Tours	in	Devon	and	Cornwall,	edited	by	R.	Pearse	Chope	(Devon:	David	&	Charles,	1967),	113-4.		185	See	“South	Sea	Company	Papers.”			186	Hoskins,	66-8.		187	The	link	between	ownership	of	tools	and	the	ability	to	work	at	one’s	pace,	in	juxtaposition	to	production	in	the	capitalist	mode,	is	made	by	Levine	in	Family	Formation,	1.	
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Conclusion  
 
 When we last left María de los Dolores Chirino she had been arrested—accused 
of taking part in the rebellion, stealing clothes and other valuables, and lying to 
authorities about it. When confronted with testimony by Don Juan Francisco Santeliz, 
which stated that he confiscated clothes, clothing items and other goods from her in the 
days following the rebellion, Chirino stated that she did not mention this in previous 
interrogations because—as a woman—she got confused: “the confusion and 
shortsightedness of her sex did not allow her to specify what goods and clothing articles 
her husband Joséf Leonardo Chirino gave her to put away.”188 In order to avoid prison 
and/or death, Chirino desperately attempted to exonerate her involvement by playing up 
to the role of the feminine house slave. As historian Hilary Beckles has shown, enslaved 
house servants had access to femininity in the high culture homes of plantation societies. 
This femininity was unique to female house servants, and rarely extended to the vast 
majority of enslaved women, who worked in fields.189  
 A few months later, Doña Ana Tellería, Joséf de Tellería’s sister, pleaded with 
Coro’s court to free Chirino and other enslaved people owned by her family.190 Tellería 
argued to the court that Chirino was innocent. She referred to the testimony of two 
witnesses—including one convicted rebel—who corroborated Chirino’s account that she 
was not involved in the rebellion. Tellería also argued that Chirino had split up with her 
																																																								188	“Expedientes,”	ff.	134.;	“no	la	permitio	la	confucion,	y	cortedad	de	su	sexo	expecificar	los	bienes,	y	prendas	que	le	dio	aguardar	Joséf	Leonardo	Chirino	su	marido.”		189	Beckles,	55-71.		190	Ibid.,	ff.	159-67.	
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husband in the days following the rebellion, evidenced by the fact that José Leonardo fled 
the region and was not found until three months later. Besides, the kind of violence that 
was unleashed during the rebellion “are not possible within the feminine breath.”191 
 “Therefore,” started Tellería, “María de los Dolores is only part of this summary 
process for the simple reception of precious objects that Dn Francisco Santaliz 
found.”192These “precious objects”—principally European textiles and clothes—were not 
hidden away in the mountains as so many other rebels did with their goods, argued 
Tellería, because Chirino was innocent. She accepted the merchandise from her husband 
because she was afraid of him, and for good reason. Chirino handed the objects over to 
Santeliz once he found them. She simply forgot to mention this to Valderrama in her 
testimony because “unsure of the success of the trial, in which she is afraid that her 
innocent life is in danger, in the presence of a Judge who is circumspect and respectable 
for his character and honor and ultimately unknown, as an outsider she was much more 
exposed to fall in contradictions, to be disturbed, to be confused.”193Unfortunately for 
Chirino, her family, and her community, Coro’s authorities did not believe her testimony 
or that of Tellería.  
 In December of 1796, a year and a half after the rebellion, the Tellería family was 
ordered to sell Chirino and her children outside of Coro. Chirino would not make it out of 
prison alive, however. The last record of Chirino, which is currently available, comes 
from Joséf de Tellería’s will, where it reads: “the Mulata María de los Dolores died 																																																								191	Ibid.,	ff.	159-60.;	“no	caven	en	el	aliento	femenino.”		192	Ibid.,	ff.	160.;	“Resta	pues	que	María	de	los	Dolores	solo	parece	en	el	proceso	suMaríada	por	la	simple	receptacin	de	las	alajas	que	le	encontró	Dn	Fran.co	San	teliz.”		193	Ibid.,	ff.	161-2.;	“incierta	del	excito	del	juicio	en	que	teme	peligre	su	vida	ynocente,	aprecencia	de	un	Juez	sircunspecto	y	respectable	por	su	carácter,	y	honores,	y	enfin	desconocido,	como	forastero	esta	mucho	mas	expuesta	a	caer	en	contraiciones,	aturbaxos,	confundirse.”	
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without being sold.” 194The document adds that she was buried, but that a death certificate 
was not issued “in order to avoid costs.”195Chirino, enslaved since birth, separated from 
her children, and incarcerated for the last months of her life, died in prison for possessing 
“precious objects.”  
 It is unclear whether or not Chirino was actually involved in the rebellion. She 
may very well have forgotten to mention to Valderrama that, at one point, she had held 
some of Martínez’s goods in her possession. Perhaps Doña Ana Tellería was correct, that 
Chirino was embarrassed and afraid to mention this detail; that she thought it would land 
her in trouble. But perhaps Chirino was lying, perhaps she was an active participant in the 
rebellion, and that she helped her husband murder Martínez and take his belongings. If 
Chirino was involved, at the very least, she was eager to receive this merchandise after 
the deed was done. Or perhaps the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Perhaps Chirino 
was, like most rebels no doubt, “tentative,” as historian Aisha Finch makes clear in her 
study of the Escalera conspiracy.196 Finch demonstrates that most rebels, the non-elite, 
were unsure about whether or not they wanted to join an insurrection. There appears to 
have been a spectrum with enslaved peoples’ resistance during this period. Some people 
were not involved at all, others were zealous, but it is likely that many—perhaps most—
were caught somewhere in the middle. Chirino’s testimony points to this latter scenario 
as being the most likely, although historians may never know for sure. 
																																																								194	“Testamentaria	de	Joséph	de	Tellería,	1798,”	Archivo	Histórico	del	Estado	de	Falcón.	Coro,	Venezuela,	ff.	403.;	“la	Mulata	María	de	los	Dolores	fallecio	sin	ser	vendida.”		195	Ibid.;	“por	evitar	costos.”			196	Aisha	Finch,	Rethinking	Slave	Rebellion	in	Cuba:	La	Escalera	and	the	Insurgencies	of	1841-1844	(Chapel	Hill:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2015),	141-167.	
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 Juan Jesus de Lugo was brought to trial in February of 1796, accused of being a 
part of the Coro rebellion. In the minds of authorities, the key determining factor in his 
guilt or innocence was what he did with the textiles and clothes of two elderly white 
women who lived in Coro’s sierra: Doña Concepción Suárez and Doña Ana Vera. Had 
Lugo stolen them, or did he, as he contended, hide them for Suárez and Vera in order to 
keep their merchandise safe from the rebels?  
 Suárez and Vera were questioned on the Hacienda of Quitaragua, because they 
were too frail to make the trip to Coro. Suárez testified that the rebels surprised her 
outside of her home, and she felt threatened. Lugo then escorted her back home, although 
Suárez stated that she was unsure of his motives. She added that the rebels had not 
physically assaulted Lugo as he had testified. Suárez confirmed Lugo’s account, 
however, that together, she and Lugo had used one of her hammocks to fill with clothes, 
textiles, and other valuables, and that Lugo took this hammock to his home to hide it 
from the rebels.197  
 Vera’s testimony contradicted Lugo’s even more than Suárez’s did. Vera declared 
that it was not true that Lugo showed up to her home in the first hours of the rebellion, 
asking for a sack to help recover some of her stolen goods. Vera stated that she did not 
see Lugo until he arrived at her home in the days following the rebellion. She added that 
Lugo told her that he had arrived to check on her and her house, and to assess any 
damage that may have occurred. It was at this point, insisted Vera, that Lugo asked for a 
sack in order to retrieve the clothes and other goods that were stolen from her. According 
to Vera, Lugo also stated that he had some of her clothes-filled chests hidden at his 
																																																								197	“Expedientes,”	ff.	301-2.	
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house, and that he would also bring these back to her.198 As was the case with Chirino, 
Valderrama did not believe him. Over one year later, in February of 1797, Lugo was 
banished from Venezuela and sent to live in Puerto Rico.199 This was the last mention of 
Lugo in surviving documents.  
 Chirino and Lugo’s presence in documents relating to the Coro rebellion end 
awfully, but not before they reveal much about the rebellion’s actors and the society in 
which they lived. European textiles were of great symbolic value in eighteenth-century 
Coro, serving as markers of race and class with the potential to subvert the very order 
they were meant to solidify. Because Coro’s landowners squandered much of their wealth 
on European cloth and the production of palatial clothes, these commodities served as the 
ends that elites hoped to achieve by accumulating capital through their plantations and 
haciendas. When Coro’s rebels sacked these haciendas, they were claiming rightful 
ownership to the European textiles owned by elites, which epitomized the racial and class 
hierarchies of eighteenth-century Coro. Through evenly distributing these goods amongst 
themselves, Coro’s rebels were critiquing these polarities, which served as the backbone 
of Coro’s society. The act of redistribution also served as a declaration of what their new 
republic would be like, once they took power. The stealing of textiles and their 
distribution, then, was as significant an ideological proclamation as any reference to the 
French Revolution.  
 The role of European cloths in the Coro rebellion reveals how ideology and 
materiality cannot exist without one another. The high exchange value of European 
textiles was largely responsible for their high symbolic value in eighteenth-century Coro. 																																																								198	Ibid.		199	“Expediente,”	ff.	16.	
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This exchange value was high because of the costly nature of textile production in 
eighteenth-century Europe. These exorbitant costs were largely due to their long, 
multiplex, non-capitalist production process. Thousands of peasant artisans in Flanders, 
Brittany, and Devon grew the raw material used for the cloths, and worked as spinners, 
weavers, fullers, and a host of other specialty jobs in order to produce these textiles. The 
vast majority of these peasants worked in textiles part time, as they were provided much 
of their own subsistence through other means. The vast majority of workers also owned 
their own tools, giving them the independence to work largely at their own convenience. 
By the time European merchants were able to ship textiles across the Atlantic, a large 
chunk of their costs were already sunk. 
 Despite the archaic forms of production employed across the eighteenth-century 
Atlantic, these productive systems still managed an organic relation to one another. 
Textile production in Flanders and Brittany expanded due to the growth of overseas 
markets, such as Coro. Coro’s plantation economy grew through the cheap labor they 
employed in the form of African slaves and their enslaved or legally free descendants. 
These enslaved Africans were exchanged in their homelands for European commodities, 
most significantly textiles. And during the time of the SSC, the bulk of these products 
were produced in Devon.  
 The common misconception among historians that the early modern period, and 
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, can be characterized as capitalist, runs up 
against the reality of commodity production in the Atlantic during these periods.200 
																																																								200	This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	these	modes	of	production	and	the	Atlantic	system	that	connected	them	were	not	hugely	profitable,	both	quantitatively,	and	more	importantly,	qualitatively.	The	point	made	about	qualitative	significance	is	taken	from	Inikori.	See:	Joseph	Inikori,	Africans	and	
the	Industrial	Revolution	in	England:	A	Study	in	International	Trade	and	Economic	Development	(New	
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Marx’s definition of capitalism is helpful here; it explains the historical “stages” of 
production. Capitalism is an economic system in which the worker is divorced from her 
means of subsistence and from the means of production.201 Instead of being in the hands 
of workers, as was the case in eighteenth-century Flanders, Brittany, and Devon, these 
means are under the domain of the capitalist class. Capitalism is an economic system of 
“generalized commodity production,” signifying that the means of subsistence and of 
production are manufactured as commodities.202 These commodities are then purchased 
by wage earners who are not provided these necessities or are not able to provide them 
for themselves, as their ancestors were. A cart-blanche definition of capitalism disguises 
the qualitative differences between economic systems; systems that, in accordance with 
their particular laws, have the power to greatly shape the societies in which they operate. 
This is evident in the manufacturing process of textiles in eighteenth-century Europe, and 
their consumption in Coro. But commodities cannot be produced unless they can be 
circulated. For this, we turn to the joint-stock companies of eighteenth-century Europe. 
  
																																																																																																																																																																					York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002).	See	the	introduction	of	this	dissertation	for	a	further	discussion	of	the	scholarship	on	capitalism	and	its	history.			201	See,	in	particular,	Chapter	6	in	Marx’s	Capital,	Vol.	1,	“The	Sale	and	Purchase	of	Labour-Power”	in	Karl	Marx,	Capital,	Volume	1	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	1990),	270-80.	This	is	not	to	say	that	Marx’s	analysis	of	the	capitalist	mode	of	production	is	without	flaws.	Particularly,	his	historical	understanding	of	its	birth	and	its	development	are	faulty.	See	the	introduction	for	further	discussion.		202	Ernest	Mandel	uses	the	term	“generalized	commodity	production”	in	his	introduction	to	Marx’s	
Capital,	Volume	1,	20.	
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Chapter Two: Joint-Stock Company Capital 
 
 The textiles that Coro’s elites consumed were brought to the region during the 
eighteenth century thanks to the efforts of three European companies; ones responsible 
for not only providing the region with European commodities, but for creating Coro’s 
African character and constructing its plantation economy. The Dutch West India 
Company (WIC), Britain’s South Sea Company (SSC), and Spain’s Real Compañía 
Guipuzcoana (RCG) were responsible for the enslavement of thousands of African 
people and sending them to toil on Coro’s plantations. Moreover, many of the cacao and 
sugar plantations that Coro’s rebels loathed to work on were created as a result of the 
economic stimulation that the WIC, the SSC, and the RCG provided the region. These 
plantations were erected, and others had their production increased, as a result of the 
companies’ provision of enslaved people and European goods, as well as their purchase 
of Coro’s plantation commodities. When Coro’s rebels killed white elites, sacked 
plantations, and burned down fields, they were attacking a system of oppression whose 
core was found an ocean away, in Europe’s financial capitals, among wealthy stock 
holders, blue blood aristocrats, royal families, and the continent’s leading merchants.  
 Slavery in eighteenth-century Coro was largely a product of the WIC, the SSC, 
and the RCG’s endeavors, and it was an institution that Coro’s rebels hoped to eliminate. 
Ironically, however, the 1795 insurrection began its momentum six years before the 
movement began, with the enactment of a law that was meant to strengthen slavery in 
Spanish America, rather than destroy it. On May 31, 1789, the Spanish Crown issued the 
“Real Cédula sobre educación, trato y ocupaciones de los esclavos,” which called for the 
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“humane” treatment of the enslaved people living, working, and dying in Spain’s 
American colonies.203 As was the case throughout the Americas, rumors soon swirled in 
Coro that the Real Cédula was in fact an edict that abolished slavery, and that local white 
elites were holding people in bondage against the wishes of the King and His laws.204   
 After the rebellion, Coro’s authorities testified that a mysterious African-born 
wanderer, known as Cocofío, had spread the abolition rumors there. Cocofio was legally 
free and said to have made his living as a curandero in Coro’s sierra. It was said that he 
had no home, but roamed the countryside, going from hacienda to hacienda, encouraging 
plantation workers to resist their enslavement because slavery was no longer allowed in 
the Spanish Empire.205 
 Coro’s authorities reported that Cocofio had died “two or three years” before the 
1795 rebellion, but that his mission to stir up trouble in Coro’s sierra was taken up by 
Joseph Caridad González, the loango leader who lived free in Coro after having escaped 
enslavement in the WIC operated island of Curaçao.206 González, according to 
authorities, had been spreading the rumor that the 1789 Cédula had not just outlawed 
slavery, but also some taxes, including the alcabala.207 Although González lived between 																																																								203	Manuel	Lucena	Salmoral,	“El	original	de	la	R.C.	instrucción	circular	sobre	la	educación,	trato	y	ocupaciones	de	los	esclavos	en	todos	sus	dominios	de	Indias	e	Islas	Filipinas,”	https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/58906381.pdf.		204	Abolition	rumors	were	common	during	the	period.	See	David	Patrick	Geggus,	“Slave	Resistance	in	the	Spanish	Caribbean	in	the	Mid-1790s,”	in	A	Turbulent	Time:	The	French	Revolution	and	the	Greater	
Caribbean,	edited	by	David	Barry	Gaspar	and	David	Patrick	Geggus	(Bloomington	and	Indianapolis:	Indiana	University	Press,	1997):	131-155.		205	“Expediente	sobre	la	insurrección	de	los	negros,	zambos	y	mulatos	proyectada	en	el	año	1795	a	las	inmediaciones	de	la	ciudad	de	Coro,	Provincia	de	Caracas,”	1795,	Caracas,	426,	Archivo	General	de	Indias	(AGI),	Seville,	ff.	84-88.		206	Ibid.,	“dos	o	tres	años.”		207	Ibid.	
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Coro and Caracas, he settled back into the city of Coro a few weeks before the 
rebellion—in a part of the city known as Guinea.  
 Guinea was the name used in the Atlantic to describe what is known today as 
West Africa, between the Sahara desert and the Gulf of Guinea, a region of the world in 
which the WIC and the SSC carried out much of their slaving activities. Coro’s 
neighborhood of Guinea lay about 30 miles south of the sierra, but despite its distance, 
the neighborhood was linked to the rebellion by mysterious dances that took place before 
the insurrection was underway. Guinea and it’s celebrations came to light in the days, 
weeks, and months that followed the rebellion, as authorities tried to scramble together a 
narrative on how this uprising could have occurred.  
 On November 17, 1795, the head of Caracas’s military, Comandante Francisco 
Jacot, crafted and signed a testimony that included a bombshell of an allegation—one that 
made claims of a conspiracy much wider than even paranoid planters could have 
imagined. Jacot penned the letter upon his return to Caracas, after having been sent to 
Coro as soon as word on the May 10 rebellion reached the capital. Jacot arrived in Coro 
on May 24 to oversea military operations there in support of Coro’s military and militias, 
headed by Mariano Ramírez Valderraín. Jacot submitted a detailed memorial of his time 
in Coro to the Governor and Captain General of Venezuela, featuring 29 points that he 
thought were of utmost importance. What concerned Jacot the most, however, was the 
link that he had established between González, Coro’s rebels, and none other than Coro’s 
Justicia Mayor himself, Ramírez Valderraín.208 
																																																								208	“Sublevacion	de	los	negros	de	Coro,	pieza	3,”	1795,	Criminales,	Letra	C,	Archivo	General	de	la	Nacion,	Caracas,	ff..	70-84.	
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 Jacot suspected Ramírez Valderraín because he believed that he had uncovered 
links between the Justicia Mayor and Coro’s loango community, whose origins were 
believed to lie on the Loango Coast, the other major WIC and SSC slave-trading port 
whose only rival was the southern Coast of Guinea. Jacot’s misgivings of Ramírez 
Valderraín were on alert the moment he arrived in Coro, partly because of “the rudeness 
with which he treated me.”209 His reservations developed further when he noticed that 
people spoke ill of him and of his handling of the rebellion. Jacot stated that he was in 
this state of discomfort over Ramírez Valderraín and his tenure as Justicia Mayor when 
he received news that stunned him. It all started when three loango men, all supposedly 
infected with smallpox—Felipe Guillermo, Domingo Cornelio and Francisco Castro—
were apprehended, incarcerated, and accused of being active participants in the 
insurrection. But Jacot actually thought that the loango men’s apprehension was 
unjustified because the three men were on his list of black militia members. It appears 
that perhaps Jacot saw their incarceration, at this moment, as part of the anti-black 
hysteria that gripped the city of Coro in the days that followed the rebellion. So Jacot 
ordered that the three men be set free. Jacot soon regretted this decision, however, as 
residents began informing him that the three men, particularly Guillermo, were close 
friends of González.  
 Jacot ordered that the three men be apprehended once more, and he placed them 
under the charge of Gabriel Gárces, a member of the pardo militia. Jacot would once 
again regret this decision when he found the three loangos walking around the jail 
without being chained. This was an unacceptable liberty being granted by Gárces and 
Jacot immediately began questioning the jailer’s motives. Jacot asked residents about 																																																								209	Ibid.,	ff.	72:	“la	groseria	de	que	me	trataba.”	
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Gárces, and an anonymous member of the black militia told him that Gárces was also an 
intimate friend of González. In fact, Gárces was dependent on the accused mastermind of 
the Coro rebellion, because he made his living off of selling the vegetables that the 
loangos grew in the sierra. Bringing the conspiracy full circle, Jacot revealed that Gárces 
was a close friend of Ramírez Valderraín, creating just one degree of separation from the 
Justicia Mayor and González, the devious author of the May insurrection.  
 But it was what Jacot reported next that all but confirmed his terrible suspicions. 
Jacot recounted a conversation that he had with Coro’s Priest Don Pedro Pérez in which 
the priest hinted at Ramírez Valderraín's involvement. Pérez told Jacot, “I’m a Priest, I’ve 
confessed many people, and I cannot say anything else.”210 Despite his purported 
reservations, Pérez continued: 
suppose that before the uprising, there were some dances or celebrations where people 
sang, some dishonorable little verses, and they danced a thousand obscenities: I 
remember one that said: a black man with a brand is worth more than the head of a white 
man: candle up, candle down, take out the machete, cut off the head, the vultures eat, 
drink the liquor.211 
 
Pérez recorded, then, that, before the rebellion, there were dances in Coro in which black 
people sang songs that threatened the lives of local whites. But it was what Pérez said 
next that would astonish and offend Jacot. Pérez told Jacot that this song—and others—
were sang in the open. Jacot asked Pérez if Ramírez Valderraín knew of these dances, to 
which Pérez responded yes, “because they were public.”212  																																																								210	Ibid.,	ff.	75:	“Yo	soy	Sacerdote,	he	confesado	a	muchas	personas,	y	no	puedo	hablar	mas.”		211	Ibid.:	suponga	VMD	que	antes	al	levantamiento,	se	hacían	unos	Bailes,	o	Zambras	en	que	se	cantaban,,	unos	versitos	muy	deshonestos,	y	se	bailaban	mil	obsenidades:	me	acuerdo,,	de	una	que	dice:	mas	vale	negro	con	placa,	que	cabeza	de	blanco:,,candela	arriba,	candela	abajo,	saca	la	macheta,	corta	la	Caveza,	come	los	Zamuros,	beva	la	Aguardiena.		212	Ibid.:	“porque	eran	publicos.”	
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 Jacot’s next recorded a conversation that he had had with another white elite that 
confirmed Pérez’s observations. Don Nicolas Coronado, according to Jacot, confirmed 
that these songs were sung in public dances, and the lyrics he provided were even more 
heinous than the ones cited above: 
Candle down candle up, the white dies, the black lives: and Josef Leonardo with his gang, 
together with the Blacks in Macanilla, and with a blow from his Royal Palm, the white 
dies, blacks plant semilla: the White man digs, the black man stays to plant his semilla, 
those that live will see.213  
 
Coronado’s statement confirmed that the Africans in the city of Coro, many of who had 
escaped the clutches of the WIC’s slaveocracy in Curaçao to live “free” in Coro, had 
advanced knowledge of the rebellion, and openly sang about its imminence. The songs 
also point to the fact that Chirino was known to Guinea’s singers who looked forward to 
the rebellion and the newfound freedom this would bring them. Jacot fretted over the 
scandalous nature of the songs, adding that another local authority, Don Juan Fermin 
Emasavel, confirmed that these songs were sung at public dances, and that he had even 
seen Ramírez Valderraín there.  
 If true, these scandalous songs, sung before the insurrection, would be proof 
positive of the correlation between sierra and city, between Chirino and González, 
between criollo and bozal, and incriminate Ramírez Valderraín as a rebel or—at the very 
least—a negligent fool. Some historians of the 1795 rebellion have questioned the official 
narrative of González being a mastermind of the insurrection.214 One historian has 
																																																								213	Ibid.:	“Candela	abajo	candel	arriba,	muera	lo	blanco,	lo	negro	viva:	y	Josef	Leonardo	con	su	pandilla,	junta	los	Negros	en	Macanilla,	y	con	su	volezo	de	Palma	Real,	muera	lo	blanco,,	negro	semillan:	Blanco	cava,	negro	queda	para	semillan,	quien	vivieze	lo	verán.”		214	See:	Pedro	A.	Gil	Rivas,	Luis	Dovale	Prado	and	Lidia	Lusmila	Bello,	La	insurrección	de	los	negros	de	
la	serranía	coriana:	10	de	mayo	de	1795	(Caracas:	Ministerio	de	Educación	Cultura	y	Deportes,	2001);	
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suggested that it was unlikely that González, being African-born and the leader of an 
African-born community, would have conspired with a Venezuelan-born rebel in Chirino, 
and the largely criollo contingent of the sierra.215 The song quoted above, sung by 
Guinea-community members in the city, counters these historians’ assessments, however, 
and suggests that perhaps the divisions between bozal and criollo have been overstated.  
 The songs sung by people brought to Coro by the joint-stock companies could 
have been delusions of hysterical white elites, but there exists further evidence that ties 
these songs to Chirino and the rebels of the sierra. In September of 1795, the landowner, 
Doña Nicolosa de Acosta, described being abused by the rebels, having her belongings 
stolen, and her home and fields burned down. De Acosta stated that she actually lived in 
the home constructed on her sugar plantation Baron since 1779, unlike most plantation 
owners who lived in the city and retired to their country estates for the occasional 
weekend away. De Acosta stated that between 8 and 9 PM on the night of May 10, the 
rebels appeared at her front door, shouting threateningly. Once they realized that de 
Acosta would not open the door, the rebels lit it on fire. It was at this point that de Acosta 
encouraged her lover, Don Joseph María de Manzanos, to escape, and the insurgents, 
who were surrounding the home, killed him. One of the rebels then broke open a window 
to allow for his sister, who worked at the plantation, to get away, and this is how de 
Acosta herself managed to flee, along with her niece and two granddaughters.  
																																																																																																																																																																					Ramón	Aizpurua,	“Revolution	and	Politics	in	Venezuela	and	Curaçao,	1797-1800”	in	Curaçao	in	the	
Age	of	Revolutions,	1795-1800,	edited	by	Wim	Klooster	and	Gert	Oostindie	(Leiden:	KITLV	Press,	2011),	97-122.			215	Cristina	Soriano,	“Rumors	of	Change:	Repercussions	of	Caribbean	Turmoil	and	Social	Conflicts	in	Venezuela	(1790-1810)”	(Ph.D.	Diss.:	New	York	University,	2011)	204-5.	
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 This is when de Acosta found herself face to face with Chirino and two other 
rebels who stated “there should not remain a white man, not even for semilla, that the 
women would have to accommodate to the new laws, that there was no longer slavery or 
alcabalas.”216 De Acosta’s recounting of this episode points to the rebels’ use of the word 
“semilla” to describe both the new society that would be built and the literal reproduction 
of African lineage, which would serve as the foundation for this new society. De Acosta’s 
account echoes the usage of “semilla” in the songs sung in the days before the rebellion 
where the black semilla was counter posed to the white semilla, which would disappear. 
De Acosta’s testimony also provides further evidence for claims made by white elites that 
Coro’s rebels had planned to “marry the white women.”217Although statements made to 
this effect were reflections of planters’ worst fears, when paired with rebels’ usage of 
semilla in both Guinea and the sierra, it appears that Coro’s rebels planned, not just to 
marry white women, but to allow them to live in their new society, and to adopt roles 
similar to those taken up by black women in their communities.218 Because white women 
represented chastity, honor, and beauty in Coro, there may have been a preference for 
white women amongst some rebels. More importantly, however, white women were not 
considered the same threats as white men, and the rebels probably decided to spare their 
lives for this reason.  
 De Acosta stated that she was beaten as her residence burned down, but that she 
managed to escape, only to return days later and find a shell of her former home. Much of 																																																								216	“Expediente	sobre	la	insurrección,”	ff.	291:	“no	havia	de	quedar	blanco	baron,	ni	para	semilla,	que	las	hembras	se	havian	de	acomodar	a	sus	nuevas	leyes,	que	ya	no	havia	esclavitud,	ni	alcabalas.”		217	See	the	introduction	for	a	discussion	of	the	claim	that	Coro’s	rebels	planned	to	marry	white	women.			218	See	the	next	chapter	for	a	discussion	of	black	women’s	roles	in	Africa	and	in	maroon	communities	in	the	Americas.		
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her cane was destroyed. Her clothes, textiles, silverware and tools were stolen, and much 
of her livestock was decimated. De Acosta was not alone. The landowners Don Josef 
Antonio Zárraga, Don Josef de Tellería, and Don Francisco de Manzanos also had their 
cane fields and homes destroyed, as well as their belongings sacked. 
 These sugar plantations, the ones that Cocofío and González allegedly roamed to 
spread the word of abolition, and the ones that Chirino, his family, and his community 
labored on, were the product of more than a century of groundwork laid by European 
joint-stock companies. These companies crafted the world in which Coro’s rebels hoped 
to plant the semilla of a new society, one in which the white ruling class would no longer 
exist, and where the black race would govern in its place. This chapter will inspect three 
of the principal companies that shaped eighteenth-century Coro: the WIC, the SSC, and 
the RCG. This examination shows that Coro’s rebels were striking against a local 
political economy that was stubbornly resistant to reform because it was lodged into a 
much wider political and economic project invested in its immutability. This Atlantic 
undertaking served disparate interest groups, but groups whose concerns all convalesced 
around the accumulation of capital and the extension of white supremacy.  
 
The Dutch West India Company  
 
 The first European joint-stock company that formed eighteenth-century Coro and 
the conditions that led to the 1795 insurrection was the Dutch West India Company 
(WIC). The WIC was responsible for creating the African character of Coro through the 
steady supply of enslaved African people throughout the eighteenth century, some of 
94	
who, no doubt, were involved in the rebellion, as well as many more rebels whose 
ancestors had been brought to Coro via WIC activities. The WIC also governed the island 
of Curaçao, which was, perhaps, the premier entrepôt of the early modern Caribbean. 
Ceded from Spain in 1634, Curaçao lay just 60 miles off of the coast of Coro, and 
dominated the latter’s economy, which relied on contraband trade with Curaçao’s 
merchants. The WIC collapsed four years before the 1795 insurrection, but not before its 
practices helped build Coro’s plantation economy through promoting the production of 
sugar and livestock, and by providing these industries with the enslaved workers that it 
relied on.  
 Formed in 1621, the WIC was constructed by the States General at the end of the 
twelve-year truce between The Netherlands and Spain. The WIC was to serve as a 
weapon against their Spanish rivals and their commercial, military, and political interests 
in the Atlantic. The first WIC went bankrupt in 1674, but through coercion and financial 
manipulations, a second WIC was immediately formed upon the corpse of the first 
company’s dead capital. The WIC’s main interests were in the slave trade and the 
running of Caribbean plantations and commercial colonies, Curaçao being the company’s 
crown jewel throughout its history.  
 The idea for a Dutch joint-stock company holding a monopoly on Atlantic trade 
was first promoted in the early seventeenth century by the influential merchant and 
pamphleteer Willem Usselinecx. Usselinecx was born in Antwerpt and moved to 
Middleberg in the late sixteenth century after Antwerp fell to the Spanish during the 
Eighty Years War. Driven by a—perhaps understandable—hatred towards Spain, 
Usselinecx’s fortunes ironically grew as a merchant serving Spanish land in Iberia and 
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the Azores. Usselinecx envisioned the coming joint-stock company as a righteous 
instrument of Calvinism, represented by The Netherlands, to be used in their commercial 
and military struggle against Catholicism, represented by Spain.219  
 Usselenicx eventually became one of the first shareholders of the company he had 
envisioned: the WIC. Shareholders like Usselenicx were attracted to the company 
because of its monopoly on the Dutch slave trade, as well as its potential trading 
operations in the Americas. This, no doubt, would bring profits. Investors were also 
drawn to the idea of missions to sack Spanish bullion shipments, and were buoyed by 
major successes of these operations in 1628 and 1646. In addition, WIC investments were 
considered safe because the company was state-sponsored, it received government 
subsidies, and guaranteed regular dividends.220  
 The States General’s interests in the WIC complemented those of shareholders. 
Having found great success with its first joint-stock company, the Dutch East India 
Company (VOC), they considered that the WIC had the potential to bring similar 
benefits, but through the Atlantic. In addition to serving as an instrument of war against 
Spain, the Staten General also believed that a joint-stock company was necessary in order 
to pull together enough capital to secure Dutch shares in the Atlantic trades.  
 When the WIC was founded it took several years to raise enough capital to begin 
operations, and the general financial health of the company would vacillate until it went 
bankrupt in 1674. The value of the company’s stock was at 115% in 1628 and reached a 
high of 206% the following year. In 1633, the stock price dipped to 61% of its nominal 																																																								219	Henk	Heijer,	De	Geschiedenis	Van	De	Wic	(Zutphen:	Walburg	Pers,	2007),	21.		220	P.C.	Emmer,	“The	West	India	Compnay,	1621-1791.	Dutch	or	Atlantic?”	In	Companies	and	Trade:	Essays	on	Overseas	Trading	Companies	during	the	Ancien	Régime	(Leiden:	Leiden	University	Press,	1981),	76.	
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value, and by 1638, it was consistently selling at below this price.221 In 1638, the 
company lost part of its monopoly on Atlantic commerce, keeping a monopoly on its 
most prized trade, enslaved people, as well as other successful commodities, including 
ammunition and Brazil wood.222 This adjustment may have helped the value of stock to 
increase in the following years, but by the 1670s, it became clear that the company would 
not be able to continue operating as it had. The WIC directors came to the conclusion that 
they were losing money because of competition from illegal slave traders in Africa. They 
came to believe that if they could manage to raise one million guilders, however, that 
they would be able to strike blows against these interlopers and regain control of the 
slave trade.223 
 But the WIC was unable to raise this money, so the company devised a plan to 
raise these funds by force. The WIC decided to disband and to form a second WIC with 
the capital investments still held by its shareholders. Shareholders were compensated by 
transferring 15% of their nominal stock from the first company into the second, upon the 
stipulation that they hand the new company 4% of the value of their holdings in cash. 
Holders of bonds had 30% of their investments transferred to the new company upon the 
condition that they give the company 8% of their investments in cash. If investors did not 
agree to these conditions, they would lose everything they had invested in the first 
company.224 The 1.2 million guilders that were collected surpassed the 1 million guilders 																																																								221	J.G.	Van	Dillen,	“Effectenkoersen	aan	de	Amsterdamsche	beurs,	1723-1794”	Economisch-Historisch	Jaarboek	17	(1931):	1-46.		222	Emmer,	79.		223	Heijer,	107.		224	Cornelis	Goslinga,	The	Dutch	in	the	Caribbean	and	in	the	Guianas,	1680-1791	(Assen:	Van	Corcum,	1985),	4.	
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the company thought they needed to revamp their trade, and this money served as the 
cash used for the second company’s operations, which had no money when it was 
declared bankrupt.225  
 The transition from the first WIC to the second came with some structural 
changes to the company and its operations. When the WIC was first founded, it was 
established with five regional chambers: that of Amsterdam, Zeeland, Rotterdam, 
Northquarter and Grogingen. There were 19 members of the board of directors, who were 
leading shareholders chosen by the regents of each chamber.226 With the second WIC, the 
chambers were kept as they were but the board of directors was reduced to 10. As before, 
the company directors were voted in by the bewindhebbers, principal investors who 
oversaw the daily operations of their respective chambers. The Chamber of Amsterdam, 
which held 4/9s of the company’s shares, had 10 bewindhebbers and 6 buytenheeren, 
essentially bewindhebbers who were selected from outside of the city of Amsterdam, but 
in its vicinity. The Zeeland Chamber held 2/9 of the company’s capital and had 6 
bewindhebbers. The Noorderkwartier held 1/9 parts and 13 bewindhebbers, the Maze 
chamber had 1/9 parts and 7 bewindhebbers and the Kamer Stad en Lande also held 1/9 
of the company’s capital, but had 14 bewindhebbers. The bewindhebbers were selected 
by and amongst the hooftparticipaten, or major investors, in each chamber. In the 
Amsterdam chamber, hooftparticipaten were those who had 4,200 florins invested in the 
company, but hooftparticipaten in the other chambers invested a minimum of 2,800 
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florins. The Upperbewindheber was William IV of Orange, who technically had the final 
say on matters.227  
 The bewindhebbers were the backbone of the WIC, and were ultimately 
responsible for all decisions made by the company. In exchange for their service, 
bewindhebbers received a 10% commission on all dividends that were issued, a sizeable 
sum indeed. Many bewindhebbers held investments in Atlantic trade not monopolized by 
the WIC, and thus used their positions to obtain inside knowledge on Atlantic conditions.  
Bewindhebbers were also attracted to the position for the social status it afforded them at 
home.228 
 The WIC oversaw a host of Dutch state and commercial operations over its 
lifespan, but these changed as years went by—ironically because of the company’s very 
success. The company began as a heavily armed monopoly holder of all Dutch trade in 
the Atlantic. As stated above, the company lost part of this monopoly in 1638, but 
retained their hold on a number of trades, most significantly the slave trade. The company 
held a monopoly on Dutch trade in Africa, including the slave trade until 1730, when the 
slave trade was opened to private concerns. And finally, in 1734, the WIC lost its 
monopoly on the trade in other African goods. From here until the company’s demise in 
1791, the WIC served as a state management company that operated with the aid of 
private capital. This phase of the WIC’s lifespan was aimed at promoting Dutch private 
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interests in the Atlantic.229 In other words, the WIC’s efforts in forcing open new markets 
for Dutch interests paid off, and their trading activities were no longer necessary.  
 But after 1730, private Dutch traders came to rely on the WIC for the stability of 
their operations, whether they realized it or not. Key to Dutch slaving activities in Africa 
was the presence of WIC forts across the West African Coast. The Dutch held a dozen 
forts on the Gold Coast from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, which provided 
enslaved people to private merchants looking to complete their cargoes. These forts and 
their personnel also provided Dutch merchants with provisions and other goods that they 
could trade in the Atlantic.230 The heavily armed WIC establishments also provided 
security for merchants in case they would need it, and gave Dutch traders legitimacy, 
which was needed to carry trade with indigenous peoples. In the Caribbean, the WIC 
administered the island entrepôts of St. Eustatius and Curaçao, making it possible for 
Dutch traders to stake claims in the Caribbean, and allowing for the mother country to 
benefit from the supply side of the slave trade, as well as from the procurement of 
Caribbean commodities that were sold in Europe.  
 Like their European rivals, the Dutch traded in enslaved people up and down the 
West African coast and, to a lesser extend, in East Africa as well. Taken together, 
however, the Gold Coast of Guinea and the Loango Coast accounted for 54.3% of all 
enslaved people transported by the WIC between 1700-1738, and just over 47% of 
enslaved people during the free trade period of 1730-1803.231  
																																																								229	Ibid.,	180.		230	Ibid.,	124.		231	Johannes	Postma,	The	Dutch	in	the	Atlantic	Slave	Trade,	1600-1815	(Cambridge	and	New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1990),	114-121.	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	the	latter	period	
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 Dutch traders first arrived to the Gold Coast in the late sixteenth century, years 
before the foundation of the WIC. As part of their offensive against Portuguese claims in 
the Atlantic, the Dutch seized control of the Portuguese fort at Elmina in 1637. After the 
Portuguese retook their fort at Luanda in 1648, Elmina became the center for WIC 
operations on the African continent. The Elmina castle was the largest fort operating on 
the Gold Coast during the protocolonial period.232 It was heavily fortified, with cannons 
placed upon a massive, seemingly impenetrable stonewall that surrounded the castle.  
 About half of the WIC’s African staff, which oscillated between 200-400 people 
over the life span of the company, was housed at Elmina. The head of the operation was 
the Director General, who was head of a decision making counsel, which also included 
high-ranking military personnel. Most WIC employees in Africa were soldiers, who, 
along with sailors and craftsmen, made up about 4/5 of all WIC workers on the continent. 
The remaining workers were administrators.233  
 This military force allowed the Dutch to stake a considerable share in the Gold 
Coast trade. Until the turn of the eighteenth century, this trade consisted of an assortment 
of African goods, primarily gold, which were exchanged for an assortment of European 
and Asian goods, foremost were textiles, followed by guns, gun powder, alcoholic 
beverages, and small trinkets, primarily beads. This commercial and military prowess, 
which went hand in hand, gave the WIC the power to wield strong influence across local 
political, economic, and military events on the Gold Coast. When the Denkyara struggled 																																																																																																																																																																					is	rather	imprecise,	given	that	ships	with	an	unknown	destination	accounted	for	33.6%	of	the	records	consulted	by	Postma.			232	The	term	protocolonial	is	borrowed	from	Walter	Rodney.	See:	Walter	Rodney,	A	History	of	the	
Upper	Guinea	Coast:	1545-1800	(New	York:	Monthly	Review	Press,	1970).		233	Ibid.,	64.	
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against the Asante in the interior of the coast in the late seventeenth century, for example, 
the Dutch offered military support to the Denkyara until it was clear that the Asante 
would win in this struggle for access to Atlantic markets. Thereafter, the WIC paid the 
Asante tribute or land rent known to the Dutch as kostgeld. In exchange for preferential 
terms of trade over their European rivals, the Dutch paid the Asante King 6 ounces of 
gold a month, which was usually in the form of textiles that were valued at this amount. 
In exchange for this payment, the Asante assured protection for the Dutch and their 
presence at Elmina, as well as guaranteed a steady influx of enslaved people who were 
regularly brought to the castle in droves.234  
 After the WIC lost their monopoly on the Dutch slave trade in 1730, their role 
was to provide military and commercial support for private traders. The largest private 
company was the Middleburgh Commercial Company (MCC), which accounted for as 
much as 3/4 of all Dutch private trade in Africa after 1730.235 Nowhere was the MCC 
more active than on the Loango Coast.236   
 The Dutch first ventured into the Loango coast in 1593, and held a steady 
presence there through the nineteenth century. The Loango Coast, also referred to as 
Angola by Dutch and other European traders, was a 460 mile stretch of land along the 
Western Central African coast below Cape Lopez and above the Congo River. Loango 
was also the name of the dominant polity of the coast until the turn of the eighteenth 
century. Thereafter, the Kakongo and Ngoyo began to assert a role in the Atlantic trade, 																																																								234	Larry	W.	Yarak,	Asante	and	the	Dutch,	1744-1873	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	1990),	96-133.		235	Postma,	132.	The	Zeeland	region	accounted	for	over	77%	of	all	African	trade	during	the	period,	and	the	MCC	was	the	dominant	company.		236	Stacey	Jean	Muriel	Sommerdyk,	“Trade	and	the	Merchant	Community	of	the	Loango	Coast	in	the	Eighteenth	Century”	(Ph.D.	Diss.:	University	of	Hull,	2012),	115.	
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along with the Loango.237 As was the case throughout the continent, WIC slaving 
increased heavily during the 1670s. In the 1660s, the WIC set up a lodge on the Loango 
Coast, but closed it in 1686.238 Thereafter, WIC traders, like their European rivals, would 
have to fend for themselves without castles or lodges to protect them.  
 During the free trade period, independent Loango merchants handled most trade. 
In fact, 593 Loango merchants conducted business with the MCC between 1732-97. 
These were small merchants, however, as 85% of them traded an average of less than one 
enslaved person a year.239 Although reliable data is unavailable, it appears that most 
enslaved people were kidnapped on the coast, although some were brought from the 
interior, principally across the Mayombe rainforest, and traded to African merchants on 
the coast in exchange for Atlantic commodities.240  
 Once people were enslaved, they were transported to the coast for sale. On the 
Loango Coast, the captain of a Dutch vessel would fire a canon from their ship offshore. 
A Loango merchant and his workers would then guide the ship’s captain to an anchoring 
post. From there, the Loango merchant would board the ship to set trade terms. Once 
terms were agreed upon, the Dutch captain would check the availability of enslaved 
people and the level of European competition before they hired indigenous workers to set 
up a temporary base on land from where business would be conducted.241 
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 On the Gold Coast, business was managed through the WIC’s forts. Each fort 
would contract a caboceer, a local broker, usually someone who lived in the small 
commercial communities that lay outside of the fort’s walls. The caboceer would serve as 
an interpreter for local traders from the interior and collect outstanding debts.242 Enslaved 
people, once purchased, were kept in a dungeon below the fort, under tortuous and 
unsanitary conditions that bread much suffering, disease and death. Until 1730, the WIC 
would hold enslaved people in these dungeons until WIC ships arrived to purchase them. 
After 1730, however, most enslaved people on the private ships had already been 
purchased independent of the WIC forts. The role of the forts was still key, however, as 
they were almost always the last stop on the slaving voyage, and would provide food and 
commercial items, including the last human cargoes needed for the trip across the 
Atlantic.243  
 Until 1730, the WIC’s board of directors directed all slave shipments, including 
the African and American destinations and the desired size of the cargos. In The 
Netherlands, the ship had to be prepared, a crew was hired, merchandise was purchased 
from local merchants, and food—dried fish, smoked meats, break, beans, barley, cheese 
and spirits—was obtained in Holland for both the enslaved captives and the ship’s crew. 
This preparation usually took several months, followed by an average of 76 days voyage 
to West Africa. While on the continent, slaving crews spent as little as a month to as long 
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as a year obtaining enslaved people, although the average time spent in Africa was 92 
days.244 
 The middle passage was, of course, brutal, especially for the enslaved Africans on 
board. Upon Dutch ships, it was customary to place men in the slavegaaten or slave hole, 
chained to each other, whereas women and children were kept on deck, more easily 
subject, one could imagine, to the sexual tortures of their transporters. In the slavegaaten, 
men had only about 15 cubic feet of space. Enslaved people were fed twice a day, at 9 
AM and 5 PM, and the men in the slavegaaten were regularly brought on deck for fresh 
air, exercise, and the occasional dance party. These practices were considered essential in 
order to minimize death among their ranks. But death was inevitable. Historian Johannes 
Postma estimates that nearly 18% of enslaved people aboard WIC ships died during the 
middle passage between 1700 and 1739.245 
 Most of the enslaved victims of the WIC and their partners ended up on Curaçao 
for sale to nearby plantation regions, such as Coro. In the first thirty years of the 
eighteenth century, the WIC was responsible for nearly 20,000 enslaved people who 
arrived in Curaçao. By the eighteenth century, however, the slave trade via Curaçao had 
already declined, having reached its peak of over 23,000 enslaved people from 1662-
1674. By the late eighteenth century, the slave trade via Curaçao had declined 
considerably, a far cry from its heyday when it was the chief supplier for the entire 
Caribbean. The slave trade in Curaçao was still active in the late eighteenth century, 
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however, and this was one of the means by which enslaved people in Coro were procured 
up until the 1795 insurrection.246  
 But enslaved people were ultimately but one of the many commodities that were 
traded between Curaçao and Coro during the eighteenth century. Most eighteenth-century 
trade between Curaçao and Coro was illegal in Coro, however, as it was in all of Spain’s 
empire. Therefore, it is impossible to record exactly how much trade was conducted 
between Curaçao and Coro over this period. In 1778, however, various acts of “free 
trade” were incorporated in Spain’s American colonies, including The Captaincy General 
of Venezuela, which was upgraded to this status that same year.247 One of the free trade 
acts allowed for commerce in certain goods to certain foreign powers. The measures were 
meant to increase access to enslaved people and specie, two commodities that were 
needed in Venezuela, but that colonists had trouble accessing. Beginning in 1783, Coro’s 
Real Hacienda began recording recently legalized foreign commerce, which is indicative 
of the overall balance of trade between the two regions in the eighteenth century, as a 
whole. Data is currently available for most years between 1788-1794.  
 Data on imports from Curaçao is currently available for the years 1788-90 and 
1793-4.248 According to the free trade laws, only enslaved people and specie were to be 
imported from foreign colonies, but authorities in Coro recorded other goods as well.249 
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The vast majority of goods imported were tools needed in plantation production. In the 
five years that are available, Coro’s merchants imported 1,501 pesos worth of hoes, 983 
pesos and 1 real worth of machetes and 674 pesos 1 real worth of knives. For some 
reason, Coro’s authorities did not register imports of enslaved people or specie, which 
were presumably the items that returned to Coro in exchange for the region’s exports. 
The one exception is for 1793 when Coro’s authorities noted an importation of 713 pesos 
worth of silver coin. They did not, however, record the number of enslaved people 
imported. The 713 pesos of silver coin that was imported amounted to 27% of the 2,639.5 
pesos of imports that year, only superseded by the 910 pesos of hoes imported that year, 
which accounted for 34.48% of imports that year.250 
 Data on exports from Coro to Curaçao are much more complete, and is currently 
available for the years 1788-1790 and 1792-94. Most of Coro’s exports to Curaçao during 
these years were in sugar products, the overwhelming majority of these being panelas, 
blocks of raw sugar. In these six years, Coro’s merchants were recorded as exporting 
30,954 pesos and 6.5 reales worth of panelas (also known as papelónes), or 
approximately 54% of all exports to Curaçao. Second were cow hides, which equaled 
12,117 pesos or 21% of all exports, followed by bovine creatures that equaled 5,341 
pesos or 9.25% of exports, followed by Brazil wood at 3,644.5 pesos or 6.31% of all 
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exports to Curaçao. The rest of the recorded exports were primarily in deer, sheep, and 
goat hides, followed by other miscellaneous animal products including fish and turtles.251   
 There are, of course, many problems with this data. If the export data from Coro’s 
Real Hacienda is compared with Curaçao’s Day Register, Coro’s merchants sometimes 
arrived with goods that were not recorded during their exit from Coro. For example, in 
January of 1792, the Coriano merchant Don Francisco Lucambio was recorded as 
exporting only panelas from Coro. But when this shipment was recorded in Curaçao, the 
island authorities also noted that Lucambio had imported animal skins.252 Unfortunately, 
Curaçao’s Day Registers do not record the exact amount of goods imported or their 
value, nor do they register what was exported from the island. Another issue with this 
documentation is that, despite the legalization of trade, contraband was still common. 
Between January and June of 1792, for example, there were 18 boats from Coro 
registered as coming into Curaçao’s port at Willemstad, but only 14 recorded by Coro’s 
Real Hacienda as leaving for Curaçao.253 Some of these merchants were undoubtedly 
from Curaçao and conducted their trade off of Coro’s coast, as their names (of Dutch, 
Spanish, and Portuguese origin) do not come up in Coro’s accounting of any merchants 
exporting anywhere.  
 The above data does give clear indications about the nature of Coro-Curaçao 
traffic, however, particularly for exports. Panelas were the majority of exports from Coro 
to Curaçao, showing the dependence that Coro’s sugar plantations in the sierra had on 
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Curaçao as a consumption market. This evidence counters the common understanding in 
the historiography that Venezuelan sugar production was geared exclusively towards the 
domestic market.254 It seems clear that Coro’s sugar plantations were producing for 
foreign markets, particularly for merchants in Curaçao. In addition, if the export of cow 
hides are combined with those of the bovine animals themselves, they total 17,519.5 
pesos or 30.34% of exports to Curaçao, making bovine products the second largest area 
of domestic production for Curaçao’s market. Together with sugar, bovine products 
accounted for over 84% of all exports to Curaçao, followed by Brazil wood, which 
accounted for just over 6% of exports to Curaçao. Imports are trickier, however. In the 
five years that are available, 5,121 pesos 1.5 reales worth of goods were imported, but 
these number was exchanged for 45,175 pesos ½ real worth of exports. This makes a 
discrepancy of over 40,000 pesos. It is presumed that these goods were exchanged for 
specie and enslaved people, but we cannot know for sure at this time. These goods could 
have illegally been exchanged for luxury items such as textiles, jewelry, household 
furniture, or an assortment of other goods.255 
 It is also important to note that exports to Curaçao during these years were only a 
fraction of Coro’s overall exports, with the majority of products being shipped to French 
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colonies in the Caribbean.256 In fact, exports to the French Caribbean reached as high as 
78.5% in 1789 and 79% the year after, equaling approximately 62.5% of Coro’s exports 
from 1789-90 and 1792-4. Exports to the French colonies were mostly in mules and 
cattle. Curaçao was the second leading destination for Coro’s recorded exports, equaling 
19.4% for the years in question. Curaçao was challenged for second place by Spain’s 
other American colonies, which received approximately 16.5% of Coro’s recorded 
exports, with the remaining exports, just over 1.5% going to other ports in the Captaincy 
General of Venezuela. Not one import from the French colonies was recorded in the 
years in question, although it is presumed that the imports were of specie and enslaved 
people. The imports from other ports in Spanish America and Venezuela were mostly in 
foodstuffs.257  
 This data points to the fact that if it were not for the WIC, its shareholders, and its 
founders, Dutch shares in the Venezuelan trade would not have existed, and perhaps 
neither would have Coro’s plantations. But Coro’s plantations were found, and this was 
largely due to the WIC. The WIC, and by extension the lives of Coro’s rebels, existed, 
therefore, to meet the needs of Dutch merchants and investors, as well as the needs of the 
Dutch state, which was active in helping these parties achieve their financial goals.  
 After 1785, a commission was appointed to evaluate the WIC, which, despite its 
activity was struggling to stay afloat given its enormous overhead costs. The commission 																																																								256	This	counters	most	work	that	has	been	on	Venezuela,	Curaçao	and	contraband.	For	an	example,	see:		Wim	Klooster,	“Curaçao	as	a	Transit	Center	to	the	Spanish	Main	and	the	French	West	Indies,”	in	
Dutch	Atlantic	Connections,	1680-1800:	Linking	Empires,	Bridging	Borders,	ed.	Gert	J.	Oostindie	and	Jessica	V.	Roitman	(Leiden	and	Boston:	Brill,	2014),	25-51.		257	“1788,	pliego	3,”	Caracas	578,	AGI;	“1788,	pliego	4,”	Caracas	578,	AGI;	“1788,	pliego	5,”	Caracas	578,	AGI;	“1789,	pliego	3,	Caracas	578,	AGI;	“Libro	manual	de	la	Real	Caja	del	Departamento	de	Coro,”	Caracas	579,	AGI;	“1792,	pliego	4,”	Caracas	580,	AGI;	“1793,	pliego	2,”	Caracas	580,	AGI;	“Libro	manual	de	las	Reales	Cajas	del	Departamento	y	Ciudad	de	Coro,”	Caracas	581,	AGI.			
110	
recommended that the company be loaned 150,000 guilders to pay off its outstanding 
debts, and that the company be subsidized with 250,000 guilders a year until it’s charter 
expired in 1791.258 The WIC was disbanded that year and the State General compensated 
stockholders by paying their shares at 30% of their nominal value, although shares were 
selling at 22% at the time.259 In November of 1792, the Council of the Colonies was 
formed, and this government body took over the WIC’s administrative duties in Africa 
and the Caribbean.260 
 Through its 170 years of operation, the WIC managed to shape much of the 
Atlantic world, and nowhere was this influence felt stronger than in late eighteenth-
century Coro. Through its direct trade in enslaved Africans, as well as their facilitation of 
the trade in the years after they lost their monopoly, the WIC was perhaps the entity most 
responsible for transporting Coro’s rebels and their ancestors to the lifestyle they 
despised. The provision of enslaved people to Coro also buoyed the region’s plantation 
economy, which was at the heart of the rebels’ suffering. In addition, the WIC’s 
management of Curaçao throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries created an 
entrepôt that provided a permanent stimulation to this economy. Although the WIC no 
longer existed in 1795, it had furthered the interests of Dutch elites and laid the 
groundwork for a hierarchical political economy in Coro—one organized around the 
principal of white supremacy.  
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 The second company that shaped late eighteenth-century Coro had ceased 
operations in the region more than half a century before the 1795 insurrection. Great 
Britain’s South Sea Company (SSC) was awarded The Spanish Crown’s coveted asiento 
contract in 1713, giving the company the exclusive right to provide Spain’s American 
colonies with enslaved African people. The SSC was responsible for the shipment of 
about 75,000 enslaved people to Spanish America between 1715 and 1739, with about 
7%, or 5,240 of these people, being shipped to Venezuela. Many of these enslaved people 
ended up in Coro, and were the ancestors of the 1795 rebels.261 
 Founded in 1711, the SSC was a latecomer to England’s slaving activities, and 
benefitted from the work of its predecessors. England first set up a joint-stock company 
dedicated to the African slave trade in 1660 with the Company of Royal Adventurers 
Trading to Africa. The company would be reorganized and renamed the Royal African 
Company (RAC) in 1672, and the RAC received a 1000 year monopoly on the English 
slave trade. The RAC’s monopoly would not reach 1000 years, however, and was 
disbanded in 1752.262 Central to the founding of these companies was the desire amongst 
English elites to provide enslaved people to Spain’s colonies in the Americas, whether by 
legal or extralegal means.  
 The SSC was established with several aims, including the desire to make profits 
from the slave trade to Spanish America. The initial reasoning given to form the SSC, 
however, was to restructure England’s spiraling debt, which was thought to weaken the 
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country militarily during a time when military conflict and territorial expansion was 
ubiquitous. In addition, the company was envisioned as a Ponzi scheme in which its 
principal proponents could speculate and make big earnings. This scheme would lead to 
the 1720 London stock market bubble and it’s bursting, making the SSC responsible for 
one of the first stock market crashes in history. 
 But the financial goals of the company would not be possible without trade, and 
therefore, the SSC was organized with the aim of procuring Spain’s asiento.263 The 
asiento contract was thought to be so profitable that the company was able to raise capital 
with ease, especially when this contract was confirmed two years after the company was 
established. The SSC was awarded the asiento on a 30 year contract in 1713, and began 
providing enslaved people to Spain’s American colonies soon after. They were to provide 
these colonies with 4,800 piezas de indias a year. A pieza de india was a subjective 
measuring tool used to evaluate the fitness of an enslaved person and their body. Men 
over 4 feet 10 inches tall were considered a whole “piece” as long as they had no physical 
“defects.” Women and children could be counted as less than one “piece,” but this was 
not always the case.264 Per the asiento contract, the SSC also had the right to send one 
ship a year carrying commodities other than enslaved people to any Spanish American 
port. Although the SSC could ship European commodities to any Spanish American port, 
they only shipped to Veracruz, Cartagena, and Porto Bello throughout the country’s 
history.  
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 In a sample size of 134 SSC ships, historian Colin Palmer found that 55.9% of the 
SSC’s captives came from either the Loango Coast or the Gold Coast, with 32.8% being 
purchased in the former region.265 The SSC did not own many ships used in the slave 
trade, but rented most, and commissioned a captain and a crew. The SSC utilized the 
RAC both to procure enslaved people and to serve as protector of their interests. 
Oftentimes, the purchases of enslaved people had been previously arranged with the 
RAC. Perhaps just as often, however, enslaved people were procured in the same way the 
private traders obtained enslaved people, by conducting operations on their own, though 
relying on RAC support by way of their military presence, particularly at their forts.  
 The RAC operated between 15 and 20 settlements during the lifespan of the SSC. 
These structures, varying in degree from massive castles to fortified enclosures of several 
buildings, to small factories meant to be used temporarily, housed between 200-300 
soldiers, sailors, and administrators.266 By far the most important settlement, and the 
military and administrative center of the British Empire in Africa was Cape Coast Castle, 
located in the town of Fetu on the Gold Coast. Second in size only to the Dutch castle of 
Elmina, Cape Coast Castle was built by Swedish merchants in 1652, sold to the Royal 
Company of Adventurers twelve years later, and inherited by the RAC. In 1710, Cape 
Coast Castle was described as being defended by out-works, being surrounded by 14-foot 
thick walls, being protected by 74 large guns sitting atop, as well as many small arms 
held inside. Also inside, there were living quarters for those stationed at the castle as well 
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as warehouses, water tanks and workshops. There were also underground enclosures 
meant to hold up to 1,000 enslaved people.267 
 The RAC wielded much power on the Gold Coast, and many considered the 
company’s military establishments to be necessary for trade, particularly for maintaining 
an upper hand. Relations between Europeans and Africans were consistently marked with 
tension that could turn violent. The kidnapping of white traders for ransom, for example, 
was a common practice during the RAC’s tenure. There are also reports of RAC 
employees taking African traders hostage in order to settle debts, and to enact other forms 
of violence to maintain control in the region. In 1726, Liverpool merchants reported that 
Africans preferred trading at sea rather than at the forts, because at the latter they were 
liable to receive “abuses.”268  
 Enslaved people were procured by the RAC and the SSC in much the same way 
as the WIC and Dutch merchants acquired them. The RAC paid 9 marks of gold or 288 
pounds as rent for the Cape Coast Castle.269 Indigenous allies would provide enslaved 
people to the RAC and the company would exchange European and Asian commodities, 
particularly textiles, for enslaved people. Enslaved people were placed in the dungeons 
below Cape Coast Castle and in other forts, where they were put in irons around their feet 
and/or their neck.  
 The Cape Coast Castle dungeon was notorious for its unsanitary conditions, 
which worried the directors of the company who felt that too many enslaved people were 
dying after being purchased. In 1718, the Cape Coast Castle surgeon recommended that 																																																								267	Davies,	248.		268	Palmer,	34.		269	Davies,	282.		
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enslaved people be given buckets where they could urinate and pass bowels. It appears 
then, as Palmer points out, that enslaved people were forced to sit and stand in their own 
excrement. These conditions, the company directors believed, were unsustainable, and 
had to be improved in order to preserve the lives of their human commodities. The 
directors’ instructions and the surgeon’s recommendations do not appear to have been 
heeded, however, as similar complaints were repeated in 1721 and again the year after.270 
 After suffering through these conditions, enslaved people were then purchased by 
SSC agents. Captain William Eyre, Commander of the ship Russell, undertook a typical 
SSC voyage in 1723. Eyres was hired by the SSC to sail from London to Cape Coast 
Castle and then to Jamaica. At Cape Coast Castle, Eyres was to receive 340 enslaved 
people from RAC agents. Eyres was instructed to take the River Themes out towards 
Guinea, while insuring that the ship’s gunpowder be safely stored away, and that the 
ship’s gunner be a “sober careful person.” 271 Once flanked outside of Cape Coast Castle, 
Eyres and his crew were to stay on the Gold Coast for no longer than 60 days. Before 
beginning to load enslaved people onto the Russell, he was to first load the Atlantic 
voyage’s provisions, which had already been purchased from the RAC in London. These 
included 14 bushels of salt, 280 chests of corn, 170 pounds of malgitta and 70 gallons of 
palm oil.  
 Enslaved people were to be brought on board, 40 at a time, and Eyres was given 
specific instructions on how to handle his human cargo, so as to minimize losses. He and 
the ship’s surgeon were to examine every enslaved person they took onto the ship, to 																																																								270	Palmer,	42-4.		271	“Instructions	to	Captain	William	Eyres,”	MS	255567,	The	British	Library,	London,	The	United	Kingdom,	ff.	10.	
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ensure that “no one wants neither limb or eye, nor that they have any dangerous 
distemper sore or wound nor be lame sick meagre or refuse.”272 The SSC requested that 
half of the enslaved people boarded be men, and that six out of seven of them be between 
the ages of 16 and 30. The remaining seventh of the cargo should comprise of boys and 
girls no younger than 10 years old. It seems that Eyres was asked to take 40 enslaved 
people at a time because they had to wait for the RAC to receive periodic supplies of 
enslaved people, meaning that not all 340 people were available at once. Eyres was also 
told that if any enslaved person were to die on board during the loading period, that the 
RAC was required to provide replacements. Once all of the enslaved people were 
procured, Eyres was to receive a receipt from RAC authorities and take a copy with him 
to Jamaica.  
 Once on the way to Jamaica, Eyres was to make a list of everyone on board, 
including the enslaved people, along with descriptions of them. If someone was to die on 
the crossing, he was to “note the numbers at the close of each muster distinguishing their 
ages and sexes.”273 He was also instructed to not throw any dead overboard without the 
knowledge of the chief mate and surgeon. Eyres also had to create a certificate of death 
that included the date and time of death, as well as swear an oath. If any enslaved person 
died on the voyage, and they were not documented in this fashion, Eyres was warned that 
he would not get paid. Eyres was instructed “to take particular care that the tobacco beef 
and spirits laid in for the negroes be expended amongst them and not wasted or 
embezzled by your men which waste and embezelments has sometimes occasioned great 
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mortality.”274 In addition, Eyres was instructed to wash the Russell’s deck frequently with 
vinegar, and to “divert” his enslaved captives with “musick and play as much as you 
can.”275 Finally, Eyres was warned to not mix drinking water with salt water and to give a 
written account of what works and what does not work in terms of “what may conduce 
most to their preservation.”276 While in Jamaica, Eyres was to be compensated four 
enslaved people for every 104 people that survived the middle passage and made it to 
Jamaica.  
 Upon their arrival to Jamaica, captains such as Eyres would transfer custody of 
the enslaved people to SSC agents on the island. Enslaved people would then go through 
a “refreshment” period that lasted weeks but no longer than 30 days. During this period, 
SSC agents were charged with improving the physical condition of enslaved people, in 
order to make them more attractive for purchase in Spanish America. These agents were 
instructed to feed enslaved people twice a day with meals that included beef, fish, rice, 
bread, yams, fruit, rum and tobacco. Once enslaved people were considered ready for 
their next voyage, they were placed on one of the many ships that the SSC contracted to 
send their human cargo to Spanish American ports, such as Coro and Caracas. The 
contractors were usually local owners of small vessels who were usually paid a fixed sum 
per head sold in Spanish America. The ship-owner or captain manned the ship and 
travelled to the destinations, but the SSC provided the voyage’s provisions. Some 
enslaved people, perhaps as many as a quarter before 1730, were purchased by the SSC 
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from other traders in Jamaica.277 About 13% of enslaved people died on SSC trips such as 
these from 1720-1725.278  
 Sometimes, however, the SSC would contract captains in London to sail directly 
to Jamaica to provide enslaved people to markets in Spanish America. One such case 
occurred with Captain James Dufay on the SSC’s sloop The Queen of Spain.279 Dufay 
was tasked with sailing to Jamaica to work in the service of the company’s 
representatives there. He was to be paid 8 pounds a month, plus the 10 pounds he was 
given ahead of time for provisions. He was to stay in Jamaica to follow directions of the 
factors there and take enslaved people to any point in Spanish America where he was 
requested to go. He was to receive bills of health before leaving Jamaica, and he was to 
receive another one after departing every Spanish American factory he visited to unload 
his human cargo. As was the case with Eyres, Dufay was instructed to keep the sloop 
clean and to register any enslaved people who died during his travels.280 
 Planters in Spanish America were notoriously picky about the enslaved people 
they purchased. Factors in Caracas pressed the SSC to provide them with African-born 
enslaved people, and the SSC responded by trying to ensure that the enslaved people 
provided to Caracas were dark-skinned. In edition, enslaved women were to be deemed 
sexually attractive and “as near as possible be all virgins.”281 In 1736, the Caracas factor 
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in their faces nor filed teeth.”282 Three years later, an agent in Caracas requested that 
enslaved men be no older than 25, and be preferably between 20 and 24 years old, while 
women be from 18 to 20 and no older than 22.283  
 In Coro, it seems that the “license trade,” in which an entrepreneurial slaver 
would purchase a license to carry enslaved people to Spanish America from the SSC, 
provided the majority of enslaved people to the region. The licensed traders dominated 
the trade in enslaved people to the more peripheral regions of the empire, such as Coro. 
This was certainly the case before 1735, when Caracas was upgraded to a factory due to 
years of increasing demand.284  
 It is also likely that many enslaved people who ended up in Coro were purchased 
in Curaçao by the SSC. The company is known to have purchased a small percentage of 
enslaved people from Dutch traders in St. Eustatius and Curaçao, and this was 
particularly the case for Caracas.285 In 1730, the SSC’s factors in Caracas mention that a 
Mr. Murray Crymble, was the “agent and attorney for Curaçao and Coro for some 
years.”286 This letter is the only form of documentation that is currently available, which 
references asiento operations in Coro. It indicates that the function of the asiento in Coro 
was intimately tied to Curaçao, so much so that the Caracas factors of the SSC assigned 
an agent to cover the two places together.   
																																																								282	Ibid.,	62-3.		283	Ibid.			284	Ibid.,	71-9.		285	Ibid.,	59.			286	“Copy	of	a	letter	wrote	by	Cobitt	and	Berrie	Factors	at	Caracas,”	SP	36/18/187,	The	National	Archives,	Kew,	United	Kingdom,	ff.	190.	
120	
 Spanish planters were considered to be unhappy with the prices provided by the 
SSC, and as a result, many turned to contrabandists. In Coro, it’s likely that this was the 
case, particularly with Curaçao so nearby. Contrabandists did not have the same overhead 
costs as the SSC, so they could sell enslaved people to planters for 120 pesos or less, 
while the company sold enslaved people for between 200 and 300 pesos. In response to 
the problem of contraband, the SSC tried to lower prices of enslaved people, to 200 
pesos, in 1734 Cuba for example. The SSC even allowed for “indultos,” which were 
essentially fines doled out against interlopers whose illegally traded human commodities 
were declared legal after payment. Between 1716-19, 91 enslaved people were brought 
into Caracas via this method. 287  
 Payments by Spanish planters for enslaved people were always a problem for the 
SSC everywhere, and this was also true of Venezuela. In 1736, Caracas’s Treasurer, Don 
Joseph de Armas, informed the Commander General of the Province of Venezuela that 
the SSC was becoming less willing to accept payment for enslaved people in cacao.288 
Armas claimed that in 1733, they traded about 6,000 fanegas of cacao to the SSC, but 
that this number dropped in half the following year, and in 1735, it had reached a low of 
1,000 fanegas.289 The SSC would respond to this issue in a way that favored the planters 
and Venezuela’s authorities. In 1736, the SSC declared that all of the enslaved people 
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they sent to Venezuela would be exchanged for “fruits of the country,” or agricultural 
products, such as cacao.290  
 Much of the cacao produced in Coro ended up in London during this period, and 
some wound up being sipped by the company’s stockholders as they bought and sold 
shares in the SSC. London’s Stock Exchange was organized in coffee shops scattered 
around a part of town known as Exchange Alley. At these houses, traders would sip 
chocolate, tea, and coffee as they bought and sold shares in a handful of publicly owned 
companies, one of the most prominent of which was the SSC. Buyers and sellers could 
operate at the coffee houses by themselves, or they could hire a broker who was paid a 
.5% commission.291 By the time of the 1720 bubble, London’s newspapers were 
publishing stock quotations, and these papers would circulate around the Alley’s coffee 
shops.292  
 Although some of the SSC’s proponents may have anticipated the 1720 Bubble 
with glee, they probably did not foresee it’s bursting that same year, especially not when 
the company was first proposed. On March 7, 1711, Member of Parliament Robert 
Harley spoke in front of his London colleagues to present a plan on how to restructure the 
government’s debt, which had become a concern for some time. England had begun 
accruing debt in 1693 once Parliament ruled to guarantee all debt that had thereto been 
personal debt of the King.293 Harley proposed that part of the government debt be 
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restructured through the formation of a joint-stock company that would trade in the South 
Seas. The plan envisioned government bonds being converted to stock in the new 
company, which could potentially save the government millions of pounds in interest 
payments, make the country more fiscally stable, and hence, allow it to acquire more 
debt. Harley was a Tory and his plan received much ridicule because it ruffled the 
feathers of the entrenched Whig interests of the East India Company and the Bank of 
England. Harley’s proposal was so ill received by the Whigs that he even was stabbed 
right after his speech. But Harley would eventually survive his wounds and spearhead the 
company’s formation once he regained his health less than two months later.294 
 Many interests converged to make the South Sea Company happen. First and 
foremost, were those interests of the Kingdom of Great Britain. With the expansion of 
Atlantic warfare in the seventeenth century, increased capital investments were needed 
for growing militaries and their ships, armor, and weapons.295 The strength of a state’s 
finances was essential to their ability to fight wars. War overseas was taking up over 1/3 
of government expenditures in 1710, and these could only be met if the state was able to 
continue borrowing. Another third of state revenues were being used to make interest 
payments, and this figure was projected to rise to 50% by 1714-17.296 A collapse in credit 
issued in Europe following the great frost of 1709, made matters more difficult, and this 
certainly influenced the timing of Harley’s proposal.297  
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 At the time of the South Sea’s founding, the English government held 9.47 
million pounds in interest arrears.298 These bonds were not highly valued, as they were 
being traded at 32 percent on the stock market.299 Therefore, the state’s amount of short-
term debt was damaging its credit standing and making it more expensive for the 
government to borrow.300 Harley’s plan, then, was to convert the government’s floating 
debt into stock for a company that held a monopoly on trade to Spain’s American 
colonies. In addition, the government would set up an annual tax fund of 558,678 pounds, 
which would be transferred to the SSC. With this money, the SSC could disperse annual 
dividends to their shareholders.301 The holders of government bonds were forced to 
convert their assets into SSC stock, but as will be seen shortly, they were happy to do 
so.302  
  Spanish American markets were massive, and coveted by all European powers 
for this reason. These markets were closed off to legal commerce, however, except for 
times of need during wartime, and more significantly, except for the asiento. Providing 
enslaved people to Spanish America held the potential for being a profitable exercise, and 
just as importantly, it gave the holding power the ability to dominate their rivals in the 
Atlantic. With the asiento in hand, states could stake their claim to the largest consumer 
market in the Americas while effectively closing these markets off to their rivals. In 
addition, it gave states the legal right to confiscate contrabandists’ goods in the Americas. 																																																								298	Ibid.			299	Dale,	41.			300	Ibid.,	42.			301	Sperling,	1.			302	Carswell,	45.		
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Although traffic in goods other than enslaved people was usually banned in asiento 
contracts, asiento holders took advantage of Spanish colonists’ desires for European 
products, which could be provided more cheaply via illegal trade, under cover of asiento 
trade. It is safe to assume that many, if not most, slaving vessels carried a host of 
contraband goods, although exact amounts are impossible to know for sure, due to their 
dubious legality.  
 It is important to note here that although the SSC did not hold the asiento when 
the company was approved by Parliament, it was assumed to be coming as a result of the 
anticipated peace with France during the War of Spanish Succession (1701-14). Sure 
enough, five months after the SSC scheme was approved by Parliament, France and 
England came to a secret agreement that saw France grant England the asiento of their 
Spanish allies. This agreement would be officially ratified two years later.303  
 It was not just the British state that hoped to benefit from the establishment of the 
SSC, as another, just as influential band led to the company’s erection. This group was 
comprised of the speculators John Blunt, George Caswall, Jacob Sawbridge and Elias 
Turner. The latter three men were partners in the Sword Blade Company, which received 
a royal charter in 1691 to manufacture French-style sword blades, which were grooved 
rather than the traditional English swords, which were flat.304 Blunt took control of the 
company in 1700, and along with Caswall, Sawbridge, Turner, and others began to utilize 
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the company as a front to dip into public finance operations, which was legally 
monopolized by the Bank of England.305  
 The Sword Blade Company and the Bank of England would go to war over the 
right to serve as the Kingdom’s bank. The drama began when lands confiscated by Irish 
Jacobites were put up for auction by the British government in the aftermath of the 
Williamite War in Ireland. The Sword Blade Company was one of the largest purchasers 
of Irish land, and by the fall of 1702, they had purchased 200,000 pounds worth. To pay 
for this land, the Sword Blade Company used its privilege to issue stock, which was not 
purchased with cash but exchanged for Army Debentures, or government debt. The 
debentures stood at 85% on the market, and were converted at 100%. Through these 
manipulations, the government was able to make a substantial profit, which they used to 
cancel 200,000 pounds of debt.306 It is likely, although not confirmed, that the Sword 
Blade directors held Army debentures themselves, and thus made a handsome profit off 
of their sale.307 
 After this charade was concluded, the Sword Blade Company began issuing 
mortgages and providing other financial services with the land they now owned, which 
precipitated conflict with the Bank of England. Legal action was taken against the Sword 
Blade Company in 1707, when the Bank had its charter prolonged another 25 years. In 
addition, the Bank’s new charter included language aimed at the Sword Blade Company 
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and their ability to extend credit, as a conglomerate of more than six individuals.308 By 
the following year, the Sword Blade Company was nearly bankrupt. Loyal heirs to the 
Jacobites who had their land confiscated were claiming legal ownership to the land in 
question, and the Sword Blade Company shares had fallen to 51%.309 Only a new venture 
could save the company, as well as the fortunes of Blunt, Caswall, Sawbridge, and 
Turner. 
 This new venture came in the form of the SSC. It is nearly certain that months 
before Harley proposed the idea of an SSC, Blunt and Caswall had been in contact with 
him, encouraging the idea.310 What is known for sure is that Blunt was appointed by 
Harley to draft the SSC’s charter, and that Blunt, his brother, Caswall, and Sawbridge 
would be named to the SSC’s directorate.311 In addition, the Sword Blade Company 
became the SSC’s official bank.312 The Sword Blade Company’s history of speculation, 
insider trading, and government debt conversion would weave itself into the very nature 
of the SSC venture, lead to the 1720 bubble and its bursting, and contribute to the 
downfall of the SSC.  
 Political interests also contributed to the formation of the SSC and the makeup of 
its directors and governors. Harley, a Tory, hoped to establish a financial interest for his 
political party, one that could rival the Whig-dominated institutions of the Bank of 
England and the East India Company. The East India Company’s directorate included 19 																																																								308	Ibid.,	31-2.			309	Ibid.,	32.		310	Carswell,	35;	Dale,	46.			311	Sperling,	6.		312	Ibid.;	Paul,	47.	
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Whigs, just four Tories, and one director who was elected by both political parties. The 
Whigs chose all 24 directors of The Bank of England.313 Harley managed to control the 
appointment of the SSC’s governors and directors, the vast majority of whom were Tory 
merchants and politicians.314 In addition, the SSC’s charter stipulated that no governor or 
director of the Bank of England or the East India Company could serve a similar position 
for the SSC.315 
 Governors and directors of the SSC were also investors, which motivated them to 
participate in the company. Governors were required to hold 5,000 pounds of stock, and 
directors were to hold 3,000 pounds. In addition, governors received 500 pounds a year 
as salary, sub-governors received 300 pounds, deputy-governors earned 250 pounds and 
directors received 150 pounds. Although illegal, SSC directors were known to carry on 
personal trade with the SSC, and had inside information on Atlantic market conditions. 
Finally, directors were motivated by the ability to have inside information on the 
company for the purposes of speculation.316  
 As mentioned above, although stockholders were probably forced to convert their 
government bonds into SSC stock, they were happy to do so. Government bonds were not 
transferable or inheritable, but stock was. Therefore, a creditor or investor could buy and 
sell stock shares at her or his discretion, which was not possible in the case of 
government debt.317 But joint-stock companies were few, and investors took advantage of 																																																								313	Sperling,	7.		314	Ibid.		315	Ibid.,	17.		316	Ibid.,	17.		317	Paul,	32-3.	
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the opportunity to purchase stock in these companies when they could. In addition, the 
SSC’s access to yearly payments by the British government made the investment a safe 
one, and one that guaranteed an annual dividend. In addition, converting their individual 
bonds into stock for a big company gave stockholders more leverage to collect their debts 
from the government.318 
 Stockholders were also motivated by the potential for profit, which was laid out in 
the initial plans of the SSC. Although concrete details were not given as to how trade 
would be completed in Spain’s American colonies, the public was led to believe that the 
SSC would have “security ports” throughout the region, which would allow them to 
conduct trade.319 The idea was also floated around that the SSC would conquer portions 
of Spanish American territory, and that this could lead to limitless possibilities for profit 
with a company that held a monopoly on commerce for the region.320 The fact that the 
Royal Navy protected SSC ships also offered security to their investments.321  
 The Spanish Crown was also an interested party in the formation of the SSC 
because their many colonies relied on the labor of enslaved African people, and these 
could only be provided to the colonies through a contract with a foreign merchant or 
government. The SSC was formed, after all, when England had established itself as the 
major military power in the Atlantic. The fact that the Royal Navy protected SSC 
shipments was, again, a form of security for the Spanish Crown. In addition, the RAC—
who provided many of the enslaved people that were purchased by the SSC—were the 																																																								318	Ibid.,	46.		319	Sperling,	11.		320	Sperling,	9;	Paul,	6.		321	Paul,	7.	
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most efficient traders in enslaved people in the Atlantic; their voyages were faster and 
they were capable of trading more enslaved people, per tonnage, than any of their 
competitors.322 From the standpoint of the Spanish Crown, then, the agreement with the 
SSC must have been considered a success, despite the fact that the company fell about 
20,000 bodies short of providing the 95,000 enslaved people to Spain’s colonies during 
its 25 years of activity.   
 Trade, however, had ceased being the principle concern of the SSC’s directors 
early into the life of the company, if it had ever been the principle concern at all. 
Throughout the period between the commencement of trade activities and the 1720 
bubble, the SSC continued to convert government debt into stock shares, and this was 
where the vast majority of the company’s capital resided. The 1720 bubble, then, was the 
culmination of a series of speculative moves made by the SSC, which would change the 
character of the company.  
 In 1719, Parliament agreed to a scheme to convert lottery annuities into SSC 
stock, which would bring instant profits to the government, annuitants, and the SSC 
itself.  94,330 pounds of lottery annuities were converted to SSC stock as a result, and 
this was capitalized at 1,084,790 pounds, in accordance with their current market price of 
11.5 years purchase. In addition to this sum, 117,912 pounds of stock were issued as 
arrears of interest, and the government was loaned 544,142 pounds. As a result of these 
maneuvers, the SSC’s nominal capital was increased by 1,746,844 over night, reaching a 
total of 11,746,844 pounds. The holders of the lottery annuities made a profit of 117,912 
pounds after converting their holdings. The SSC made a profit of 76,522 pounds after 
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they sold 520,000 pounds of stock at 114%, which netted them a profit of 48,658 pounds 
cash and 27,522 pounds worth of stock.323   
 Later that year, the King of Great Britain gave a speech that would precipitate the 
1720 bubble and it’s bursting. The King urged members of the House of Commons to 
come up with a plan to reorganize all of the country’s debt. That month, Blunt proposed a 
scheme in which the SSC would convert all of the country’s existing debt into SSC 
shares. The Bank of England countered this offer, before the SSC provided a counter 
offer and won Parliament’s approval to restructure as much as 30,981,712 worth of 
government debt, all debt held by the country, which was not owned by the Bank of 
England or the East India Company.324 The company would pay 4,156,305 pounds for the 
privilege of converting the redeemable debt and they agreed to pay a percentage for the 
irredeemable debt, which could have fetched a total of 3.4 million pounds. Therefore, the 
SSC agreed to pay the government as much as 7.5 million pounds for the privilege to 
convert state bonds into SSC stock. This scheme was designed to have the effect of 
saving the government 422,499 pounds in annual interest payments until 1727, and 
542,499 in the years following.325 
 But the SSC did not have 7.5 million pounds. In order to raise this money, then, 
they would have to inflate the price of their stock. As was the case during the 1719 debt 
swap, the SSC could only issue new shares for the same amount of government debt that 
they converted. However, if the prices of the shares were high enough over their nominal 
value, then they would not have to convert all of the new shares they acquired. If they 																																																								323	Sperling,	26.		324	Sperling,	27-8.		325	Ibid.	
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were able to convert the 24 million pounds of government debt, for example, and sell the 
shares at twice the price of their nominal value, then they would have 12 million pounds 
of surplus stock with which they could sell at the prevailing rates, pay the government 
what they owed them, and keep the rest as profits.  
 This is, in effect, what happened. In order to attract investors to the scheme, 
which was not a mandatory transfer, the SSC agreed to make shareholders eligible for 
loans from the company, and issued favorable terms, such as payments for shares in 
installments. By the time the 1720 SSC bill passed, the price per share had risen from 130 
when the bill was first introduced, to 300 when the first stocks were sold three months 
later. By this time, the vast majority of the company’s capital was held in government 
debt, and its cash flow was mostly the result of the sale of shares, rather than from the 
Atlantic trade. Therefore, when the SSC lent money to subscribers, they were lending 
them their own money, and when they issued dividends, they were doing the same. But 
the public was unaware and stock prices went out of control, raising from 302 on April 1, 
1720, ballooning to 610 on June 1 of that year, and reaching a high of 950 the following 
month. Stock prices would then steadily decline through the next couple of months before 
they began their sharp decline in October, reaching the price of 290. This total fell to 192 
two months later, and to 155 two weeks after that.326  
 By this time, the vast majority of shareholders had purchased their stocks at prices 
well above their nominal value or their prevailing market price. Fortunes were lost, and 
the country’s political and economic elites were incensed at the company. An 
investigation into the SSC and the 1720 bubble brought down a host of MP’s charged 
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with taking bribes, and brought down the company’s directors who were forced to pay 
huge fines to the government.  
 The largest task of Parliament, however, was to ensure that the British state was 
not harmed during these proceedings.327 In late December, in the aftermath of the 
bubble’s bursting, Parliament passed a resolution stating that the SSC debt conversions 
were final, and that no changes would be made to return the state’s burden to the levels at 
which it existed before the swaps commenced in April. Parliament then acted to soften 
the blow to investors and to rescue the SSC itself. Parliament acted to cancel over 7/8ths 
of the company’s debt to the government, leaving this total at 1 million pounds. The SSC 
would be obliged to pay the government 2 million pounds in cash, plus interest to the 
government by the summer of 1722. Still burdened with over 7 million pounds of debt, 
which was owed to the public, Parliament allowed the company to sell part of the annuity 
the government was contractually required to provide them every year. This move 
effectively restored the SSC’s credit, and they were able to resume the sale of shares 
pegged to the nearly 17 million pounds of capital it still held in government bonds.328 
 After the bubble burst, and the SSC’s financial health was restored, the trade with 
the Americas, with Venezuela, and with Coro, changed little. The RAC continued to 
supply a large amount of enslaved people to the Americas on the behalf of the SSC, but 
these shipments halted in 1724, when the SSC began purchasing all enslaved people from 
private traders at Jamaica and Barbados.329 The asiento contract with the SSC was 
terminated five years early with the outbreak of the War of Jenkins’ Ear, which pitted 																																																								327	Ibid.,	34.		328	Ibid.,	44-7.		329	Ibid.,	39.	
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Spain against England in a tit for tat of ship confiscations in the Americas. The Spanish 
Crown bought out the final years of the contract for 100,000 pounds.330 Thereafter, the 
SSC continued its work managing Great Britain’s debt, serving as an intermediary for 
interest payments between the government and SSC stockholders until the company was 
disbanded in 1855.331  
 All in all, the SSC was responsible for ruining the lives of nearly 75,000 people 
and responsible for the deaths of thousands more, structuring the plantation economy of 
Coro in the process. The SSC performed these tasks as an instrument designed to further 
the interests of merchant and financial elites, but most importantly, those of the British 
state. Erected in order to cancel the country’s spiraling debt, the SSC was able to 
accomplish this while allowing the country to further its military engagements and 
expand its reach into the Atlantic and its markets. The bubble fiasco, aimed at enlarging 
the pockets of the company’s directors and its key shareholders, resulted in the 
conversion of most of Great Britain’s debt, giving the country the ability to continue its 
campaign of dispossession of non-European peoples. Great Britain’s ability to continue 
its expansion would not have been possible without the SSC and the ancestors of Coro’s 
rebels.  
 
The Real Companía Guipuzcoana 
 
  Given that they held a monopoly on the Venezuelan market, the Real Compañía 
Guizpocoana (RCG), also known as the Caracas Company, was the company that, on 																																																								330	Paul,	110-11.		331	Sperling,	48-9.	
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paper, most directly shaped the conditions that spurred the 1795 insurrection in Coro. The 
RCG was founded in 1728 through a partnership between the Spanish Crown and Basque 
merchants who were engaged in the trade of Venezuelan cacao. The company was 
granted a monopoly on Venezuelan trade soon after its establishment, and its activities 
stimulated plantation production in Coro and provided many of the region’s consumer 
goods. But the company also engaged in a number of other enterprises, including the 
slave trade. Taken together, the RCG’s efforts converted Venezuela from a backwater 
dependent on government subsidies to a Captaincy General, and one of Spain’s most 
valuable colonies.332 
 The impetus for forming the RCG was the Crown’s desire to stimulate the cacao 
economy of Venezuela, and to gain control of this trade, which had been encroached 
upon by foreign merchants. Chocolate consumption was growing throughout Europe, 
from the stock trading alleys of London to the homes of middling families in Madrid. In 
fact, it appears that its consumption grew steadily since the mid seventeenth century. In 
Spain, books were written on chocolate as early as 1625.333 The vast majority of Europe’s 
supply of cacao beans, from which chocolate was produced, came from Venezuela. 
Despite this fact, non-Spanish merchants, particularly the Dutch, controlled much of the 
Atlantic cacao trade. It was claimed that no ship had sailed directly from Spain to 
Venezuela from 1706-1721, and that between 1700 and 1728, only five ships had made 
the voyage.334 In fact, this was a worrying trend for the Empire as a whole, as in 1705 it 
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was estimated that no Spanish ship had sailed to Peru in 10 years, or to New Spain in six 
years. The Spanish Crown, then, was desperate to revitalize their American trade, and 
Venezuela was considered an untapped goldmine.335  
 The semi-autonomous Basque region of Spain was home to the Province of 
Guipuzcoa—a region that had been active in the cacao trade for decades before the 
erection of the RCG. Guipuzcoa was a sovereign state united to the Spanish Crown by a 
common King. The Province held its own assembly and was not required to provide men 
for military service. They also had some autonomy in their commercial affairs.336 In fact, 
the Province had tried unsuccessfully for years to have certain duties removed from 
nearby ports in the interest of increasing the cacao trade, and combatting contraband. The 
Province of Guizpucoa, then, decided to pursue a different strategy to further their 
interests in the trade, and to reanimate Spain’s fledgling empire. They would erect a joint-
stock company, a partnership between the Province, its merchants, and the King of Spain; 
one that would intervene in the foreign-dominated cacao trade and promote the 
development of a potentially rich but underutilized colony in Venezuela.337  
 The Basque Province’s representative, Felipe de Aguirre, proposed the idea to the 
Crown, which approved the formation of the Real Compañía Guipuzcoana de Caracas in 
1728.338 It was clear from the asiento offered the RCG that taking the cacao trade into the 
Crown’s hands was the company’s primary purpose. Although the document has 
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deteriorated, and not all of the its words can be read, the first sentence of the contract 
stated that the Company was erected to:  
remedy the scarceness of cacao…in this Kingdom…and facilitate to the relief of the 
public, that without having to depend on the judgment of Foreigners that unjustly and 
fraudulently enjoyed this, and from whose hand the cacao was purchased, this will be 
managed by Spanish Traders.339 
 
 The 1728 contract, then, gave the RCG permission to send two ships a year to 
Venezuela, each equipped with 40-50 guns. These vessels could unload their 
merchandise at Caracas’s port of La Guayra and at Puerto Cabello. The ships were given 
permission to sail directly from Guipuzcoan ports, but return voyages would need to stop 
in Cádiz to pay import duties. At first, however, the King refused to agree to a monopoly 
on the Venezuelan market, but this would change just two years later, when the King 
agreed to grant no other licenses for Venezuelan trade, and the legal monopoly was 
issued in 1741.340 
 Shares were initially divided between the Spanish Crown, the Province of 
Guipuzcoa, and Basque merchants, but it would later include elite Venezuelans as well. 
When first erected, the RCG was tasked with raising 1.5 million pesos by issuing 3,000 
shares, valued at 500 pesos each. The King of Spain was the company’s largest 
shareholder, with 200 shares, followed by the Guipuzcoan Province at 100 shares.341 But 
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750,000 pesos in the five years in which actions were issued.342 As state bodies held only 
20% of the company’s shares, the vast majority of shareholders were private individuals, 
and most were probably Spanish merchants, particularly those from the Basque country. 
Twenty five percent of shareholders held less than eight actions, whereas 22.73% held 
between 8 and 15 shares, 17.05% held between 15 and 30 shares, 10.23% held between 
30 and 50 shares, 10.79% held between 50 and 100 shares, and the Crown was the only 
entity to hold more than 100 shares.343  
 The RCG’s trade was organized through San Sebastián until 1751, when the seat 
of the company was moved to Madrid. From the company’s hub, its five directors would 
manage the trade. The Crown appointed the company’s first directors from a pool of 
shareholders that held at least ten shares. Directors earned the lofty salary of 5,000 pesos 
a year, and were required to meet at least once every five years at a gathering which 
could be attended by all stockholders. Investors holding eight or more shares had the 
right to vote at these meetings.344  
 The RCG’s directors arranged for the purchase of commodities, their shipments to 
Venezuela, and their returns. At their ports in Spain, the company erected storage sheds, 
which were designed to house one year’s worth of supplies for Venezuela.345 Sailors were 
paid three months of wages before they set sail to Venezuela and three months salary 
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before the return voyage.346 Between three and six ships departed and returned each 
year.347 The company’s vessels were given the authority to seize any ships and/or goods 
engaged in contraband trade, as long as they were within Venezuelan waters. These 
seized goods were not taxed, and 2/3rds of the goods went to the RCG, while the ship’s 
crew kept the remaining third.348 
 But the company did not confine themselves to trade, they also engaged in a 
number of manufacturing ventures. The first and, by far, the most successful venture was 
their management of the Spanish Crown’s arms factory at Plasencia, which the RCG took 
over in 1735. The proceeds earned from the Plasencia arms factory would be deducted 
from the royal duties the company owed the Crown for the Venezuelan trade.349 The 
RCG’s intervention into the factory stimulated production from 8,000 muskets a year to 
12,000.350 Many of these arms were used to equip Venezuela’s militias.351 
 The RCG also established other manufacturing bodies. They built a flourmill in 
Campos, liquor distilleries in Estella and Viana, and even began hiring out weavers in 
Valdenoceda, Rioja, and León. These enterprises were designed to lower the costs of 
their trade, and to stimulate domestic production in Spain, which by this time had become 
																																																								346	Ibid.,	82-3.		347	Ibid.,	74.		348	Ibid.,	62.		349	Ibid.,	74.		350	Ibid.,	169.		351	Ibid.,	267.	
139	
dependent on foreign products. To compensate the company for these exercises, they cut 
their liquor shipping duties in half.352 
 Dividends were handed out regularly during the early life of the company but 
slowed once financial trouble hit the RCG. The first dividends of 20% were paid out in 
1735, 1737, 1738 and twice in 1739. Two dividends were issued in 1741, the first for 26 
2/3% and the second for 33 1/3%. The following dividend would take ten years to issue, 
and in 1751 25% was paid to shareholders. In 1752, the company voted in favor of a 
dividend of 100%, which would be paid through an annual payment of 5%. A special 
10% dividend was announced in 1775, with half paid in 1777 and the other half the year 
after.353 
 The RCG’s activities in Venezuela, and the Atlantic, greatly stimulated cacao 
production in Venezuela, and in Coro. Before the advent of the RCG, it was reported that 
Coro only produced 280 fanegas of cacao a year, and that this was consumed 
internally.354 Although exact figures on cacao production in Coro during this period are 
impossible to calculate at this time, it is safe to assume that this production expanded 
rapidly, as it did throughout Venezuela. In 1749, the RCG reported that they had exported 
slightly over 869,247 fanegas of cacao from Venezuela in the 17 years in which it had 
operated. This figure was almost 25% higher than the 643,215 fanegas of cacao that 
Venezuela had exported in the previous thirty years. The company also claimed that year 
that the productivity of cacao harvests more than doubled between the two periods, from 																																																								352	Ibid.,	169.		353	Ibid.,	321.		354	Pedro	José	Olavarriaga,	Instrucción	general	y	particular	del	estado	presente	de	la	Provincia	de	
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an average of 60 to 130 fanegas.355 The following years saw cacao production expand 
further. From 1749-1764, Caracas exported over 880,000 fanegas of cacao; most cacao—
over 500,000 fanegas during these years were shipped to Spain, but 300,000 fanegas 
were shipped to Vera Cruz, 75,000 fanegas for the Canary Islands, and 28,000 fanegas to 
Spanish islands in the Caribbean.356 These export numbers would eventually drop, 
however, largely because of competition from Guayaquil. In 1777, the company reported 
that they were exporting just 18,000 fanegas of cocoa to Vera Cruz every year, and that 
same year, the RCG exported a paltry 9,691 fanegas of cacao to Spain.357 
 Payment for cacao was always a tensional situation for both the RCG and for 
planters. In 1749, the cacao planter and crown bureaucrat Juan Francisco de León led an 
insurrection against the RCG, denouncing the company’s abusive and corrupt practices. 
Part of the issue was the amount that the company paid for cacao, something that left 
planters with little choice because of the RCG’s successful battles against contrabandists 
from Curaçao. After the rebellion, the RCG raised the price of cacao to 14 pesos per 
fanega. This required, however, that the cacao be traded for the company’s goods of the 
same value.358 In addition, the King required that the company purchase all cacao that 
colonists presented them, and that the company also reduce the prices of the 
manufactured goods that they sold and traded to colonists.359  
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 But tension continued. In 1760, more than 10 years after the de León rebellion, 
colonists complained about the company’s inability to pay for cacao in silver coin, rather 
than merchandise. They also complained that the RCG’s merchandise was still too 
expensive. The company reacted by further slashing the prices of textiles, tools, and oils. 
They also increased the purchasing price of cacao to 14 pesos per fanega (without 
requiring that the payment be in company goods), and expressed that they had been 
trying their best to pay planters in specie, but found it difficult to do so. But the company 
claimed that they had actually made great strides in providing Venezuela with specie, 
stating that from 1750 to 58, they had introduced 2,425,000 silver pesos into Venezuela 
from Veracruz or an average of 303,125 pesos a year.360 This amount was significantly 
more than the annual average of 253, 025 pesos of coin that they imported from 1731-48, 
and even more than the 66,404 pesos a year that were imported into Venezuela from 
1701-30, before the RCG began operations.361  
 As mentioned above, although RCG ships would sail directly from Guipuzcoa to 
Venezuela, the return voyages had to come through Cádiz. While at Cádiz, the 
company’s ships were not required to unload, but a government representative would 
board the ship to calculate the duties, which were required to be paid. Cacao sales were 
done in public auctions twice a year, in March-April, and September-October.362 After 
the company’s midcentury reforms, however, sales were reduced to once a year in 
September-October because merchants had trouble unloading their cacao between 
																																																								360	Ibid.,	186.		361	“Certificación	del	producto.”			362	Hussey,	157.	
142	
purchasing periods during the previous arrangement.363 These reforms also saw the 
company expand its mercantile activities beyond Cádiz, Madrid, and San Sebastian, 
giving them the permission to supply cacao to Aragón, Asturias, the Basque region, 
Castille, Galicia, and Navarre. They also were given warehouses at these ports for where 
they could store cacao, which was non-perishable, and other goods. It appears, however, 
that sales to merchants in the new markets was forbidden, and that the company could 
only sell cacao to individuals for their own consumption and to communities and their 
representatives.364 Muleteers, contracted by the provinces themselves, would then 
purchase the cacao at the port and transport them inland, presumably to be purchased by 
retailers at the towns’ respective markets.365   
 But the Spanish market only consumed about half of the cacao they imported. 
Spain imported about 80,000 fanegas of cacao—60,000 of which came from 
Venezuela—but only consumed 40,000 a year. The rest was exported to foreign markets. 
This cacao was exported from either Cádiz or San Sebastián.  
 But because Coro’s chief agricultural commodities were sugar and livestock, the 
RCG mostly shaped the region indirectly, through the promotion of their production, 
propelled by the company’s principal interest in cacao. After the 1749 rebellion, the 
Company issued a statement defending their existence and highlighting the ways in 
which they had boosted Venezuela’s economy. Besides the increase in cacao production, 
which had more than doubled under their watch, they claimed that sugar production had 
increased dramatically all over the Province, and that the number of livestock had tripled 																																																								363	Ibid.		364	Ibid.,	158.		365	Ibid.,	160.	
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since the company’s founding.366 The RCG also claimed responsibility for the provision 
of enslaved people to Venezuela, which nearly doubled since 1715-30.367 Although the 
vast majority of Venezuelan exports were cacao, the company did trade in tobacco and in 
hides, both produced in Coro, particularly the latter. From 1749-64, for example, the 
RCG exported 88,000 arrobas of tobacco and over 177,000 hides to Spain from the 
Province of Venezuela.368  
 The RCG also shaped Coro through its struggle against contraband, particularly 
coming to and from Curaçao. In fact, one of the reasons why the company as erected in 
the first place was to gain claims to the growing Venezuelan market, which was largely 
lost after the WIC seized Curaçao in 1634.369 In fact, the Dutch often dominated the 
cacao trade, even though Spain was perhaps the largest consumer market for the product, 
and despite the fact that their colony, Venezuela, was its chief supplier.370 In the thirty 
years before the RCG was founded, Dutch contrabandists usurped a substantial portion of 
Venezuelan cacao. From 1701-1729, the Dutch were responsible for shipping most 
Venezuelan cacao during six of those years, averaging 43.13% of cacao shipments during 
the entire period.371 
																																																								366	“Manifiesto,	que	con	incontestables	hechos	prueba	los	grandes	beneficios,	que	ha	producido	el	establecimiento	de	la	Real	Compañía	Guipuzcoana	de	Caracas,”	Caracas	924,	AGI,	ff.	13-14.		367	“Certificación	del	producto.”		368	Hussey,	234.			369	Ibid.,	52.		370	Ibid.,	53.		371	Calculated	using	the	figures	provided	in:	Wim	Klooster,	Illicit	Riches:	Dutch	Trade	in	the	Caribbean,	
1648-1795	(Leiden,	KITLV	Press,	1998),	228-9.	
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 For many years, the RCG was successful in its battle against contraband. It was 
able to cut back on contraband through a huge military presence both at sea and on the 
ground. In 1760, the company had 15 ships at its disposal, 10 of which patrolled the 
Venezuelan coast at any given time, loaded with 518 men, 92 cannons and 86 guns.372 
The RCG would use these means to confiscate goods being trafficked by contrabandists. 
Historian Wim Klooster argues that there was a pattern to these confiscations: essentially, 
one or two RCG vessels would approach the contrabandist’s vessel and open fire, to 
which the contrabandists would return fire as they retreated to land or escaped their boat 
via a canoe. RCG soldiers would then take possession of the contraband goods and return 
them to shore.373 In 1760, the RCG had 12 land patrols of 10-12 men each that would 
frequent contraband hotbeds.374 Methods such as these saw a great deal of success. 
During the first ten years of the company’s operations, from 1730-40, the Dutch share in 
Venezuelan cacao declined sharply to an average of 10.18%.375 Although this figure 
would climb to an average of 30.23% from 1741-1755, this was still significantly lower 
than previous Dutch shares in the trade.376 
 As these figures show, the RCG’s efforts reduced contraband trade, significantly 
during certain periods, but it never fully disappeared. In 1779, Dutch traveller to Curaçao, 
J.H. Hering, wrote that trade to Venezuela from the island was extremely dangerous 
because of Spanish coast guards. He added that only small shipments could be carried to 																																																								372	Ibid.,	148.		373	Ibid.,	149.		374	Hussey,	233.		375	Calculated	from	Klooster,	228-9.	The	year	1733	is	missing	from	Klooster’s	figures.			376	Ibid.	Post	1755	records	for	cacao	exports	are	currently	unavailable.		
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Venezuela, and legally free black sailors conducted most of this commerce, insinuating 
that the trade was conducted piecemeal. Hering added that Spaniards would also go to 
Curaçao where they could “get a pretty good price for their merchandise.”377 Hering was 
right. In 1757, the company reported that Dutch merchants could sell their manufactures 
35% cheaper than could the RCG, and that they could always undercut the prices that the 
latter had established. This was because of the high overhead costs that the RCG was 
responsible for.378 In addition, Dutch traders would purchase cacao for two to four times 
higher than the RCG did. When the company would purchase cacao for 8-12 pesos a 
fanega, Dutch merchants from Curaçao would pay 24-26 pesos if the cacao was 
purchased in Venezuela, and 30-32 pesos per fanega if Venezuelan merchants made the 
trip to Curaçao.379 Although extensive records are not available at this time, the RCG 
claimed that contraband had picked up extensively after 1770. Between 1769-1771, based 
on information they gathered from an agent in Amsterdam, the RCG claimed that 34 
ships left Curaçao for the Captaincy General of Venezuela, carrying over 194,500 pesos 
worth of goods and returning with over 229,275 pesos in coin, 16,196 fanegas of cacao, 
and 144,855 hides.380 
 The RCG also shaped Coro through their forays into the slave trade after 
receiving a contract to import 2,000 enslaved people in 1755. The company argued that 
Venezuela had been deprived of enslaved people since the SSC ceased operations in 
																																																								377	J.H.	Hering,	Beschrijving	van	het	eiland	Curaçao	(Amsterdam:	S.	Emmering,	1969),	59:	“vry	goeden	prys	voor	hunne	Koopwaaren	maken.”		378	Hussey,	181.		379	Ibid.,	273.		380	Ibid.,	249.	
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1739, estimating that only 60 enslaved people were legally imported into Venezuela from 
1739-1755.381 It appears, however, that the RCG did not come close to securing this first 
contract, as they imported just 310 enslaved people, after having purchased them in 
Curaçao for 45,378 pesos. Before they were sold in Venezuela, however, 13 of these 
people were born and 28 died, so a total of 295 people ended up being sold in Venezuela 
for 62,320 pesos.382 Ten years later, the RCG would receive another asiento to supply 
The Captaincy General with 2,000 enslaved people. They would purchase the enslaved 
people through a factor stationed at Puerto Rico who would receive them. The RCG 
contracted two outfits to bring enslaved people to Puerto Rico. They contracted the 
Weyland Brothers, presumably an English slaving company, and a private French slaver, 
to bring between 1,000 and 1,100 enslaved people to Puerto Rico. By 1769, the RCG had 
imported 1,013 people with this second contract, and sold them all in Venezuela.383 
 The RCG may have been the most profitable of three companies profiled here, but 
its profits vacillated throughout its existence. The first ships sent by the company 
produced a loss of about 800,000 pesos, and the company blamed locals and their 
preference for contraband trade for its losses. The RCG had estimated that their first three 
ships would bring in 80,000 fanegas of cacao, but they brought only 27,797 fanegas.384 
This trend continued, and in 1747 in was recorded that the RCG had provided Spain with 
only a little more than half of the approximately 16,000 fanegas of cacao imported.385 																																																								381	Ibid.,	172.		382	Ibid.		383	Ibid.,	239-42.		384	Ibid.,	69-70.		385	Ibid.,	81.	
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From 1752-53, the RCG claimed a deficit of 350,000 pesos.386 By 1763, however, 
fortunes had turned for the company, and after being granted concessions by the Crown, 
particularly allowing the RCG to increase the price of cacao by 6 pesos per fanega, the 
RCG reported assets that surpassed liabilities by over 1.7 million pesos, although 44% of 
these assets were classified as “collectible debts.”387 Three years later, this surplus 
reached over 2 million pesos.388 It appears, however, that these figures may have been 
misleading, because it was determined that the Venezuela factors for the RCG were owed 
just under 1.5 million pesos in 1769. This number climbed to over 2.4 million pesos two 
years later.389 Nevertheless, in 1774, the RCG recorded a surplus of nearly 1.6 million 
pesos.390 
 In 1777, the RCG lost its monopoly privileges after years of contestation by local 
elites in Venezuela gave through, along with the burgeoning ideals of liberalized trade. 
By this time, the company’s surplus had climbed to 1.8 million pesos. After war broke 
out in 1779, however, the company’s fortunes declined, and by 1781, their surplus had 
fell to 1.17 million pesos. By 1783, this surplus further declined by half, reaching 
559,096 pesos. Two years later, it was announced that the RCG would be liquidated, and 
that a new joint stock company, The Philippine Company, would be erected in its place. 
The Philippine Company would continue to provide Venezuela with goods, 2,000 tons a 
year, in fact, and it was granted a twenty-five year monopoly on trade to The Philippines. 																																																								386	Ibid.,	181-2.		387	Calculations	made	from	data	Provided	by	Hussey,	191-4.		388	Ibid.,	236.		389	Ibid.,	250.		390	Ibid.,	257.	
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Although the RCG was liquidated, stockholders were encouraged to transfer their 
holdings to the new company, and most probably did. The period of free trade was 
enacted in 1780 in Venezuela, and this practice began in Coro in 1783.391  
 Because of the RCG’s efforts, in tandem with the WIC and the SSC, Venezuela 
went from a peripheral and overlooked slab of land in Spain’s vast empire, a region 
dependent on subsidies for survival, to a Captaincy General producing a surplus.392 The 
RCG greatly increased the Province’s production of cacao, struck blows against the WIC 
and their contraband, stimulated the trade in enslaved people, and practiced the 
abominable commerce itself. These practices greatly shaped Coro’s culture and its 
political economy, while stimulating production on its sugar plantations and haciendas. It 
was these latter effects, which spurred the 1795 rebellion in Coro.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Two days after Jacot submitted a letter denouncing him as a potential participant 
in the insurrection, Ramírez Valderraín began testifying before the court in Caracas. He 
was presumably sent from Coro to Caracas for this reason, and his testimony lasted seven 
days. Ramírez Valderraín was first asked if he had any suspicions of a coming rebellion, 
to which he flatly answered “no.”393 The next five questions he faced all concerned the 
dances and seditious songs that Jacot had reported just days before.  
																																																								391	Ibid.,	273-93.		392	Ibid.,	87.		393	“Sublevacion	de	los	negros	de	Coro,	pieza	3,”	1795,	Criminales,	Letra	C,	Archivo	General	de	la	Nacion,	Caracas,	ff..86.	
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 Ramírez Valderraín steadfastly claimed that there were no unusual songs or 
dances before the rebellion, but he later contradicted himself. When asked if anyone had 
told him that there were “abusive” songs sung before the rebellion, which hinted at its 
coming, Ramírez Valderraín stated that no one said anything “before verifying the 
uprising.”394 He added:  
that the black Luangos (sic.) or [black people] from Curaçao that inhabit the City’s 
neighborhood of Guinea have always been accustomed to have a dance out in the open, 
on the eve of a holiday once they retire from their labors in the countryside, turning on 
their candles if there is no moon, but always asking for a license from the Justicia 
Mayores, who put up guards when it seems appropriate, and even attending [the dance] in 
order to avoid whatever disorder because there is no other amusements in that city, 
people from all classes attend, until the middle of the night, the principal men and women 
of the town: that the blacks are accustomed to singing at these dances in a language that 
you cannot understand.395  
 
Ramírez Valderraín then stated that he did remember hearing “Pa’ semilla” sung at the 
dances, that he did not understand its significance at the time, but that after the rebellion 
he understood that this expression meant that “the Blacks wanted to extend their 
generation through the White women.”396  
 Ramírez Valderraín’s overall point was that there was no way that he or any other 
military authority could have known about the Coro rebellion in advance. He argued that 
nothing unusual occurred that could have given him notice that such an event would 
unfold. He conceded that there were dances before the rebellion, but that dances were a 																																																								394	Ibid.:	“antes	de	verificarse	la	sublevacion.”		395	Ibid.:	que	los	negros	luangos	o	de	Curaçao	que	habitan	en	un	Barrio	de	la	Ciudad	llamado	Guinea	han	acostumbrado	siempre	quando	se	retiran	de	las	labors	del	campo	en	las	visperas	de	fiesta	poner	baile	al	raso	encendiendo	su	candelada,	sino	hay	Luna,	pero	pidiendo	siempre	licencia	a	los	Justicias	Mayores	que	la	han	dado	como	el	declar.te	poniendo	Guardia	quando	le	ha	parecido	oportuno,	y	aun	asistiendo	el	mismo	a	fin	de	evitar	qualquiera	desorden	porque	no	hay	otra	diversión	en	aquella	ciu.d	suelen	concurrir	a	ellas	presionar	de	todas	clases,	y	hasta	la	hora	de	recogerse	que	en	la	media	noches,	los	hombres	y	señoras	principales	del	Pueblo:	Que	en	estos	bailes	acostumbrar	los	negros	cantan	en	lengua	que	no	se	entiende	sus	canciones.		396	Ibid.:	“los	Negros	trataban	de	extender	su	generacion	en	las	Blancas.”	
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common occurrence in Guinea and that songs were often sung. He added that he was not 
the only white elite to attend these dances, either. Because there was never much to do in 
Coro, many white elites attended the dances, but Ramírez Valderraín and other whites did 
not understand the lyrics of the songs sung because they were in a foreign language.  
 But then Ramírez Valderraín testified that he did remember hearing “Pa’ 
semilla.” He stated that he did not understand the significance of the term at the time, but 
Ramírez Valderraín added that he now realized that the expression meant that the singers 
of the songs aimed to “extend their generation through the White women.” Therefore, as 
Ramírez Valderraín gave this testimony, he revealed that there were, in fact, signs given 
before the rebellion that indicated that an insurgency was afoot. This acknowledgement 
served as evidence to contradict his earlier statement that there were no clues that could 
have pointed to a rebellion being underway.  
 It is not clear at this time what, if anything, came about regarding Jacot’s 
accusations of Ramírez Valderraín. But Jacot’s pointing to the use of the term semilla in 
songs sung in the city of Coro before the rebellion, and de Acosta’s testimony that 
indicates its usage in the sierra during the rebellion, point to the possibility that there was, 
indeed, a coordinated conspiracy between the largely creole rebels in the sierra and the 
largely African-born black people in the city. It is unlikely, however, that Ramírez 
Valderraín was involved. Jacot’s claims regarding his possible involvement were used to 
accentuate his primary contention, which was that Ramírez Valderraín failed in his 
responsibilities as Justicia Mayor when he ignored signs of a coming insurrection. In 
addition, Jacot’s expressed concerns were likely influenced by a personal rivalry that had 
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developed between the Justicia Mayor and the outsider who was appointed as his de facto 
superior.  
 After the rebellion was crushed, and long after Cocofío, González, and Chirino 
were dead, various landowners such as de Acosta received reparations from the Crown 
for damages they suffered during the insurrection. De Acosta was awarded a pension of 
300 pesos a year for her losses. Don Josef Antonio Zarraga’s heir, Doña Felipa Caro, her 
son and her daughter, were awarded a pension of 600 pesos a year until her daughter was 
married. Caro was also awarded a 2,000 peso dowry for the purposes of her daughter’s 
future wedding. Doña María Josefa Rosillo de Telleria, the widow of Don Josef de 
Tellería, and her two daughters and three sons were awarded a pension of 100 pesos a 
year. The male Tellerias would receive their pension until they were 25 years old, and the 
women would receive their pensions until their death or until they were married. They 
would also be exempt from taxes and their debts would be placed on hold until the boys 
were employed and able to pay these bills themselves.397  
 Coro’s hacendados were granted reparations because they were part of an 
Atlantic political economy in which the assets of whites were supported—in fact, 
guaranteed—by imperial states; states that, in turn, were backed by merchant and 
financial elites. Nowhere was this partnership more crystallized than in the organization 
of European joint-stock companies like the WIC, the SSC and the RCG. The WIC was 
created as a weapon in the fight against Spanish rivals at the end of a truce. It was 
envisioned a means to further Dutch commercial interests in the slave trade and in the 
Americas, and to do so by force if necessary. The British government formed the SSC 
largely out of their need to restructure the country’s spiraling debt. The Province of 																																																								397	“Expediente.”	
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Guipuzcoa and the Spanish Crown created the RCG to tap into, and further develop the 
Venezuelan market, which had been taken over by foreign rivals, particularly the Dutch.   
 Although merchants and shareholders were hoping to make profits from their 
investments, they also had diverse reasons for financing joint-stock companies. Investing 
in the WIC was considered a safe venture because they had government backing, and big 
money holders saw it as a viable alternative to hoarding inactive capital. Many SSC 
investors were attracted to the company for speculative reasons, in order to turn a large 
profit in a matter of weeks. Before the 1749 de León rebellion, RCG investors were 
attracted by the promise of high returns on what was essentially a new colonial 
enterprise, in the restructuring of Venezuela. After the rebellion, investors may have been 
more interested in investing because they were guaranteed their money back after a 100% 
dividend was announced in 1752.   
 Regardless of the motives for their founding, the WIC, the SSC, and the RCG 
created Coro and the racialized political economy that the rebels sought to destroy. 
Operating for more than a century and a half, the WIC established a Dutch stronghold in 
the trade in enslaved people, furthered Dutch interests in this trade, and opened the door 
for private merchants to eventually take over. The WIC also turned Curaçao, laying just 
sixty miles off shore from Coro, from a Spanish cattle depot to the premier trading station 
of the Greater Caribbean. Through acquiring the asiento, the SSC was able to further 
England’s share in the slave trade to places like Coro, and helped propel England’s 
hegemony over Atlantic waters. The RCG, through its monopoly of the Venezuelan 
market and its chief product cacao, stimulated the crop’s production in Coro, while 
working with the SSC to import enslaved people, as they carried out an assault on Dutch 
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interlopers, who were, in turn, buoyed by the protection of the WIC. These three 
companies’ activities would contribute to the demographic growth of Coro’s black 
population and to the development of Coro’s plantation economy.   
 When Coro’s rebels exclaimed their desire to kill all white men and further the 
black race, they did so because the world they lived in was based on the dominance of 
white capital and the denigration of black workers.398 But Africans in Coro and across the 
Atlantic did not give up their cultures or their moral economies.399 The latter will be the 
focus of the next chapter.  
  
																																																								398	The	term	“white	capital”	is	borrowed	by	W.E.B.	Dubois.	See:	W.E.B.	Dubois,	Black	Reconstruction	in	
America,	1860-1880	(New	York:	The	Free	Press,	1935).		399	The	term	“moral	economy”	was	coined	by	E.P.	Thompson.	See:	Thompson,	E	P.	Thompson,	"The	Moral	Economy	of	the	English	Crowd	in	the	Eighteenth	Century"	Past	and	Present.	50.1	(1971):	76-136.		
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Chapter Three: The People 
 
 Three and a half years before the 1795 rebellion, José Caridad González received 
a Royal Order from the King of Spain, which signaled the coming of a revolution, while 
it propelled González to a level of prominence that rivaled that of the region’s most 
senior authorities. On October 29, 1791, González met with King Carlos IV in the 
outskirts of Madrid, at His El Escorial Palace in San Lorenzo, to ask for help on behalf of 
Coro’s loango community. González complained that he and his people had suffered 
“harms and harassments that have been made with the objective of suffocating the 
resources of the interested parties.”400 According to the Royal Order, Coro’s loangos had 
been “peacefully enjoying the land in the territory of Santa María” until a man named 
Luis de Rojas sold the lands to Don Juan Antonio Zárraga.401 The Order claims that Rojas 
was not the rightful owner of the property, and that, therefore, he did not have the 
authority to sell it.  
 The Royal Order concluded by stating that González and the loangos should be 
provided “justice” without “complaints,” “trouble nor any form of harassment.”402 But 
the loangos would not receive justice. One year following the rebellion, the Real 
Audiencia of Caracas requested “whatever papers that exist within the Secretary’s office 
of the Captaincy General, and Government scribes, in relation to the dispute over lands 
that the black luangos of Coro continued with the home of Don Juan Antonio 																																																								400	“Real	Orden,”	October	29,	1792,	Caracas,	375.	Archivo	General	de	las	Indias.	Seville,	Spain	(AGI);	“perjuicios	y	vejaciones	q.e	se	han	preparado	con	el	objeto	de	sufocar	los	recursos	de	los	Ynteresados.”		401	Ibid.:	“disfrutando	pacificame.te	un	terreno	en	el	territorio	de	S.ta	Maria.”		402	Ibid.:	“quejas,”	molestia	ni	vejacion	alguna.”		
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Zárraga.”403 The Audiencia’s request indicated that the struggle over the land of Santa 
María de la Chapa was still alive and well at the time of the May, 1795 insurrection.  
 The 1791 Royal Order, and the loangos’ struggle for La Chapa, point to the 
significance of land for Coro’s rebels. The right to cultivate land and to enjoy the fruits of 
one’s own labor was the basis of the rebels’ moral economy.404 This moral economy was 
informed by the autochthonous social structures of the rebels’ African homelands, where 
open space, coupled with low population densities, assured that fields were available to 
all. This African moral economy collided with the realities of Coro, where land was 
concentrated into the hands of a few white elites. These elites used these territories for the 
purposes of plantation production; an economic activity that had the effect of depriving 
Africans of the lifestyles that they felt they were entitled to.    
 The loango struggle over ownership of the lands of La Chapa was first 
documented twenty years before González received the Royal Order. On December 27, 
1771, a group of loangos was jailed for living on this land, because Zárraga claimed that 
it was his property. Two loangos, Francisco Bartolo and Juan Antonio Curazao, testified 
before a Caracas Tribunal on April 13, 1772, saying that they had been incarcerated since 
their December arrest simply because they were cultivating the lands of La Chapa, where 
they lived. They added, “in this settlement there is a neighbor named don Juan Antonio 
Zárraga that causes us great harm, for he has even taken water away from us and tries to 
																																																								403	“Expediente	sobre	la	insurrección	de	los	negros,	zambos	y	mulatos	proyectada	en	el	año	1795	a	las	inmediaciones	de	la	ciudad	de	Coro,	Provincia	de	Caracas,”	1795,	Caracas,	426,	AGI,	ff.	372.:“qualesquiera	papeles	que	existtan	en	la	Secrettaria	de	Capittania	General,	y	escribanias	de	Govierno,	relattivos	al	pleitto	que	sobre	tierras	seguian	los	negros	luangos	de	Coro	con	la	casa	de	Don	Juan	Antonio	Zárraga.”		404	See	the	introduction	for	a	discussion	on	the	term	“moral	economy.”	
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remove us from the entire possession.”405 Bartolo and Curazao added that Zárraga had 
paid Juan Luis Rojas—who was named in the 1791 Royal Order as having sold the land 
to Zárraga— to “remove us from there.”406 The loangos exhorted authorities to help them 
convince Rojas, the Captain of Coro’s Black Militia, and his soldiers to “set boundaries 
on the property.”407 
 Bartolo, Curazao, and the other loangos were arrested while Coro’s Black Militia 
began the forcible removal of their community to other lands. It appears that in December 
of 1771, Coro’s authorities gave in to Zárraga’s pressure and determined that the loangos 
should be removed from La Chapa and sent to live four miles away in Macuquita. In 
October of 1772, Rojas stated that because the loango community was so large, and 
because their numbers were growing every day, that he and the militia were authorized  
“to little by little and with the best convenience send them to royal land in the said 
Macuquita, which are more comfortable, more extensive lands, and with better 
waters.”408   
 The loangos were not the first people to claim rightful ownership over the 
“extensive lands” of La Chapa. Zárraga inherited this land at some point between 1758 
and 1772 from his aunt, Doña María de Sangronis. But de Sangronis had been in a 
																																																								405	Cited	in:	Pedro	A.	Gil	Rivas,	Luis	Dovale	Prado	and	Lidia	Lusmila	Bello,	La	insurrección	de	los	
negros	de	la	serranía	coriana:	10	de	mayo	de	1795	(Caracas:	Ministerio	de	Educación	Cultura	y	Deportes,	2001),	90.	“en	este	sitio	se	halla	un	vecino	nombrado	don	Juan	Antonio	Zárraga	que	nos	sirve	de	grande	perjuicio,	pues	hasta	el	agua	nos	la	ha	quitado	y	nos	procura	desapropiar	de	toda	la	posesión.”		406	Ibid.:	“desapropiarnos	de	allí.”		407	Ibid.,	91:	“que	ponga	en	propiedad	los	linderos	de	la	tierra.”		408	Cited	in:	Miguel	Acosta	Saignes,	Vida	de	los	esclavos	negros	en	Venezuela	(La	Habana:	Casa	de	las	Americas,	1978),	196.:	“a	que	podríamos	poco	a	poco	y	con	la	mejor	comodidad	irlos	mandando	a	la	tierra	realenga	de	dicho	Macquita,	que	son	tierras	más	cómodas,	más	extensas	y	con	mejores	aguas.”	
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dispute over the land of La Chapa for some time, with Don Ysidro Navarro, who claimed 
that he had purchased the land from the Spanish Crown. Navarro claimed that de 
Sangronis was illegally claiming the land because it had, in fact, been royal lands before 
he had purchased it. But the case was settled in 1758 in favor of de Sangronis. In 1774, 
Navarro again claimed ownership of the land and, this time, took Zárraga to court. 
Navarro claimed that Zárraga had been illegally using about 320 yards of royal lands in 
La Chapa, those that were adjacent to Zárraga’s plantation of San Ygnacio. Navarro 
asserted that Zárraga could only claim about 10 of the 330 yards of land that he was 
using.409 
 In Zárraga’s defense of himself, he revealed important details about loango 
settlement in the region. Zárraga stated, “the free blacks from Curazao hoped to disrupt 
me on the same lands, without any foundation except for me having added them to these 
with pious spirits that they could stay there if destiny allowed it.”410 Zárraga’s claim that 
he had allowed the loangos to stay on his land, but that they were now “disrupting” him 
on those lands may, actually, have some validity. As Rojas stated above, the loango 
community in the city and sierra of Coro was growing continuously, as families grew and 
as newcomers arrived every year from Curaçao. It seems likely that the loangos simply 
squatted on the lands of La Chapa, perhaps with the understanding that the land was royal 
land and not claimed by any individual. As the community grew, however, and as their 
lands expanded, their presence became a nuisance to Zárraga and his family.  
																																																								409	Gil	Rivas,	Dovale	Prado,	and	Lusmila	Bello,	86-91.		410	Ibid.,	89.:	“pretendieron	perturbarme	en	las	mismas	tierras	los	negros	libertos	venidos	de	Curazao,	sin	otro	fundamento	que	el	de	haberlos	agregado	en	ellas	con	piadoso	ánimo	de	que	pudiesen	mantenerse	entre	sí	si	se	les	daba	dicho	destino.”	
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 González and the loangos’ struggle for the land of La Chapa mirrors their other 
struggle for power in Coro’s society. In September of 1794, Coro’s Justicia Mayor, 
Mariano Ramírez Valderraín divided the city’s black militia into two. The original 
militia, headed by Rosas, was comprised mainly of formerly enslaved, Curacaoan born 
refugees. After the rebellion, Valderraín stated that, because there were so many migrants 
from Curaçao in the sierra and the city of Coro, that he thought it necessary to form a 
second company, one made exclusively of the African-born loangos. But it is likely that 
Valderraín took responsibility for the formation of the second company because he did 
not want to reveal to his superiors, in the aftermath of the rebellion, that he had given in 
to pressure from González and his African-born followers. González and his loango 
contingent appear to have been eager to form a militia of their own so that they could 
increase their power within the region, while separating themselves from Rojas, who they 
had a history of quarrels with.411  
 The African-born loangos wanted González to be the captain of the newly formed 
militia, but they encountered problems in appointing him. When González’s confidants—
Juan Felipe Guillermo, Juan Bernardo, and Domingo José Nicolas—made the petition for 
a new militia, Valderraín told them that González could not be named captain because he 
was in Caracas. The militia captain had to be present in Coro to be given an official title. 
Valderraín then named another African-born loango, Nicolas Soco, as Captain. 
Valderraín claimed that he sent the men’s petition to the Captain General in Caracas, but 
that the Captain General responded by naming Soco as Teniente (second in charge) and 
Juan Domingo Rojas—Juan Luiz Rojas’s friend, and perhaps, his family member—as 																																																								411	“Sublevacion	de	los	negros	de	Coro,	pieza	3,”	1795,	Criminales,	Letra	C,	Archivo	General	de	la	Nacion,	Caracas	(AGN),	ff.	96-100.	
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Captain. Soco and the loangos returned to Valderraín after Juan Domingo Rojas was 
named their Captain, insisting that González be named Captain of the new militia, and 
arguing that Juan Domingo Rojas could not be their captain because he was already a 
member of Juan Luiz Rojas’s militia.412  
 Valderraín appears to have been sympathetic to the loangos’ position, and he sent 
a missive along with the three loango men to Caracas in order to appeal to the Captain 
General. Guillermo, Bernando, and Nicolas immediately set off for Caracas and returned 
in January or February of 1795, accompanied by González himself. It is unclear whether 
or not González officially took charge of the loango militia in the eyes of Coro’s 
authorities, but he was named as the captain of the 46-man strong loango militia in the 
official list that the new company gave Valderraín.413  
 The disputes over land and power in Coro led some loangos to participate in the 
planning and execution of the Coro rebellion. As stated in the introduction, a loango 
named Juan Francisco Año Nuevo was accused of planning the rebellion alongside 
Chirino at the home of Juan Bernardo Chiquito. Año Nuevo worked on the Socorro 
plantation, which was home to Chirino.414 Two other loangos were among the rebels in 
the sierra. On the first night of the rebellion, Juan Luis Martin, an African-born loango, 
who lived and worked on Doña Nicolosa Acosta’s plantation of El Baron, was identified 
as the rebel who lit the match that burned down de Acosta’s door. Martin was also one of 
the two rebel “spies” that were apprehended at Caujarao on the night of May 11. Martin 
																																																								412	Ibid.			413	“Expediente,”	ff.	47-9.		414	“Expedientes,	sublevacion	de	esclavos	en	la	sierra	de	Coro,	1795,”	1795,	Judiciales,	A16-C54-D11183,	Academia	Nacional	de	Historia,	Caracas	(ANH),	ff.	87-95.	
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and another person who was formerly enslaved in Curaçao, a rebel known only as Flores, 
were allegedly sent to the city to inform González of the rebels’ whereabouts.415  
 The second loango spy may have been a member of González’s militia. Five 
months after the rebellion, local landowner, Don Juan Echave, reported that a black man, 
Martin Olave, told him that Juan Luis was a corporal in González’s loango militia and 
that he filled the same role with Chirinos’ rebels in the sierra. But Juan Luis Martin was 
not listed as a member of the loango militia.416 The First Corporal of González’s militia, 
however, was a man by the name of Juan Francisco Flor.417 It is possible that Olvave 
and/or Echave confused Martin for Flor, and that Flor is the Flores that was identified as 
the other loango spy sent by the rebels to the city.  
 What Martin and Flor (or Flores) did after being freed by their comrades is 
unclear, but hours after the spies were let loose, González and 21 other loangos arrived to 
Valderraín’s house asking for guns. González and the loango militia members arrived 
after 2pm on May 11, soon after Valderraín had received word that there was an uprising 
underway in the sierra. By the time the loangos arrived, however, about 40 white and 
pardo volunteers were positioned outside of Valderraín’s home.418 
 The loango militia members arrived with seven or eight guns and requested that 
they be given more for those that were not carrying arms. Valderraín testified that he 
immediately became suspicious of the loangos’ request, and advised the Ayudante of the 
Pardo Militia, Gabriel Gárces to confiscate the guns they were carrying. Valderraín later 																																																								415	“Sublevacion,”	ff.	120-25.		416	“Expediente,”	315-17.		417	Ibid.,	ff.	47-9.		418	“Expedientes,”	ff.	111-16.	
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testified that González’s response was that he “he said he would obey but in a disgusted 
way.”419 Valderraín then told González, “although he did not doubt his loyalty to the 
King, as well as that of his companions, but because they are saying that the rebels are 
black, it would be best if Caridad, and his companions would enter and stay in a 
room.”420 Valderraín then escorted the loangos to a bedroom in his home, but he viewed 
the detention as a precaution rather than a necessity. He even left the door to the room 
open, although at some point later, guards closed it. Valderraín added that the loangos 
stayed in the room all afternoon, and night, and through the following day.421  
 But González and the loangos would eventually resist their confinement. Five 
months after the rebellion, Captain Nicolas Antonio de Nava, Don Juan de la Paz and the 
enslaved woman, Gabriela Sarraga, all testified that González and the other loangos had 
repeatedly tried to escape. Nava stated that González often asked to be let go, “saying 
that he and his twenty two other armed blacks were obliged to capture the rebels.”422 At 
one point, González tried to force his way through the bedroom door, and as the door was 
being detained by guards on the other side, González “sticking his hands through the door 
trying to force it [open], which was responded with going after a gun and requiring him 
to contain himself because if he did not, they [his hands] would be removed.”423 Nava 
																																																								419	Ibid.,	113:	“dijo	obedecia	pero	con	un	modo	que	significaba	repugnacnia.”		420	Ibid.:,	“aunque	no	dudaba	de	su	fidelidad,	y	la	de	sus	companyeros	al	Rey,	pero	como	les	decía	que	los	levantados	eran	negros,	convenia	que	el	mismo	Caridad,	y	dichos	sus	companyeros	entrasen	y	se	estuviesen	en	un	quarto	que	esta	en	el	mismo.”		421	Ibid.		422	“Expediente,”	ff.	309.:	“diciendo	que	el	con	sus	veinte	y	dos	negros	armados,	se	obligava	a	prender	a	todos	los	sublevados.”		423	Ibid.:	“meditendo	manos	a	la	puerta	pretendio	forsarla	a	cuya	accion	abocandole	un	Trabuco	y	requeriendole	a	que	se	contubiera	pues	de	lo	contrario	se	quitava.”	
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added that González replied to the threat by removing his hands from the door and 
keeping in silence. According to Nava, González “did not speak again and he was 
bothered when he heard a cannon which was shot at the insurgents.”424  
 Hours later, the rebel force suffered their first defeat at the hands of Coro’s ragtag 
royal army, and González would soon suffer a gruesome fate. After the decisive battle of 
the early morning of May 12, 24 rebels were captured in the battlefields and escorted to 
the city center. According to Valderraín, every one of the 24 rebels that were 
apprehended testified the following: 
that the black Luango Josef de la Cardiad Gonzales who was in court, and in that capital 
[Caracas], attempting to become the captain of those of his nation; had inspired a 
thousand errors in the slaves and free blacks, telling them, that for the first he had brought 
a royal document in which your Highness had declared them free, and that the leading 
subjects of the city were hiding it; and to the second ones that in aiding his designs for the 
uprising of the slaves, it was them that would rule afterwards in a republic; in whose 
harmony there is universal truth that the zambo Leonardo head of the main insurrection 
of the hills, that he would be the one that started the movement in the countryside and 
when he came down to the city he would find aid with the people that followed Josef 
Caridad Gonzales.425 
 
According to Valderraín, the 24 rebels confessed to the crimes they committed and 
provided him with the details of the conspiracy. As was seen in the previous chapter, 
Coro’s authorities claimed that González had followed the lead of the late African 
wanderer Cocofío, who had told enslaved people that the 1789 laws regarding slavery 
were actually a pronouncement of emancipation. González, according to Valderraín and 
																																																								424	Ibid.:	“no	bolvio	a	hablar,	y	amostaso	al	oir	un	cañonaso	que	tiro	a	los	amotinados.”		425	“Expedientes,”	ff.	6-7.:	“que	el	negro	Luango	Josef	de	la	Caridad	Gonzales	que	estubo	en	la	corte,	y	en	esa	capital,	pretendiendo	la	capitania	de	los	de	su	nacion;	havia	inspirado	mil	errores	a	los	escablos	y	negros	libres,	diciendoles,	que	para	los	primeros	havia	traido	real	cédula	en	que	su	Magestad	los	daba	por	libres,	y	que	los	sugetos	principales	de	esta	ciudad	se	la	havian	ocultado;	y	a	los	segundos	que	auxiliando	sus	designios	a	la	sublevacion	con	los	esclabos,	serian	los	que	mandasen	despues	en	republica;	en	cuyo	concierto	es	constancia	universal	entro	en	el	zambo	Leonardo	cabesa	de	motin	principal	en	la	serrania,	este	havia	de	ser	el	que	diese	el	primer	movimento	en	los	campos	y	quando	vajase	a	la	ciudad	havia	de	auxiliarse	de	la	gente	que	siguiera	al	Josef	Caridad	Gonzales.”	
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local authorities, had been telling enslaved people that he had proof of emancipation in 
his hands—that the King of Spain himself had granted him a copy of the proclamation 
when he had visited him in 1791.  
 Immediately after the 24 rebels were executed, Valderraín ordered that González 
and the loangos, who were being held in his home, be transferred to Coro’s jail. 
Valderraín stated, that, as the loangos were being transferred to the jail, González was 
killed when he “ran off with two of his closest people.”426 In September of 1795, a royal 
bureaucrat in Coro, Don Gerónimo Tinoco, gave more details on what happened the day 
González was murdered:  
in front of the jail’s door where the beheaded blacks were, horrified without a doubt of 
that spectacle, Charidad escaped from the guards, and he ran away with two others who 
were followed by some members of the same guards, and they were killed by blows from 
sabres and lances at a short distance.427  
 
González and his two comrades died a horrific death on the afternoon of May 12, 1795. 
Not only did numerous people wielding brutal weapons stab them sadistically, but they 
were also murdered amidst a horrifying, grisly spectacle of 24 headless bodies. 
González’s struggle for arms and loango lands in Coro ended in his heinous demise, and 
would lead to even more suffering for his community. 
 An investigation into the lives and deaths of Coro’s loango rebels points to the 
significance of African political economy to the construction of antislavery ideology in 
the Americas during the Age of Revolution. The African moral economy of the loangos, 
in which a strong leader ensured that community members had equal access to land, was 																																																								426	Ibid.,	ff.	7-8.:	“emprendio	fuga	con	dos	de	los	mas	inmediatos	de	su	gente.”		427	Ibid.:	“al	frente	de	la	puerta	de	la	carcel	donde	estaban	tendidos	los	negros	degollados	horroisado	sin	duda	de	aquel	espectaculo	se	escape	de	la	escolta	Charidad,	y	se	puso	en	fuga	con	otros	dos	a	quienes	siguieron	algunos	de	la	misma	escolta,	y	fueron	muertos	a	sablasos	y	lansasos	a	poco	trecho.”		
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pit against the plantation economy of Coro. This plantation economy was born out of an 
already hierarchical European system, which was further perverted through the conquest 
of the Americas, and the formation of an Atlantic political economy structured by a 
racialized division of labor. Being denied the land that they rightfully used, González, the 
loangos, and the rest of Coro’s rebels sought to take control of their environment through 
first forming a militia and by later fomenting a revolution. Key to this revolution was a 
desire to build a new republic, based on the political and economic principles of their 
homelands. This chapter will examine the political economy of Africans in the Atlantic 
through a study of the social systems of the loangos and of other maroon communities in 
the Americas. The chapter will then investigate the origins of maroon political economies 
through the study of autochthonous social systems of the two principal regions of descent 
for Coro’s rebels: The Gold and Loango Coasts of West and West Central Africa.  
 
The Loango Cumbés and Maroon Communities 
 
 González and the loangos made up a tight-knit community of hundreds of 
formerly enslaved people who fled Curaçao for Coro during the eighteenth century. 
These formerly enslaved people were known as loangos in Coro, whether or not they or 
their ancestors descended from the African coastline that bore the name. In fact, the 
loango community included formerly enslaved people born in Curaçao and others who 
were born throughout Africa. The communities also included black people born free in 
Venezuela, but who joined the loango communities voluntarily.  
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 In 1761, it was estimated that about 400 loangos lived in Coro.428 Although some 
lived in the city of Coro, most lived in the semi-autonomous cumbés of the sierra. Cumbé 
was the word used in Venezuela to designate a community removed from governmental 
and church control, and which was usually utilized to refer to maroon communities of 
black people who fled slavery in the Captaincy General. The loangos that lived in the city 
still maintained ties to the cumbés in the sierra, which were about 20 miles away. It was 
there that the city’s loangos held land and grew crops, both for their own consumption, 
and for sale at the city’s market.  
 Dutch West India Company (WIC) data helps paint a picture of the loango 
cumbés of Coro. On July 7, 1775, the WIC compiled a list of escaped slaves from 
Curaçao’s plantations between 1745 and 1774. According to the list compiled through 
consultation with the island’s slave owners, 537 people escaped their condition during 
this period, and every single one of them went to Coro. According to this document, then, 
every year, an average of nearly 18 people fled Curaçao to live free in Coro. As was the 
case in most maroon settlements in the Americas, the vast majority of those that fled were 
men. Women did account, however, for 79 of those people who escaped during the 
period in question, meaning that two or three women fled Curaçao each year to live in 
Coro. Most of the women that left Curaçao took their children with them. In fact, 22 total 
children fled Curaçao for Coro during this period, and 16 of them came with their 
mothers. Only six boys journeyed to Coro alone. Taken together, women (14.71%) and 
children (4.1%) made up 18.81% of the enslaved people who fled Curaçao to Coro during 
																																																								428	Pedro Manuel Arcaya, “Una insurrección de negros en 1795: Discurso de incorporación a la Academia 
Nacional de Historia, 11 de diciembre de 1910” in Pedro Manuel Arcaya, Personajes y hechos de la 
historia de Venezuela (Caracas: 1977), 242.	
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the third quarter of the eighteenth century, with adult men making up over 81%.429 But it 
is clear that most men who settled in Coro were married and had children, meaning that 
most women of the loango communities of Coro were actually black women native to 
Venezuela. 
 The loango cumbés were highly organized and operated with some autonomy 
from colonial authorities. One month after the rebellion, Coro’s Ayuntamiento reported 
that the loangos “make up a large and united congregation in homes and conucos, with a 
sort species of economy and republics.”430 The Ayuntamiento added that the cumbés 
were “formidable” entities due to the fact that the loangos  “demand contributions from 
their individuals which are deposited in the community’s coffers for their public 
needs.”431 The loangos planted vegetables such as cabbage and corn and raised farm 
animals for their own subsistence.432 They also travelled to the city of Coro to trade these 
products.  
 The loango communities were somewhat insular, they spoke to each other in 
African and creole languages, and they had their own system of justice. The 
Ayuntamiento testified, “they conserve their foreign dialect in the language with such 
precision that you cannot discern the new arrivals from the naturals even though they are 
																																																								429	“Lyst	der	slaaven,”	WIC,	610,	July	7,	1775,	Nationaal	Arhief	(NAN),	The	Hague,	The	Netherlands,	ff.	292-301.		430	“Informe	por	el	Ayuntamiento	de	Coro,”	April	21,	1796,	Caracas,	95,	AGI.:	“componen	una	numerosa	congresacion	unida	en	casas	y	conucos,	con	una	especie	de	economia	y	repubublicas.”		431	Ibid.:	“exigen	desus	indibiduos	contribucion	q	ban	depositando	en	las	cajas	de	comunidad	para	sus	urgencias	publicas.”		432	“Sublevacion,”	ff.	94-5.	
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different.”433 Ramirez Valderraín made the point about language again in the months 
following the rebellion when he declared “I did not understand their conversations 
because they were in their Dutch or Guinea language.”434  
 Although insular, the loango cumbés were at the same time open to new 
community members, as was the case with most maroon communities across the 
Americas. Historian Miguel Acosta Saignes has found that Venezuelan-born runaways 
also lived in the loango cumbés of Coro.435 In the great Brazilian quilombo of Palmares, 
enslaved people who were kidnapped from plantations remained in a condition of 
servitude—under vastly more humane conditions—but those enslaved or legally free 
black people who found their way to Palmares were welcomed as new members of the 
community.436 Although some maroon groups in Jamaica would capture enslaved people 
who had fled their plantations for a reward, they did also take in runaways—perhaps just 
as many as they captured.437 
 It also appears that the loango cumbés utilized their own legal system, as was the 
case in many maroon communities across the Americas. Coro’s Ayuntamiento testified 
that the loangos “use an authority which they gave themselves and that they find 
convenient for their government, arresting, awarding, and punishing in accordance with 
																																																								433	“Informe.”:	“ellos	conservan	su	estrangero	dialecto	en	el	idioma	con	tanta	exactitude	q	noze	disiernen	los	advene_sos	de	los	naturales	aun	que	se	an	distintos.”		434	“Expediente,”	ff.	302.:	“no	entendia	sus	combersaciones	por	que	era	en	su	idioma	olandés,	o	de	Guinea.”		435	Saignes,	Vida,	196.			436	Edison	Carneiro,	O	quilombo	dos	Palmares	(Rio	de	Janeiro:	Editôra	Civilização	Brasileira,	1966),	26-7.		437	Carey	Robinson,	The	Fighting	Maroons	of	Jamaica	(Jamaica:	William	Collins	and	Sangster,	1969),	71.	
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their barbaric and despotic caprice.”438 Although the Ayuntamiento may be overstating 
the fact, it is likely that the loango cumbés of the sierra had rules, regulations, honors, and 
penalties, which were governed by a set of established laws. Maroon community 
members throughout the hemisphere elected leaders and councils in accordance with 
specific principles. And there is evidence to suggest that even executions took place in 
some maroon communities, particularly for crimes such as stealing.439  
 But the loangos were not completely removed from the influences of colonial 
authorities. As seen above, they had their lands confiscated and some were arrested over 
the fight with Zárraga. The loangos were also within the orbit of the Catholic Church, 
although they did not have continual contact like other communities in the region. When 
Coro’s Ayuntamiento complained about the “abundance of the people of this infamous 
plebe” in the aftermath of the rebellion, they stated that proof positive would be found in 
local baptism records, suggesting that most loangos had been baptized.440 This is likely 
the case given the fact that most loangos used Christian names. The Ayuntamiento added 
that the loangos had lacked spiritual support for over a year. Although the Ayuntamiento 
lamented this course, their concerns reveal the fact that a priest had indeed visited the 
community in recent years. The Ayuntamiento’s concern was anticipated twenty-one 
years before the rebellion, by Caracas’s Archbishop Mariano Martí. Martí reported that 
the sierra that lay between the city of Coro and the towns south was fully populated and 
																																																								438	“Informe.”:	“disponen	con	autoridad	conferida	por	simismos	lo	q	conciben	combeniente	a	su	goverio,	prendiendo,	apremiando,	y	castigando	segun	su	barbaro	y	despotico	capricho.”		439	Alvin	O.	Thompson,	Flight	to	Freedom:	African	Runaways	and	Maroons	in	the	Americas	(Jamaica,	Barbados,	Trinidad	and	Tobago:	University	of	West	Indies	Press,	2006),	223.		440	“Informe.”:	“abundancia	de	gente	de	la	infima	plebe”.	
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that many people were “blacks who came from the island of Curazao.”441 Martí added 
that because priests were set up in the towns surrounding the sierra and not in the sierra 
itself, that the loangos needed the assistance of a priest, something that they were then 
lacking. 
 There exists scant evidence on the agricultural customs of the loango cumbés, but 
by studying other maroon communities of Venezuela and the Americas, a pattern 
emerges, in which the loangos certainly fit. In Venezuela, in September of 1794, Miguel 
Gerónimo, also known as Miguel Guacamayo, was apprehended after spending over ten 
years as the member of a cumbé.442 After being caught, Guacamayo testified about the 
importance of land in the maroon community from which he belonged, even stating that 
whoever refused to work the land “was expelled from the community.”443 The Trelawny 
maroons of Jamaica cultivated about 100 acres of land where they grew plantains, 
cassava, corn, and cash crops such as tobacco and cocoa. The women of Trelawny did 
most of the cultivating, and the men were dedicated to raising the livestock.444 
Agriculture was the primary economic activity in Palmares and the most important crop 
was corn, which was grown on plantations twice a year. After the corn-cultivating season, 
																																																								441	Mariano	Martí,	Documentos	relativos	a	su	visita	pastoral	de	la	Diocesis	de	Caracas	(1771-1784):	
providencias	(Caracas:	Academia	Nacional	de	la	Historía,	1969),	64.:	“negros	venidos	de	la	isla	de	Curazao.”		442	Federico	Brito	Figueroa,	El	problema	de	tierra	y	esclavos	en	la	historía	de	Venezuela	(Caracas:	Universidad	Central	de	Venezuela,	1985),	238-9.	It	is	not	clear	at	this	moment	whether	or	not	Guacamayo	lived	in	one	of	the	cumbés	of	the	Valles	of	Tuy	or	Aragua,	outside	of	Caracas,	or	from	Yaracuy,	outside	of	Puerto	Cabello.		443	Ibid.,	240.:	“era	expulsado	de	la	comunidad.”		444	Robinson,	68-9.	
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community members would take two weeks off for rest. They also grew plantains and 
sugar cane.445   
 All available evidence demonstrates that the political economy of maroon 
communities was, for the most part, egalitarian. Living in close quarters, and in 
precarious situations in terms of survival, unity was of the upmost importance in maroon 
communities. This unity was most effectively consolidated by ensuring that everyone in 
the community had their needs met. In addition, as historian Alvin Thompson points out, 
there was little incentive to accumulate wealth because of the small amount of resources 
available to these communities, and because of the need to move the community with 
frequency.446 As historian Gabino La Rosa Corzo demonstrates, most maroon settlements 
in Cuba held land in common, and it is safe to assume that distribution was handled in a 
like fashion.447 This reality is perhaps best demonstrated by the name of Cuba’s largest 
maroon community, Todos Tenemos. 
 But not all maroon communities held hand in common, and this appears to have 
been the case with the loango cumbés. In documentation referring to loango lands in the 
sierra, the plural form of the term conuco (conucos) is usually applied, suggesting that 
each cumbé had more than one conuco. It appears likely, then, that the loango cumbés of 
Coro were organized around small plots of land attached to each home, rather than a large 
plot of land held in common. This would follow the pattern practiced on most of Coro’s 
plantations, where enslaved people were assigned a plot of land from which they were 
																																																								445	Carneiro,	28.		446	Thompson,	212.		447	Gabino	La	Rosa	Corzo,	Runaway	Slave	Settlements	in	Cuba:	Resistance	and	Repression	(Chapel	Hill	and	London:	The	University	of	North	Carolina	Press,	2003),	231-2.	
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expected to feed themselves and their families. More importantly, however, and as will 
be seen below, this practice was common in Africa, and still lent itself to communal 
political and economic formations.   
 It is likely that members of the loango cumbés also hunted, fished, and gathered 
wild fruits and vegetables. Coro’s Ayuntamiento stated that loango children “are 
dedicated to gathering wild fruit.”448 Gathering wild plants was a common practice in 
maroon communities throughout the Americas.449 Hunting and fishing were key sources 
of food for members of the Palmares community, as were manufacturing activities such 
as weaving baskets, hats, fans and molding ceramic bowls.450 Men from maroon 
communities in Jamaica would hunt birds and catch turtles, and men and women would 
also make salt for local consumption.451 Although hunting, fishing, salt-making and 
manufacture are not documented activities amongst the loangos, it is likely that they 
engaged in most or all of these economic activities.  
 Agricultural goods, including cash crops such as sugar cane, tobacco, and cacao 
were consumed within maroon communities, but some were also commodified and sold 
at local markets. In their 1772 testimony, Bartolo and Curazao stated that they cultivated 
the land of La Chapa “with fruits not just for the supplicants but also for the neighbors of 
that city.”452 Also, as was seen in the last chapter, the Pardo Militia member Gabriel 
																																																								448	“Informe.”:	“los	dedican	a	coger	frutas	libertres.”		449	Thompson,	249.		450	Carneiro,	2.		451	Mavis	C.	Campbell,	The	Maroons	of	Jamaica,	1655-1796:	A	History	of	Resistance,	Collaboration	&	
Betrayal	(Trenton,	New	Jersey:	Africa	World	Press,	1990),	47.		452	Gil	Rivas,	Dovale	Prado,	and	Lusmila	Bello,	90.:	“con	frutos	no	solo	para	los	suplicantes	sino	tambien	para	los	vecinos	de	aquella	ciudad.”	
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Garcés was known to work with the loangos in the sale of the crops they harvested to 
inhabitants of the city of Coro. Trade in agricultural commodities was an important 
economic activity in Palmares, and Thompson has found the practice of trade was a thorn 
in the side of colonial authorities throughout the hemisphere, as they saw it as standing in 
the way of their goal to eliminate maroon communities.453  
 Guns and ammunition were perhaps the most important commodities that maroon 
communities acquired in exchange for agricultural goods.  When the Ocoyta cumbé was 
destroyed in 1771, authorities found a cache of weapons, which included swords, lances, 
arrows, and eight guns.454 In Jamaica, where two large-scale wars broke out in the 
eighteenth century between the island’s white authorities and various maroon 
communities, guns and ammunition were purchased secretly by maroon community 
members during weekly markets.455 Maroons from Palmares have also been documented 
as having acquired guns via trade.456 In their declaration, Coro’s Ayuntamiento stated that 
the loangos would regularly have meetings and celebrations in the city of Coro and that 
they “march with uniforms and arms with the seriousness of troops.”457 The 
Ayuntamiento added that they never saw loangos acquiring guns via trade, insinuating 
that their guns were stolen from local plantations.   
 Like maroon communities everywhere, the loangos were known as criminals in 
Coro. In the Ayuntamiento’s 1795 report, they complained that the loangos’ “conduct is 																																																								453	Carneiro,	2;	Thompson,	258.		454	Jesús	Chucho	García,	Contra	el	cepo:	Barlovento	tiempo	de	cimarrones	(San	José	de	Barlovento,	Venezuela:	Lucas	y	Trina	Editorial,	1989),	74.		455	Robinson,	34.		456	Carneiro,	2.		457	“Informe.”:	“marchan	uniformados	y	armados	conformalidad	atropa.”	
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corrupt and incorrigible” and that Coro’s jails were filled with loangos, most of who were 
imprisoned for stealing from local haciendas.458 It is likely that some loangos did engage 
in the theft and/or robbing of cattle, crops, and tools from neighboring plantations, as this 
was common among maroon communities across the Americas, so much so that 
Thompson suggests that “banditry” should be considered an economic practice amongst 
these communities in of itself.459 The Ocoyta cumbé outside of eighteenth-century 
Caracas used guns to carry out raids on nearby towns and robbed merchants as well.460 
The maroons of the Clarendon Hills of southern Jamaica carried out similar raids during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.461  
 González himself may have been sought for robbery by Coro’s authorities fifteen 
years before the 1795 insurrection. An investigation conducted by Coro’s Justicia Mayor 
from 1780-1 was carried out against Josef Colina, racially classified as pardo, and Josef 
Charidad Moreno, the last name being a racial signifier meaning dark black. Colina and 
Charidad were accused of carrying out various robberies of cattle and crops from the 
haciendas that neighbored their cumbé at Aduare, in the Peninsula de Paraguaná. Several 
witnesses were brought in to testify that they had seen Colina in the act of stealing 
agricultural goods, but Colina denied any wrongdoing. Josef Charidad was never found 
or questioned about these accusations, and Colina’s fate is not documented. Because the 
Josef Charidad pursued in this case of theft was never found, it is impossible to say for 
certain that this individual is the same one who was accused as being the mastermind 																																																								458	Ibid.:	“conducta	es	estragada	e	incorrigible.”			459	Thompson,	239.		460	Miguel	Acosta	Saignes,	“Life	in	a	Venezuelan	Cumbé”	in	Maroon	Societies:	Rebel	Slave	Communities	
in	the	Americas,	edited	by	Richard	Price	(Garden	City,	New	Jersey:	Anchor	Books,	1973),	67.		461	Robinson,	32.	
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behind the 1795 rebellion. And although Coro’s Justicia Mayor was carrying out the 
investigation, Aduare laid about 50 miles from the city of Coro and about 70 miles away 
from Coro’s sierra. Whether or not this man was González, the incident does point to the 
fact that at least one cumbé inhabitant of the region of Coro was being sought for the 
stealing of hacienda goods.462 
 Although historians have probably overstated it, maroon community members 
across the Americas did occasionally kidnap enslaved women from plantations.463 This 
activity was carried out in order to bring women into the communities, in which men 
formed the vast majority of the population. In the early eighteenth century, maroon 
communities in Urama and Moron, outside of Puerto Cabello, were documented as 
having carried out these actions.464 In the seventeenth century, inhabitants of Palmares 
were also known to kidnap women from nearby plantations.465 As mentioned above, 
however, it is likely that a sizeable percentage of women who lived in the loango cumbés 
were legally free and joined the communities through a partnership with one of the 
community’s men. Gonzalez’s wife, for example, Jossefa Leonarda de Piña, had been 
born in Coro, was legally free, and racially classified as mulata.466 And given that legally 
free black people were a majority in the region, it is likely that this was the case for the 
loango cumbés.  
																																																								462	“Contra	José	Colina	y	José	Caridad	Moreno	por	robo,”	1780-1781,	Casos	Criminales,	Archivo	Histórico	del	Estado	Falcón	(AHF),	Coro,	Venezuela.		463	Thompson,	71.		464	Saignes,	Vida,	189.		465	Carneiro,	33.		466	“Expediente,”	ff.	301-3.	
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 Although maroon communities in Coro were communalist, there did exist a 
hierarchy of command where a leader held some material advantages over other members 
of the community, as was the case throughout the Americas.467 After he was able to 
obtain a Royal Order, Gonzalez rose to a position of leadership in his community. This is 
seen in the fact that it was he who travelled often to Caracas to lobby for a loango militia, 
and that it was he who travelled to Spain to receive the Royal Order. Local whites also 
noted the power González held in his community. On the second of June, just a few 
weeks after the rebellion, Captain Don Manuel de Carrera wrote that González “turned 
into a petty king or casique of slaves who gave him gifts, attended to him, and had 
considered him so much that without fatigue, or industry he lived idly and comfortably in 
the placid tranquility of the city.”468 Carrera added that Gonzalez’s followers were like 
his “tributaries.”469 
 There are reasons to interpret Carrera’s portrayal as an exaggeration, however. 
Mariano Ramirez Valderraín’s testimony before the court in Caracas also indicated that 
González held a special position within the loango community, but one that was 
reciprocal. Ramirez Valderraín stated that González’s wife, Peña, had come to him the 
year before the rebellion to complain that the loangos had failed to provide for her while 
González was away, as they promised they would.470 Ramirez Valderraín added, 
however, that the loangos had come to this agreement with González and Peña because 																																																								467	As	Thompson	points	out,	this	is	typical	of	most,	if	not	all,	communalist	societies.	See:	Thompson,	211.		468	“Expediente,”	ff.	89.:	“se	conbirtio	tambien	en	un	regulo	o	casique	de	esclavos	que	lo	regalavan,	attendian	y	concideravan	tantto	que	sin	fatiga,	ni	industria	vivia	ocioso	y	comodamente	en	la	apacible	tranquilidad	de	la	ciudad.”		469	Ibid.,	ff.	90.		470	“Sublevación,”	ff.	101-3.	
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González was in “Madrid and Caracas on errands in the interest of the same black 
Luangos.”471 
 Although leaders in maroon communities did have some material advantages over 
their peers, it is important to note that the position of maroon leader was always acquired 
through merit, rather than through inheritance. Coro’s authorities repeatedly asserted that 
González’s notoriety grew as a result of his efforts in defense of loango lands, especially 
after he was granted the Royal Order. Guillermo Rivas, the leader of the Ocoyta cumbé, 
earned his title of Captain because of his leadership qualities, his combat abilities, and his 
ability to create commercial opportunities for his community. Much like González, Rivas 
was considered a protector of the people of his community and even those on neighboring 
plantations. Historian Jesus “Chucho” García even asserts that enslaved people would 
threaten their owners with reprisals from Rivas if they endured what they considered 
excessively poor treatment.472 Thompson argues that a consistent feature in maroon 
communities is that leaders had the largest homes and gardens and more than one wife, 
even though women were a minority in the communities.473 A King governed Palmares, 
and the quilombo’s most famous leader, Zumbi, was married to three women. But again, 
leadership in maroon communities from Coro to Jamaica, and to Brazil, was earned 
rather than awarded. Zumbi gained the crown after he led an insurgency against his 
unpopular uncle Ganga-Zumba.474  
																																																								471	Ibid.:	“Madrid	y	Caracas	en	dilig.s	interasantes	a	los	mismos	negros	Luangos.”		472	García,	65-70.		473	Thompson,	212.		474	Carneiro,	36.	
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 The political economy of the loango cumbés of Coro bore striking similarities to 
that of maroon communities throughout the Americas. Although unable to break away 
completely from white control, maroon communities in the Americas, including the 
loango cumbés, were highly organized and did enjoy a significant amount of autonomy 
from colonial authorities. These communities maintained their native languages and 
developed new creole ones as well. They had their own legal system, yet they sometimes 
found themselves in trouble with colonial authorities for raiding plantations. Most 
importantly, perhaps, was the fact that maroon communities practiced an agrarian 
lifestyle in which land, its fruits, and its game were available to all members, even those 
that that were enslaved, or had recently joined the community. As will be demonstrated 
below, these practices were not created in a vacuum; they were forged in accordance with 
the social relations of their African homelands.  
 
The Gold Coast 
 
 Although the maroon communities of the sierra of Coro—most of whose 
members had previously been enslaved in Dutch Curaçao—were known as loangos, 
many of them actually had origins approximately 500 miles northwest of the Loango 
Coast. As stated in the introduction, about one third of the enslaved people transported by 
Dutch slavers during the eighteenth century were from the Gold Coast.475 Although royal 
authorities usually referred to the maroons of Coro as loangos, they did sometimes refer 
to the maroons as “loango or mina” and “loangos or minas.” Mina was an ethnic marker 																																																								475	Alex	Borucki,	“Trans-imperial	History	in	the	Making	of	the	Slave	Trade	to	Venezuela,	1526-1811.”	
Itinerario	36:2	(2012):	29-54.	
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used in the Atlantic to refer to someone with origins in the Gold Coast. The term mina 
was taken from Elmina, the name of the largest fort on the Coast. The term Elmina was a 
variant of the original name that the Portuguese gave the castle, São Jorge da Mina, with 
Mina meaning mine in Portuguese. The Portuguese referred to the region that would later 
be known as the Gold Coast as Costa da Mina because it was known for its large gold 
deposits.476 As stated earlier, loango was a term used to describe Coro’s maroon 
community, whether they were born in Venezuela, Curaçao, on the Loango Coast, the 
Gold Coast, or anywhere else on the African continent.  
 Maroon settlements throughout the Americas, such as the loango community in 
Coro, were constructed upon African political and economic customs, such as those that 
were practiced on the Gold Coast. Communalist principles in regards to production and 
consumption produced a highly organized egalitarian society. A familial system that 
connected members of society to a common ancestor facilitated this mode of existence. 
Leadership was important. The heads of households (usually males) were responsible for 
the home’s other members, whose numbers could be in the dozens. This structure 
expanded to the levels of the town itself, the larger community and the head of state.477 
Slavery was practiced throughout the Gold Coast, but its nature was dramatically 
different to the way it was practiced in the Americas, and quite different than how the 
institution had existed throughout European history.  
 The region that was known as the Gold Coast during the protocolonial and 
colonial periods is roughly coterminous to present-day Ghana. The indigenous peoples of 																																																								476	Ivor	Wilks,	Forests	of	Gold:	Essays	on	the	Akan	and	the	Kingdom	of	Asante	(Athens:	Ohio	University	Press,	1993),	4.		477	K.Y.	Daaku,	“Aspects	of	Precolonial	Akan	Economy,”	The	International	Journal	of	African	Historical	
Studies	5:2	(1972):	245.	
179	
the region are known as the Guan. The region’s largest ethnic group was the Akan, who 
inhabited the forests of the interior of the coast up to the Black Volta. The second largest 
group was the Ga who mostly lived on the eastern coast. The Guan lived amongst both 
the Akan and the Ga during the eighteenth century, although they were mostly 
concentrated on the coast, near Winneba. The Ga and the Akan spoke mutually 
intelligible Kwa languages. Although it is a matter of controversy regarding when the 
Akan and the Ga arrived to the Gold Coast, it was probably at some point in the thirteenth 
century. Regardless of when they arrived, both groups were certainly present when the 
Portuguese invaded the lands during the fifteenth century.478  
 The Akan dominated the Gold Coast during the early modern period, and in the 
eighteenth century, the Akan’s largest historical polity, Greater Asante, held political and 
economic control over the region.479 Historian Ivor Wilks traces the rise of the Akan and 
the Asante to the transition that occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when the 
Akan developed an agrarian society. Prior to this period, Akan-speaking groups engaged 
in hunting until demographic expansion, through the incorporation of migrants, facilitated 
the need for settlement and agricultural production. Thus began the clearing of 
forestlands for cultivation, as well as the concomitant growth of the Akan population.480  
																																																								478	Kwame	Yeboa	Daaku,	Trade	and	Politics	on	the	Gold	Coast,	1600-1720	(Oxford:	The	Clarendon	Press,	1970),	1-2;	J.K.	Flynn,	Asante	and	Its	Neighbors,	1700-1807	(London:	Northwestern	University	Press,	1971),	4.		479	I	follow	Kwame	Arhin’s	decision	to	avoid	the	term	“empire”	when	discussing	the	Asante,	and	utilize	the	term	Greater	Asante	instead.	As	historians	have	made	clear,	Asante	expansion	had	the	effect	of	uniting	a	people,	making	this	expansionary	process	quite	different	than	imperialism.	See:	Kwame	Arhin,	“The	Structure	of	Greater	Ashanti	(1700-1824)”	The	Journal	of	African	History	8:1	(1967):	65-85.		480	Wilks,	41-90.	
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 Akan polities and those of the Ga and Guan followed a social system whose basis 
was the home. A typical household on the Gold Coast comprised of a family head, 
usually a male and a father. Polygamy was common on the Gold Coast and the male head 
of the household could have one or more wives. The household also included unmarried 
children, married sons and their families, the household head’s mother, younger brothers 
and unmarried sisters, and the sons and daughters of the head of the household’s married 
sisters. Servants were also considered part of the household, and so pawns, as well as 
enslaved people and their descendants, were also considered members of the home.481   
 Agriculture was one of the principal economic activities for families. Men, free 
and enslaved, cleared the Gold Coast’s forests to prepare it for cultivation. This practice 
was the most labor-intensive aspect of agricultural production, but the bulk of the work 
was only carried out once every three years. Men would cut down the trees, fence the 
field, and weed the land during the clearing period. Wilks estimates that families 
cultivated about 2.5 acres of land every three years before the land was abandoned for 
new ones. The soil of the cleared land required fallowing every three years, and the land 
could not be replanted until 10-15 years later, in order to give the soil time to 
recuperate.482   
 Women and children would harvest the land, while men hunted, fished, and raised 
livestock. Families would plant cereals, fruits and vegetables, such as rice, maize, yam, 
cassava, and pineapples.483 Wilks estimated that the planting and harvesting of 
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agricultural goods required about 83 work days every three years, meaning that women 
and children had time to pursue other economic activities, such as marketing, as well as 
ample leisure time.484 Men in the family would rear cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, horses, and 
donkeys.485 During the eighteenth century, men used guns, spears, and bows and arrows 
to hunt food for consumption and for sale. Hunting groups would leave their homes early 
in the morning and return in the evening with food and/or ivory.486 One early nineteenth 
century Tatar traveller noted that Gold Coast hunters dipped their arrows in poison, and if 
they were hunting big game, they would climb a tree for safety once the animal was 
inflicted. Sometimes, hunters would follow their prey for days before they died.487 
Fishing was most important on the coast, where men would fish, while women would 
prepare the meat for sale or consumption.488  
 Some of the agricultural and animal products were commodified and joined other 
commodities, such as gold, onto local markets. Before the slave trade took over the 
Coast’s economy during the seventeenth century, the trade in gold had been the dominant 
economic activity European traders were engaged in. In fact, Gold Coast peoples had 
produced gold for European markets since the ancient Roman period.489 During the 
eighteenth century, most gold production was conducted on Akan lands. Women 
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produced much gold through panning in riverbeds, loose alluvium deposits, and coastal 
sand. This form of production was not taxed, and was available to all individuals. Gold 
was also mined, however, which was a larger, more intensive undertaking, and which 
was controlled by local leaders who employed enslaved men.490   
 Although leadership was important amongst Gold Coast peoples, the society’s 
stated ideals contributed to a political economy that was more horizontal than 
hierarchical.  In the eighteenth century, the holder of the Asante Golden Stool was 
considered head of state, and the Queen mother, who held veto power, assisted him in his 
duties. These premier positions were followed by senior elders, who were in charge of the 
army.491 The holder of the Stool was the trustee of all the land, but in practice, the 
custodians of land were town leaders or chiefs. These subchiefs were entrusted with 
ensuring that all community members had access to land. Family heads were awarded 
land, which was then allotted to each member of the household.492 Asante states were 
considered an enlarged nuclear family, and as such, the state’s role was to ensure that all 
family members had equal access to land.493 In a similar vein, the vast majority of trade 
in commodities was free to all individuals and families, with minimal state interference. 
As historian K.Y. Daaku insists, the highest level of human achievement among the 
Asante was not the hoarding of wealth, as it was among European leaders, but the 
distribution of wealth to as many people as possible.494   																																																								490	Ibid.,	83-7.		491	Ibid.,	94.		492	Daaku,	Trade,	50-1;	Daaku,	“Aspects,”	241-5.		493	Daaku,	“Aspects,”	245.		494	Ibid.,	247.	
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 Throughout the eighteenth century, many communities on the Gold Coast were 
incorporated into the Asante, who forced new towns to pay tribute. The Asante 
established themselves as the dominant polity on the Gold Coast in 1701. Prior to that 
time, the Asante had begun uniting various polities surrounding Kumase, which became 
the capital of Greater Asante. Change came in the early eighteenth century when the 
Asante had grown to such an extent that they began refusing tribute payments to the 
Denkyira, which was the dominant polity of the late seventeenth century. Although the 
Asante were able to establish their growing presence at the turn of the eighteenth century, 
there were still Denkyira loyalists dispersed throughout the region, and the Asante would 
find themselves in conflict with these communities through the following decades, as 
well as with incorporated towns that rejected Asante control.495  
 The Asante continued their expansion throughout the eighteenth century, but in 
the model typical of Akan political growth. Those new communities, the vast majority of 
them being Akan, were incorporated into Greater Asante as provinces, protectorates or 
tributaries. Provinces, such as Akwamu and Assim, were considered parts of Greater 
Asante, and had the benefits of royal protection, but their chiefs were required to pay 
tribute, and pledge loyalty to the Golden Stool. Chiefs of the Asante Provinces would 
receive 20% of the tribute for themselves. Protectorates, such as Accra and Elmina, were 
independent partners who engaged in trade with the Asante and with Europeans. They 
could request protection from Asante but their political ties were not as formal as they 
were with the Provinces, and they were not considered members of Greater Asante. 
Protectorates usually recorded this status because of their fortuitous geographical 
locations, which gave them economic independence and strong relations with trading 																																																								495	Daaku,	Trade,	144-60.	
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partners, particularly Europeans. Tributaries were towns that were tied to the Asante 
simply through tribute payments, which were collected by an annual Asante visitor. But 
there were no other formal political ties, except if the town’s leader invited the Asante to 
intervene in some way.496   
 Throughout the eighteenth century, the Asante were constantly occupied with 
battling Provinces that resisted incorporation or some particular aspect of their 
relationship with Asante. These battles resulted in the enslavement of thousands of 
people, fed the Atlantic slave trade, and created eighteenth-century Coro. Many of the 
Provinces that were incorporated into Asante rejected their newfound relationships 
because of their loyalty to Denkyira. Others rejected the amount of tribute that they were 
responsible for paying, and still others refused the presence of the Asante military.497   
 Most people on the Gold Coast were enslaved by way of warfare, whether they 
remained in the region or if they were traded to Europeans. Contemporary oral histories 
taken by historian Akosua Adoma Perbi show that 31% of respondents found that warfare 
was “very important” to acquiring slaves, while 26% noted the importance of local 
markets. Kidnapping, tribute, and pawning each received 10% of interviewee responses 
designating those areas of slave procurement as “very important.”498 
 As was the case throughout Africa, slavery in the Gold Coast region was radically 
different than it was in the European tradition, and from how it was practiced in the 
Americas. The Gold Coast peoples were linked through an idea of consanguinity and for 
this reason, neighboring communities, even if they belonged to a different ethnic group, 																																																								496	Arhin,	76-85.		497	Ibid.,	78.		498	Perbi,	28.	
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were considered family. Although enslaved people were marked by their condition in 
particular ways they still held the same rights as any other family member of the 
household. They had the same right to plant, eat, and trade, to be clothed, and to receive 
protection. Enslaved people on the Gold Coast could have independent incomes, could 
own property, and they could inherit their master’s property. Slaves could also rise to 
positions of authority within their communities and within society. In fact, Perbi has 
documented that 20% of Asante stools, or royal office appointments, were held by 
enslaved people.499   
 But slavery did limit one’s possibilities in life and enslaved people were 
considered a separate, lower class. Enslaved men and women ate with the free women of 
the home, separated from the free men. Enslaved people were also expected to dress more 
modestly and were barred from wearing gold. The status of enslaved people was not 
forgotten during their lifetimes, although by the third or fourth generation, enslaved 
people would be considered an equal member of their families.500 Enslaved people made 
up a sizeable minority of the population and practiced all of the economic activities 
conducted by free people.  
 Before being sold to Europeans on the coast, most enslaved people were taken to 
local markets where they were sold to intermediaries. Perbi has located 63 slave markets 
in the Gold Coast region; 30 of them on the coast, and the remaining 33 were scattered 
across the vast interior.501 At these markets, enslaved people were traded for an 
assortment of other commodities, such as cowries, ivory, iron, weapons, and textiles. 																																																								499	Ibid.,	142.		500	Ibid.,	113-32.		501	Ibid.,	37.	
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European commodities held a special prestige, were in high demand, and were always 
available for trade. Salaga, laying approximately 120 miles northeast of Kumasi, and 
about 240 miles from the coast, was the site of the region’s largest market. At Salaga, 
people from as far as present day Burkina Faso and Nigeria would trade in commodities 
such as enslaved people. The Salaga market was divided into two sections: one for the 
sale of slaves and the other for the sale of all other goods. Sale items were placed on top 
of mats that lay on the ground. Enslaved people were chained together by their necks and 
waists, in groups of 10 to 15.502 
 Although enslaved people were treated as family members, the act of being 
enslaved was a horrendous experience, particularly for children. Quoba Ottobah Cugoano 
was kidnapped in 1770 when he was 13 years old. Cugoano may have been born a slave, 
stating in his memoir years later that his father was “a companion” of the Fante King. 
Cugoano states that he lived in the late King’s home until he was sent to live with his 
nephew who had inherited leadership. Cugoano stated that he lived in his new home with 
the new chief’s children “enjoying peace and tranquility, about twenty moons, which, 
according to their way of reckoning time, is two years.”503 After that time, he was sent to 
live with an uncle who had “hundreds of relations” and that he enjoyed his three months 
there, playing with all the other children. One day, Cugoano and a group of friends went 
“into the woods to gather fruit and catch birds, and such amusements as pleased us” when 
																																																								502	Ibid.,	47.		503	Quobna	Ottobah	Cugoano,	Thoughts	and	Sentiments	on	the	Evil	of	Slavery	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	1999),	12.	
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he and his friends were confronted by “several great ruffians” who claimed that the 
children “had committed a fault against their lord.”504 
 The men demanded that Cugoano and his friends follow them to account for their 
offence. Some children tried to run away, according to Cugoano, “but pistols and 
cutlasses were soon introduced.”505 Cugoano added “one of them pretended to be more 
friendly than the rest, and said, that he would speak to their lord to get us clear, and 
desired that we should follow him.”506 After travelling a considerable distance, Cugoano 
was placed in the home of a strange man for six days. The whole time that Cugoano was 
away from his home, he was desperate to return. He refused to eat until the strange man 
promised him that he would return him to his uncle’s home. Cugoano finally ate “a little 
fruit with him” but he was not returned to his uncle.507 One morning, Cugoano was sent 
to travel with the man where he “saw several white people, which made me afraid that 
they would eat me, according to our notion as children in the inland parts of the 
country.”508  
 Although he was born and raised a few hundred miles east of the Gold Coast, 
Olaudah Equiano had a similar experience to Cugoano. As mentioned above, the market 
at Salaga welcomed traders from far and wide, and many brought enslaved Igbo people 
from present day southeast Nigeria, such as Equiano. In his autobiography, Equiano 
																																																								504	Ibid.,	13.		505	Ibid.		506	Ibid.		507	Ibid.,	14.		508	Ibid.	
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stated that he was one of seven siblings and that his father also held many slaves. But 
Equiano added:  
but how different was their condition from that of the slaves in the West-Indies! With us 
they do no more work than other members of the community, even their master. Their 
food, cloathing, and lodging were nearly the same as theirs, except that they were not 
permitted to eat with those who were free born.509  
 
Like Cugoano, though, Equiano was kidnapped at a young age. He stated that in his 
community, it was common for children to stay home and play while the adults travelled 
to work the land, “and commonly some of us used to get up a tree to look out for any 
assailant, or kidnapper, that might come upon us.”510 One day, two men and one woman 
grabbed Equiano and his sister “stopped our mouths, tied our hands, and ran off with us 
into the nearest wood.”511  
 Equiano and his sister were separated and Equiano changed masters numerous 
times until he was finally sold to Europeans. On his first long stop, Equiano “got into the 
hands of a chieftain, in a very pleasant country.”512 He added, “This man had two wives 
and some children, and they all used me extremely well, and did all they could to comfort 
me; particularly the first wife, who was something like my mother.”513 Equiano stated 
that he was at this home for about a month, and that although he had much freedom of 
movement and was treated well, he used this “liberty” to “embrace every opportunity to 
																																																								509	Olaudah	Equiano,	The	Interesting	Narrative	and	Other	Writings	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	1995),	40.		510	Ibid.,	47.		511	Ibid.		512	Ibid.,	48.		513	Ibid.	
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inquire the way to my own home.”514 Equiano was traded various times before he 
reached the coast and boarded a slave ship, which “filled me with astonishment, which 
was soon converted into terror.”515 
 Cugoano and Equiano’s testimonies confirm that slavery, as practiced in West 
Africa, was a vastly more humane condition than the versions practiced by their 
European contemporaries in the Americas. Despite this fact, however, their 
autobiographies also reveal that the act of enslavement was often brutal, and that even 
though enslaved people were adopted as kin, they still longed for an opportunity to return 
home. Although angry at people who practice kidnapping of people for sale, Cugoano 
was also sympathetic towards his captors, stating, “wicked and barbarous as they 
certainly are, I can hardly think, if they knew what horrible barbarity they were sending 
their fellow-creatures to, that they would do it.”516 There is reason to believe, then, that 
people who traded enslaved Africans to Europeans did not realize that they were sending 
them into horrific conditions. Some African traders could have assumed that Europeans 
treated enslaved people in the same manner that they were treated at home.   
 Many of Coro’s loangos once had homes on the Gold Coast, and the political 
economy of the region shaped the structure of their cumbés, as well as the moral 
economy of Coro’s rebels. Like the loango communities, towns in the Gold Coast held an 
open door policy for new community members, based on the notion of consanguinity. A 
political economy with a foundation in communalist agricultural practices, buttressed by 
hunting, gathering, and trade, also carried over to the loango cumbés. The Gold Coast’s 																																																								514	Ibid.		515	Ibid.,	55.		516	Cugoano,	26.	
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social structure was not without hierarchy, however, as town and state leaders, as well as 
male household heads, held political and economic advantages over others, particularly 
enslaved people. This was also the case in maroon communities, and glimpses of these 
practices can be seen amongst the loangos, especially in regards to the unique treatment 
that González received. Nevertheless, the political economy of the Gold Coast was a 
rather egalitarian one, and one void of the worst aspects of slavery, white supremacy and 
colonial rule; features that defined life in eighteenth-century Coro. It was this lifestyle 
that served as the guiding light for Coro’s rebels.  
 
The Loango Coast 
  
 The region that served as the loangos’ namesake featured a political and 
economic system that was strikingly similar to the one practiced on the Gold Coast. 
When they held the asiento, the South Sea Company procured about 32.8% of its 
enslaved people from the Loango Coast.517 During the eighteenth century, about 37% of 
enslaved people acquired by Dutch slavers were also from the Loango Coast region.518 
Therefore, many of Coro’s rebels had origins on the Loango Coast. There is not much 
secondary material on the region during the protocolonial period. But by parsing through 
the existing literature, as well as reviewing contemporary European travel accounts, one 
is given the picture of a social system that was homologous to that of the Gold Coast and 
maroon communities throughout the Americas, including the loango cumbés.   
																																																								517	Colin	A.	Palmer,	Human	Cargoes:	The	British	Slave	Trade	to	Spanish	America,	1700-1739	(Urbana:	University	of	Illinois	Press,	1981),	31.		518	Borucki,	40.	
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 In the eighteenth century, the Loango Coast was home to three ethnic groups, 
which each had their own King and their own port of trade. The Vili of the Kingdom of 
Loango were the dominant polity for much of the early modern period until the Ngoyo 
and Kakongo Kingdoms achieved independence during the mid eighteenth century as a 
result of their engagement in the European slave trade. The Loango Kingdom was about 
120 miles long and stretched from the Chiloango River to the Baynya lagoon. The 
Kingdom had four provinces, of which Loangiri (also known as Loango) was home to the 
Kingdom’s capital of Buali and was the main trading point of the Loango Bay. The 
people of the Kingdom of Ngoyo identified as the Woyo people, and they held the port of 
Cabinda. The smallest of the three kingdoms, the Kakongo, was of the Kotchi people 
who held their port at Malemba. All three kingdoms had similar cultural and institutional 
practices and they spoke mutually intelligible dialects of Kikongo, a Bantu language.519 
 It is most likely that the three peoples broke off from the Kingdom of Kongo at 
some point in the fourteenth century. There were probably people living in the region that 
would become known as the Loango Coast when these peoples arrived, but definitive 
clues are lacking. The Vili, Wolo and Kotchi founded the land north of the Kongo 
Kingdom after the latter’s population had expanded. For some time, perhaps as long as a 
century, the Loango Coast was part of the Kongo Kingdom until it gained independence. 
By the late sixteenth century, the King of the Kongo no longer laid any claims to the 
Loango Coast.520 
																																																								519	Phyllis	M.	Martin,	The	External	Trade	of	the	Loango	Coast,	1576-1870:	The	Effects	of	Changing	
Commercial	Relations	on	the	Vili	Kingdom	of	Loango	(Oxford:	The	Clarendon	Press,	1972),	3-30.		520	Ibid.,	1-9.	
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 Homes and communities were organized on the Loango Coast in ways similar to 
the Gold Coast. Homes consisted of 10 to 40 people who conducted food production 
collectively.521Women in the family planted and harvested the fields, producing beans, 
cassava, yams, and maize.522 It is likely that enslaved men and women also worked in 
agriculture. Free men—and probably enslaved ones too—would clear a new field out of 
the forest once a year. The men would then build a fence around the field and plant traps 
to keep animals out. Women would then plant their crops and harvest the yams 10 
months after planting them. Men and women in the house worked together to stack the 
yams, and most of the land was then allowed to fallow. During this fallow, small greens 
would grow, and be used for the family’s consumption. A small portion of the field was 
maintained to grow kitchen crops until a new field was planted. Homes needed about 10 
times the amount of land they cultivated to maintain their families, and once a great 
distance between the homes, their towns, and their primary fields got further away, entire 
towns would migrate to new lands. This migration occurred about once every 10 years, 
and assumed the availability of open spaces and low population densities.523 
 But farming was meant to produce about only about 40% of a home’s food 
supply. The animal traps that men set up inside of the fields’ fences produced a steady 
supply of meat. Families also hunted, gathered fruits and vegetables, fished, and grew 
insect colonies for consumption. During the dry season, groups of men from a town 
would camp for about a month on hunting and fishing expeditions in which game was 
																																																								521	Jan	Vasina,	Paths	in	the	Rainforests,	Towards	a	History	of	Political	Tradition	in	Equatorial	Africa	(London:	James	Currey,	1990),	75.		522	Martin,	13;	Vasina,	84-5.		523	Vasina,	85-99.	
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shared collectively. Goats and dogs appear to be the only animals that were domesticated 
on farmland.524 Households also produced pottery, and manufactured cloth and baskets.  
 All three of the ethnic groups of the coast traced themselves to a common 
ancestor, and as was the case in the Gold Coast, this is perhaps what led strangers and 
slaves to be welcomed as family. Writing of his journeys through the Loango Coast in 
1776, French traveller Liévain Bonaventure Proyart wrote that the peoples of the coast 
“are human and obliging, even towards strangers, and those whom they have nothing to 
hope for. Hotelleries are not in use among them. A traveler who passes by a village at 
mealtime, enters, without any way, in the first home, and he is welcome.”525 This 
courtesy towards strangers was extended to people not considered relatives, however, as 
in the case of missionaries. Proyart added, “The missionaries often set out without 
provisions and without merchandise to procure them: they were received everywhere 
humanly, they lacked nothing for life.”526   
 As was the case in the Gold Coast, the structure of Loango Coast society was 
based on the composition of the home. Historian and anthropologist Jan Vansina argues 
that three interlocking groups formed the basis of society for Bantu-speaking peoples in 
Equatorial Africa: the district, the village, and the house. The house was led by a 
polygamous male head of the family who acted as father to a host of kin and servants, as 
well as friends. Marriages occurred in many ways: sisters could be exchanged amongst 																																																								524	Ibid.,	83-5.		525	L’Abbé	Proyart,	Histoire	de	Loango,	Kakongo,	et	autres	Royaumes	d’Afrique	(Paris,	1776),	73.:	“Ils	sont	humains	&obligeans,	meme	envers	les	inconnus,	&	ceux	don’t	ils	n’ont	rien	à	espérer.	Les	hôtelleries	ne	sont	point	en	usage	parmi	eux.	Un	voyageur	qui	passe	par	un	village	à	l’heure	du	repas,	entre,	sans	façon,	dans	la	premiere	case,	&	il	y	est	le	bien-venu.”			526	Ibid.:	“Les	Missionnaires	se	sont	souvent	mis	en	route	sans	provisions	&	sans	marchandises	pour	s’en	procurer:	on	les	a	reçus	partout	humainement,	ils	n’ont	manquéde	rien	pour	la	vie.”		
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male heads of families, women could be married off as a form of payment, or even given 
as a gift. Women were also married to heads of families as the result of violence, when 
they were granted as compensation from the losing party in war or if they were outright 
kidnapped.527  
 The structure of a “village” or town followed a similar logic to that of the home. 
Each Loango town had a leader who had earned, rather than inherited, his title. In the 
nineteenth century, a town consisted of about 100 inhabitants, and this was surely true of 
the eighteenth century as well. Therefore, a town probably consisted of between three and 
ten homes during the eighteenth century. Although a few towns of nineteenth-century 
Equatorial Africa had only one home, this was rare, and Vansina suggests that this was 
rarer still during the previous centuries. The town comprised of private rectangular homes 
that lay along the sides of a road or plaza. The town also had communal sheds, which 
were used by all community members for manufacturing activities, such as weaving, 
carpentry, and smithing.528  
 Each town had a central area designated for community meetings, including those 
of the town’s leader and his council. Here, plans were collectively made and disputes 
were handled. The town’s leader commanded respect from all members of the 
community. He and his home were always provided the largest share of a hunt, and the 
most emblematic animals hunted, such as the leopard, were always given to the town 
leader.529  
																																																								527	Vasina,	75-7.		528	Ibid.		529	Ibid.,	77-9.	
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 Homes and towns were tightly knit, communalist spaces. As mentioned earlier, 
towns in the Loango Coast generally changed locations about once every ten years, once 
farming lands proved too distant, but all of the town’s homes would move together. 
Towns, like homes, had a communal structure, which ensured that all community 
members were cared for. Proyart wrote that individuals of the towns were “willing to 
share the little they have with those they know to be in need.”530 He added that, “if they 
be happy in hunting or fishing, and have obtained some rare piece, they also run to give 
notice to their friends and neighbors, carrying them their share.”531  
 Finally, the district was a loosely organized confederation of towns that 
subscribed to a common identity. The district did not have a leader or a “chief” entrusted 
with the district’s care. Rather, the town leaders themselves maintained relations between 
neighbors. Inter-town relations were conducted by the leaders of two adjacent towns who 
maintained open communication with each other to address issues of mutual interest. 
When entire towns migrated every ten years to work new fields, they tended to stay 
within the vicinity of their district, which had the effect of maintaining a group 
identity.532 
 The Kingdom of Loango united the districts of the coast for much of the 
eighteenth century, until the Kingdoms of Ngoyo and Kakongo gained independence in 
the middle of the century. The King of Loango, known as the Maloango, held his throne 
at the city of Buali, just a few miles in from the coast. Unlike the leaders of the towns, the 
																																																								530	Proyart,	71.:	“ils	sont	prêts	à	partager	le	peu	qu’ils	ont	avec	qu’ils	savent	être	dans	le	besoin.”		531	Ibid.:	“s’ils	ont	été	heureux	à	la	chasse	ou	à	la	pêche,	&	qu’ils	se	foient	procure	quelque	piece	rare,	ils	courent	aussi-tôto	en	donner	avis	à	leurs	amis	&	à	leurs	voisins,	en	leur	en	portant	leur	part.”			532	Ibid.,	81-2.	
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Loango King’s title of Maloango was hereditary. All homes were responsible for paying 
tribute to the Maloango, but in accordance with the wealth of the home. So homes with 
fewer occupants and less land paid a lower rate than those homes that held more. Tribute 
payments were made in both labor and kind. Officials who were appointed by the 
Maloango collected tribute from the various towns. Other officials were responsible for 
meting out justice and others for providing armies during wartime. By midcentury, the 
Loango Kingdom splintered as a result of the rise of the Mafouks, merchants who gained 
much wealth and influence as a result of the slave trade. Before the split, the Ngoyo and 
Kakongo Kingdoms were tied to the Kingdom of Loango as junior partners who paid 
tribute.533 But even after the Ngoyo and Kikongo split from the Loango Crown, they 
continued to pay some form of tribute to the Maloango.534 
 Proyart’s observations reveal a society that is at once communal and hierarchical. 
His discussion of greeting customs offer insight into class, royalty, and status in the 
Loango Coast:  
If they are equals who meet each other, they make a genuflection, and recover themselves 
by clapping their hands. He who meets a man who is remarkably superior to him, 
professes himself, lowers his head, touches the earth with his fingertips, carries them to 
his mouth, and raises himself by clapping his hands. The person who has been thus 
received, whether it be a Prince or even the King, never dispenses with salvation, 
genuflecting, and clapping.535 
 
																																																								533	Martin,	22.		534	Christina	Frances	Mobley,	“The	Kongolese	Atlantic:	Central	African	Slavery	&	Culture	from	Mayombe	to	Haiti”	(Ph.D.	Diss.:	Duke	University,	2015),	70.		535	Proyart,	72.:	“Si	ce	sont	des	égaux	qui	se	recontrent,	ils	font	une	génuflexion,	&	se	relevant	en	battant	des	mains.	Celui	qui	recontre	un	home	qui	lui	est	notablement	supérieur,	se	prosterne,	baisse	la	tête,	touche	la	terre	des	du	bout	des	doigts,	les	porte	à	sa	bouche,	&	se	releve	en	battant	des	mains.	Le	personne	qui	a	été	ainsi	saluée,	fut-ce	un	Prince,	ou	meme	le	Roi,	ne	se	dispense	jamais	de	render	le	salut,	en	faisant	une	génuflexion,	&	en	battant	des	mains.”	
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Status was an important aspect of life on the Loango coast, one that was reflected in, 
while being buttressed by, ubiquitous gestures and actions. Yet, Proyart also notes that 
the King’s wealth did not seem radically superior to that of commoners, saying that the 
Maloango palace consisted of only “five or six houses, a little larger” than those of 
commoners.536 Speaking of the Mafouks, Proyart also stated, “the bourgeois have nothing 
that distinguishes them from the villagers; they are neither better dressed nor better 
housed. The bourgeoisie of the capital will work in the fields, like the peasant women of 
the smallest hamlet.”537 Therefore, it seems that although the society was hierarchical, 
and people atop the ladder had larger material means, income was still not nearly as 
stratified as it was in Europe, or its colonies.  
 As was the case in the Gold Coast, slavery was practiced on the Loango coast, but 
it was radically different from the European tradition. Another late eighteenth century 
French traveller, Louis de Granpre, wrote “many (servants) are slaves and subject to the 
caprices of their master, who sells them according to his will.”538 De Granpre added, 
however, that “though law places them there as slaves; either that their wealth gives them 
a consideration that shelters them, or that a long filiation in the place of their residency, 
has made them so natural that their master is afraid to sell them.”539 De Granpre’s insight 
demonstrates that slavery in the Loango Coast was an institution similar to the one 																																																								536	Ibid.,	57.:	“cinq	ou	six	cases,	un	peu	plus	grandes.”			537	Ibid.,	54-5.:	“Les	bourgeois	n’ont	rien	quiles	distingue	des	villageois:	ils	ne	sont	ni	mieux	vêtus,	ni	mieux	loges.	Les	bourgeoises	de	la	capitale	vont	travailler	aux	champs,	comme	les	paysannes	du	plus	petit	hameau.”			538	L.	Degrandpré,	Voyage	a	la	côte	occidentale	d’Afrique,	fait	dans	les	anneees	1786	et	1787	(Paris,	1801),	105.:	“sont	esclaves	et	soumis	aux	caprices	de	leur	maître,	qui	les	vend	suivant	sa	volonté.”		539	Ibid.:	“quoique	la	loi	les	y	assujettisse	comme	esclaves;	mais	soit	que	leur	richesse	leur	donne	une	consideration	qui	les	met	à	l’abri,	soit	qu’une	longue	filiation	dans	le	lieu	de	leur	residence,	les	y	ait	tellement	naturalizes	que	leur	maître	craigne	de	les	vendre.”		
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practiced on the Gold Coast. Enslaved people were considered a class below ordinary 
members of society, but at the same time, they were treated as family, whether this was 
due to tradition or necessity.  
 Enslaved people who were sold to Europeans on the Loango Coast had origins on 
the coast itself and in the Mayombe rainforest outside of Malemba.540 People received 
their enslaved status as a result of inheritance, criminal prosecution, kidnapping, and war. 
As was seen in the Gold Coast, many people on the Loango Coast inherited their 
condition as slaves, and could be sold to Europeans because they were in this condition. 
Historian Christina Mobley suggests that criminal prosecution for crimes, such as 
fighting, failure to pay debt, and witchcraft grew throughout the eighteenth century as a 
result of the stimulus provided by the slave trade.541 The punishment for these crimes 
increasingly became enslavement. It is also likely that kidnapping was another source of 
enslavement, given that many enslaved people were captured on the coast. As Mobley 
points out, de Granpre’s narrative consistently discuses the method of kidnapping as one 
of the major ways in which Europeans procured enslaved people.542 
 The emergence of a new class of merchant elites native to the Loango Coast 
eroded the power of the Maloango, contributed to a political breakdown in the region, 
and led to war. After the Kakongo and Ngoyo Crowns gained independence from the 
Moloango, they began to receive threats of their own from inland groups such as the 
Solango. Polities from the interior were eager to become direct providers of enslaved 
people to Europeans by getting rid of the Ngoyo and Kakongo middlemen, particularly 																																																								540	Mobley,	186-230.		541	Ibid.,	159.		542	Ibid.,	144.	
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when these groups were considered weakened by factionalism. Disputes over legitimacy 
in the two breakaway Loango states also contributed to an outbreak of civil wars, which 
coincided with the slave trade’s peak on the Loango Coast between 1763 and 1793. 
Mafouks, who mostly lived on or near the coast, also began fighting each other over 
territorial disputes.543 
 It is important to note, however, that warfare on the Loango Coast was not as 
destructive as it was in Europe and its colonies. Vasina argues that there were two types 
of wars waged during the protocolonial period in Equatorial Africa: restricted wars and 
destructive wars. Restricted wars were—by far—the most common from of warfare and 
were fought in accordance with strident rules. The leaders of the two communities in 
conflict would meet to agree upon a day in which battle would be waged. The two parties 
would then meet on that day on the borders of the two fighting districts. After one or two 
men were seriously injured or killed, peace negotiations would commence and 
compensation was negotiated. Destructive wars were extremely rare in the nineteenth 
century, and Vasina argues that they were probably rarer still prior to that. Destructive 
wars come from the Bantu word “to burn” because the communities of the losing party 
were burned to the grown. The burning wars, then, were designed to destroy or chase 
away an enemy, take their lands, and perhaps subordinate those that were defeated.544 
The result of these wars, however, whether restricted or destructive, was the transfer of 
enslaved people from the losing to the winning party, and to the enslavement of some of 
the losing party’s community members. These people who became war booty were those 
that would be sold to Europeans.  																																																								543	Ibid.,	64-107.		544	Vasina,	80.	
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 Like the loango cumbés of Coro, daily life on the eighteenth century Loango 
Coast was governed by a communal political and economic system, although classes did 
exist, as did violent conflict. On the Loango Coast and in the loango cumbés, families 
would grow crops for their own consumption, and would supplement this food source 
through hunting, fishing, collecting, and small-scale trading. These practices were 
conducted in such a way as to ensure that all community members had relatively equal 
access to food, shelter, and clothing. As was seen with maroon communities in the 
Americas, Loango Coast towns were open to new members and travellers. As was also 
true of González and the loangos, town heads on the Loango Coast gained their title, not 
through inheritance or appointment, but through earning the position by proving their 
ability to lead effectively. In addition, Loango Coast towns would regularly move to 
settle on land that was being unused, once their lands became too distant from their 
homes. It was this latter practice that caused much friction between the loango 
communities and local plantation owners in Coro, and led to the 1795 insurrection.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 Soon after González and the two anonymous loangos who attempted to escape 
were murdered, nine of their comrades suffered a similar fate. On the night of May 14, 
the wives of nine loangos were detained for trying to bribe one of Coro’s jailers to let 
their husbands free. Valderraín testified that, on the following day, he decapitated the 
nine men as a response to their wives’ actions.545  
																																																								545	“Expediente,”	ff.	9.	
201	
 On May 23, Valderraín continued the brutal retribution of suspected rebels by 
sentencing 53 people, 22 of who were loangos, to terrible fates. Twenty-one legally free 
and enslaved men of African descent were to have their throats slit. Three enslaved 
women, Polonia, Juana Antonia, and Trinidad, were ordered to receive 200 lashes each at 
the Royal Jail of Coro, and then be sold outside of the region. Seven indigenous men 
were sentenced to work on the King’s ships at Puerto Cabello for 10 years. The loangos 
that had accompanied González to request “various times arms which were denied them” 
at the home of Valderraín, and perhaps a few others were sent, along with the indigenous 
men, “to serve your Majesty for rations and without wages” for six years.546  
 Soon after these sentences were meted out, Captain Francisco Jacot suggested that 
more loangos be round up and sent to Puerto Cabello. On June 7, Jacot stated, “I 
conferenced with the Justicia Mayor about whether it would be convenient to expatriate 
the black Luangos, or minas.”547 Five days later, Jacot expounded on his position to the 
Captain General, stating that there were about 250 black and pardo free people living in 
the sierra, “added to the haciendas without a home, nor property, corrupting the growers 
with their depraved customs and most of them took part in the rebellion in order to rob, or 
as compliant troops, but it is difficult to prove for many.”548 Jacot added that the loangos 
in the sierra should be taken to Puerto Cabello because if “they are not totally expatriated 
																																																								546	Ibid.,	ff.	1-3.:	“varias	veces	las	armas	que	se	le	denegaron”;	“a	que	sirvan	a	su	Magestad	a	racion	y	sin	sueldo.”		547	Ibid.,	ff.	51-2.:	“conferencie	con	el	Justicia	Mayor	sobre	si	coviene	expatriar	los	negros	Luangos,	o	minas.”		548	Ibid.,	ff.	53-4.:	“agregados	a	las	haciendas	sin	domicilio,	ni	propiedad,	corrompiendo	a	los	criados	con	sus	depravadas	constumbres	y	los	mas	de	ellos	concurrieron	a	la	rebellion	asi	para	rrobar,	o	como	efectivos	complices	dificl	de	probarselo	a	muchos.”	
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this land will not be secure.”549 A few weeks later, on July 8, Jacot and Valderraín got 
their wish, and about 60 loangos were sent to prison in Puerto Cabello, where they would 
work in service of the King. Jacot claimed that the exiled included members of the 
loango militia who had not already been sent to Puerto Cabello in the previous group of 
22. Forty-two adult men, and ten of their sons, were sent to Puerto Cabello. Coro’s 
authorities determined that seven loango men could stay in Coro because they were 
considered “useless old men.”550  
 But the authorities in Puerto Cabello pushed back against what they interpreted as 
a burden being placed on them and their city’s resources. When Comandante Antonio 
Guillelmi reported that 60 loangos had arrived to Puerto Cabello two months later, he 
complained “there is no room to receive more prisoners without grave danger for their 
security because we no longer have bodegas, jails, nor other locations where they can be 
secured.”551 Guillelmi suggested that if Coro’s authorities were to send any more 
prisoners, that they should send them to Caracas’s port of La Guayra because Puerto 
Cabello simply would not be able to feed or house any other prisoners.  
 The Real Audiencia de Caracas came up with a temporary solution to the 
problem, followed by a more permanent solution that was favorable to the loangos. On 
September 28, the Audiencia stated that, because the loangos could no longer be held in 
Puerto Cabello, in accordance to Guillelmi’s missive, that the loangos should be sent to 
																																																								549	Ibid.:	“no	se	expatrien	totalmente	no	quedara	aseguarada	esta	tierra.”		550	Ibid.:	ff.	147.:	“viejos	inutiles.”			551	Ibid.,	ff.	256.:	“no	hay	ya	donde	recivir	mas	presos	sin	gravissimo	peligro	de	su	seguridad	por	no	tenerse	ya	mas	bodegas,	carceles,	ni	otros	parajes	donde	aseguralos.”	
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fight in Spain’s war against Revolutionary France in the “Ships of the Flotilla for as long 
as the War lasts.”552  
 On December 10, 1796, the Audiencia declared “the black Luangos entirely free 
of involvement in the expressed uprising, and that they are loyal servants of the King and 
of the public, commanding that they be returned to the care of their homes, and 
families.”553 The Audiencia added that whether they were in Caracas, Puerto Cabello, or 
fighting for the King overseas, that all of the loangos held in custody should be sent 
home to Coro. After having spent a year and a half in various prisons across the 
Captaincy General, the loangos were shockingly declared innocent. This is the only 
evidence currently available that reveals the fate of Coro’s loango community. It is 
unclear whether or not the Audiencia’s instructions were actually carried out, although it 
should be assumed that the Court’s subalterns followed these directions.  
 The Audiencia’s declaration of the loangos’ innocence raises just as many 
questions as it does answers. González and the loangos who were not dispersed in 
“service to the King” were not mentioned in the Audiencia’s sentencing, making it 
unclear as to whether or not they considered these loangos to be innocent as well.  
The Audiencia’s verdict could have been the result of pressure from Puerto Cabello’s 
authorities who were overwhelmed with loango prisoners. Perhaps feeling secure that 
victory in Coro was assured over a year after the rebellion, and after the brutal public 
executions of dozens of suspected rebels, the Audiencia could have determined that the 
loangos were no longer a threat. They may have ordered the loangos’ return to Coro in 																																																								552	“Expedientes,”	ff.	56-7.:	“Baxeles	de	la	Esquadra	por	el	tiempo	que	dure	la	Guerra.”		553	“Expediente,”	ff.	6.:	“entteramentte	libres	de	complicidad	en	la	expresada	subleacion	a	los	negros	Luangos,	y	que	son	fieles	servidores	del	Rey	y	del	publico,	mandando	que	sean	restituidos	al	cuidado	de	sus	casas,	y	familias.”	
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order to solve the problem of Puerto Cabello’s overcrowding prisons, and declared them 
innocent in order to facilitate this resolution.  
 Given the conflicts over land that existed between the loango community and 
local authorities, it is easy to see why they would have contributed to the launching of a 
revolutionary movement. Informed by the communalist, agriculturalist social orders of 
their African homelands, Coro’s loangos found common cause with local black people, 
who had the same African roots, decades before the 1795 rebellion. This is evident by the 
fact that many members of Coro’s black community, who did not have origins in the 
escaping of enslavement in Curaçao, joined the loango cumbés in Coro’s sierra. This was 
particularly the case for women who married into loango families. These women also 
brought their children with them, and maintained close relationships with their parents, 
grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins, and siblings.  
 Coro’s rebels, including those members of the loango community that 
participated in the insurrection, had similar visions of what their new society would look 
like. These hopes were based on the traditions of their African homelands, particularly 
the communal political and economic practices of the homes, towns, and districts in 
which they themselves, or their ancestors lived. The history of maroon settlements 
throughout the Americas shows that once Afro-descended people achieved freedom from 
bondage in the Americas during the early modern period, they organized their new 
society in ways that mirrored the structures of autochthonous communities in West and 
West Central Africa.  
 Therefore, the conceptions of freedom that Coro’s rebels held did not rely on the 
latest waves of Enlightenment thought, but were found in the political and economic 
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traditions of the Gold and Loango coasts. Coro’s rebels sought equal access to land, food, 
and shelter, but they did not assume that its application would do away with status or 
rank. Coro’s rebels would continue to respect their community’s leaders, and they 
accepted that these positions brought about special, but not extravagant, benefits. When 
rebels called for the abolition of slavery, they had American—rather than African—
slavery in mind. Some rebels probably envisioned that the African form of slavery would 
exist in the new Coro. Likewise, when Coro’s rebels called for the elimination of taxes, 
they thought of the colonial conception of taxes, which were applicable to all, regardless 
of one’s station in life. The rebels may have also envisioned that African forms of tribute 
would be applied to their new society as well. But these plans for a new Coro were not 
only shared by the region’s Afro-descended people. Coro’s native American rebels were 
also buoyed by dreams of a communalist society that would be rebuilt upon the ashes of 
colonial Coro.  
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Chapter Four: Indigenous Labor-Power 
  
 Like the loangos and other Afro-descended rebels, the peoples indigenous to Coro 
practiced a communal social system that was interrupted by European imperialism. These 
precolonial practices and their mores—this moral economy—continued operating in 
eighteenth-century Coro, although colonial institutions significantly distorted them. 
During the eighteenth century, Coro’s indigenous people settled on land in which they 
produced agricultural goods, both for consumption and for sale. But indigenous people 
were forced to supplement these subsistence methods through laboring for wages on 
Coro’s haciendas and plantations. Some indigenous peoples, such as the Ajagua, were 
also singled out to pay bi-annual taxes called tribute, which they despised. And like all 
legally free people in Coro, all indigenous people, including those exempt from tribute, 
were responsible for making alcabala payments, a tax imposed on the transport and sale 
of commodities. Non-whites in Coro disproportionately shouldered these alcabala 
charges, and their exaction increased dramatically in the years leading to the 1795 
rebellion. Therefore, the ideal lifestyles that Coro’s indigenous peoples hoped to lead 
were arrested by an intensifying racialized labor system—one that would lead some 
indigenous people to launch an insurrection, and others to look for relief through aiding 
the Crown’s counterrevolution.  
 People of native American descent planned the rebellion in advance and were 
among the first to rise up. José Leonardo Chirino himself was born in the Ajagua town of 
Pedregal to an indigenous mother and an enslaved black father. When the first blows 
were struck on the night of May 10, Chirino was accompanied by four other men, two of 
whom were indigenous. Juan de los Santos, a Caquetío man from Carrizal and Pedro 
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Coyo, an Ajagua man from Pecaya or Pedregal, were among those that killed Don Josef 
de Martínez while Chirino’s wife, María de los Dolores Chirino cooked him supper.554  
 People of indigenous descent continued their participation in the insurrection on 
the night of May 10 and in the morning of the day after. Like Chirino, de los Santos, and 
Coyo, the free zambos Candelario and Juan Christoval were residents of the Socorro 
plantation and among the first people to take up arms. Juan de Matos, a Caquetio man 
from Carrizal was a resident at the nearby plantation of Macanillas, and he would be by 
Chirino’s side in the first days of the rebellion.555 As mentioned in the first chapter, it 
appears that the Ajagua man Juan de Jesús de Lugo also participated in the rebellion, 
even though he claimed to be innocent. Not all rebels were named alongside their racial 
classification in surviving documents, however, so it is impossible to know exactly how 
many people of native American descent were involved. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
several of the leading figures of the rebellion were native American.556  
 Indigenous people played a key role in the 1795 insurrection as rebels, but more 
significantly, as soldiers defending the Crown. These efforts began on May 11, when 
word of the uprising reached Coro, as several indigenous people were being organized 
into contingents at Justicia Mayor Mariano Ramírez Valderraín’s home that morning. 
Two Caquetios from Carrizal, Cipriano Antonio Gonzales and Lorenzo Reyes Díaz, were 
injured on the night of May 11 in the battle at Caujarao, and they would later die of their 
																																																								554	“Expediente	sobre	la	insurrección	de	los	negros,	zambos	y	mulatos	proyectada	en	el	año	1795	a	las	inmediaciones	de	la	ciudad	de	Coro,	Provincia	de	Caracas,”	1795,	Caracas,	426,	Archivo	General	de	Indias,	Seville	(AGI),	ff.	96-7.		555	Ibid.,	ff.	92-5.		556	Ibid.,	ff.	97-102.	
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wounds.557 During the decisive battle of the morning of May 12, 84 Caquetio men—42 
from Guaybacoa, 20 from Carrizal, 20 from Santa Ana, and two from Mitare—comprised 
nearly 40% of the 213 men that defeated the rebel advance of as many as 425 insurgents 
that day.558 Being out-manned, colonial forces relied heavily on the Caquetio, their bows 
and arrows, and their expertise in using these deadly weapons to crush the rebellion.  
 The rebel defeat outside of the city of Coro led indigenous people to reach out to 
other native American communities for help. Once he received word on the rebel defeat, 
Chirino wrote a letter to the Ajagua authorities of Pecaya, in what was a calculated, yet 
desperate, attempt to breath new life into the rebellion:   
Sir Casique, and Sir Captain, and Sir Governor, my dear sirs, finding myself in this effort 
to see if these burdens which kill us will end, requesting the people that you are able to 
give me, so that I can go make a good entrance to Coro, to see if we seize them, so that 
we may have some relief; with this, you will not pay for a delay, and this is what is 
offered for now; I beg to God that he keep me many years. From your affectionate 
servant that kisses your hands, Josef Leonardo Chirino.559  
 
A white hostage named Josef Güero, who was captured alongside Josef de Tellería’s 
family after the latter was killed, penned the above letter as Chirino dictated it. Matos, the 
Caquetio man from the Macanillas plantation, was charged with accompanying Güero to 
Pecaya to hand the note to Joseph Barnandino Carencio, the town’s Cacique.560  
																																																								557	Ibid.,	ff.	343.		558	Ibid.,	ff.	176-7;	ff.	350-2.		559	“Expedientes,	sublevacion	de	esclavos	en	la	sierra	de	Coro,	1795,”	1795,	Judiciales,	A16-C54-D11183,	Academia	Nacional	de	Historia,	Caracas	(ANH),	ff.	337:	“Señor	Casique,	y	el	Señor	Capitan,	y	el	Señor	Governador,	mui	señores	mios	hallándome	en	este	empeño	de	ver	si	se	acaban	estos	pechos	que	nos	matan,	proponiendo	a	Vds	la	gente	que	me	pueden	dar,	para	ir	a	hacer	le	una	dentrada	buena	a	Coro,	a	ver	si	lo	cojemos,	para	tener	algun	alivio,	con	eso,	no	pagaran	demora,	y	es	quanto	se	ofrece	por	ahora,	rogar	a	Dios	me	guarde	muchos	años=De	su	afectísimo	servidor	que	besa	sus	manos,	Josef	Leonardo	Chirino.”		560	Ibid.,	ff.	387.	
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 It is unclear if Carencio heeded Chirino’s call, but the letter does reveal insight 
into rebel strategy and ideology. As the son of an Ajagua woman from Pedregal, Chirino 
reached out to Ajagua authorities in the nearby town of Pecaya, which served as the de 
facto capital of the Ajagua people. The “burdens” that Chirino refers to—those that were 
weighing on people of African and native American descent alike—were taxes, such as 
the alcabala, and indigenous tribute, which served as important means of labor extraction 
for the colonial state.  
 The Caquetio, who made up about 90% of Coro’s indigenous population, were 
exempt from tribute payments because of their historical loyalties to the Spanish Crown, 
but these supposed benefits came in exchange of colonial subordination, with some of its 
most tangible effects being mandatory military service and alcabala payments. Still, the 
indispensible role that Caquetio soldiers played in defense of Coro proved that they 
wielded a great deal of power, at least potentially, and when compared with other legally 
free people in the region.  
 Although the Caquetio were tribute-exempt, two of the largest indigenous groups 
in Coro, the Ajaguas and the Ayamanes, were not, and this fact would further contribute 
to the rebel defeat. On the Morning of May 15, Valderraín sent two expeditions of one 
hundred men each to the sierra of Coro to defeat and capture any rebels still in arms or 
those they judged to be guilty. Don Juan Ramos de Chaves led one of the two 
expeditions, which included 104 men, 84 of whom were Ajaguas from Pecaya, Pedregal, 
and San Luis.561 The other contingent that Valderraín sent out also included a number of 
Caquetio, although it is unclear exactly how many. These expeditions resulted in the 
capture of 35 suspected rebel leaders who, three days later, on the morning of May 18, 																																																								561	Ibid.	ff.	9-11;	ff.	76.	
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Valderraín would viciously execute.562 The 84 tribute-paying indigenous people who 
helped clean up the last residues of insurrection in the sierra were promised exemption 
from tribute payments in exchange for their efforts, although it will be seen later that 
these promises would not be immediately fulfilled.  
 Indigenous participation in the 1795 insurrection, as well as its undoing, was a 
reflection of the importance of native American—and legally free—labor in eighteenth-
century Coro. Eighty eight percent of Coro’s overall population was legally free, and 
74% of the region’s population was legally free people of African and/or native 
American descent. These workers provided free military service, made indigenous tribute 
and alcabala payments, maintained the Catholic Church through their ecclesiastical 
payments, and supported local hacienda and plantation owners through raising animals, 
and planting and harvesting cash crops. Legally free workers in Coro, such as the 
Caquetio and the Ajaguas, suffered through centuries of genocidal acts and policies that 
clashed with their communal values. An increase in exploitation in the years leading up 
to the Coro rebellion led many native American people to participate in an anti-colonial 
revolutionary movement. Many more legally free workers, however, found it in their best 
interest to fight for the Crown. In fact, although the participation of indigenous people on 
the side of the rebels was significant, the vast majority of native Americans involved in 
the rebellion fought for the Crown. This chapter will examine the role of native American 
labor in eighteenth-century Coro and explore why some indigenous people rebelled, 
while others remained loyal. But before this subject can be considered, it is necessary to 
review the precolonial and conquest periods of the region. 
   																																																								562	“Expediente,”	ff.	9.	
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Indigenous Labor until 1721 
  
 The political economy of eighteenth-century Coro, as well as the structure of 
indigenous labor during the period, was formed by the character of precolonial social 
systems, as well as by the nature of the conquest. During the precolonial period, Coro’s 
indigenous people practiced a communalist agricultural economy based on independent 
peasant production. Despite the conquest and the introduction of the encomienda, this 
political economy continued to be the dominant one for those people not coerced into 
labor arrangements with European overseers. In addition, when indigenous people who 
labored on encomiendas were not working for Europeans, they practiced similar political 
and economic customs in their spare time. The nature of the conquest, the alliance forged 
between certain conquistadors and the Caquetio, as well as European rivalry with the 
other indigenous polities of the region, likewise determined the character of eighteenth-
century labor arrangements. On one hand, the Caquetio would be ruled exempt from the 
encomienda until it was abolished in 1721, and this would also exempt them from 
indigenous tribute payments. On the other hand, the Jirajara, Ajaguas, and Ayamanes 
were forced into these institutions during the colonial period. 
 Unfortunately, not much about precolonial life in Coro is known at this time, but 
Venezuelan scholars have been able to sketch an image of precolonial society through the 
use of early colonial accounts, as well as through the use of sociological, anthropological 
and archeological theories and methods. At the time of the conquest, there were four 
indigenous peoples that inhabited the region that could come to be known as Coro: the 
Caquetio, the Jirajaras, the Ajaguas, and the Ayamanes. The largest, and perhaps, the 
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longest established group in the region was the Caquetios. The Caquetios were an 
Arawak-speaking people who arrived to Coro between 10,000 and 12,000 years ago.563 
At the time of the conquest, the Caquetio inhabited the coastal region of much of the 
future province of Venezuela, including the coasts of the region of Coro and the 
Peninsula of Paraguana, as well as many populations on the interior, including the region 
that would become known as Barquisimeto. They inhabited many key towns that shaped 
the Coro rebellion, such as Cumarebo, Santa Ana, Moruy, Jácura, Guaybacoa, and 
Carrizal. The Caquetio also inhabited the islands that would become known as Aruba, 
Bonaire, and Curaçao, whose settlements maintained close connections with the mainland 
before and after the conquest. At the time of the 1795 rebellion, there were 7,000 
Caquetio in Coro, making up 26% of the region’s overall population. 
 The Caquetio had a sedentary agricultural society in which a Cacique, Manuare, 
was the head, but where power was dispersed to individual towns and households. The 
Caquetio capital was held northeast of where the city of Coro would be established, and it 
was called Todariquiba.564 Before the Spanish invasion, the Caquetio practiced a 
communalist, yet hierarchical political economy that was similar to the one practiced on 
the Gold and Loango Coasts of West and West Central Africa. Society was structured 
upon the ideal of the family, and all community members were considered to have 
descended from the same ancestor.  
 The structures of homes differed from town to town but they did share certain 
characteristics. Homes varied in size but they would typically hold five or six immediate 
																																																								563	Jossy	M.	Mansur,	E	indiannan	Caquetio	(Aruba:	Imprenta	Nacional	Arubano,	1981),	29.		564	Adrián	Hernández	Baño,	Los	Caquetíos	de	Falcón:	Modos	de	vida	(Coro,	Venezuela:	Instituto	de	Cultura	del	Estado	Falcón,	1984),	45.	
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families, who were all closely related to one another. A town’s land was held in common, 
although homes were placed some distance from one another, erected in the middle of 
fields. Polygamy was practiced, but it is unclear how common it was. The anthropologists 
Mario Sanoja and Iraida Vargas suggest that the practice may have been reserved for 
important members of each town or region.565 
 Households consisted of a sexual and generational division of labor in which the 
home’s “father” assigned tasks to “junior” household members. Men cleared and 
prepared the fields, while women planted and harvested crops such as corn, potatoes, 
yucca, pineapple and tobacco. Men fished and hunted, while women and children 
gathered fruit. Men manufactured axes, knives, lances, and bows and arrows, while 
women created the hammocks on which people slept and the ceramics in which they ate 
their food.566  
 Each town practiced some economic activities together while others were 
practiced on the household level. Because fields were shared, agriculture was largely 
conducted cooperatively between neighbors. In addition, hunting and fishing was 
conducted in groups of men, probably from various households. Fishing was particularly 
important for communities near the coast, where men would light campfires near the 
shore to attract fish, which led to a rather efficient system. Hunting for armadillos, deer, 
elk and rabbits was also done collectively amongst groups of men. Each household 
																																																								565	Mario	Sanoja	and	Iraida	Vargas,	Antiguas	formaciones	y	modos	de	producción	venezolanos	(Caracas:	Monte	Ávila	Editores,	1974),	149-175.		566	Hernández	Baño,	26-35.	
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provided their own fruits and vegetables that were collected from the wild, and women, 
especially, probably conducted their manufacturing duties at home, and for the home.567  
 Towns and homes were largely self-sufficient but individuals did conduct trade 
and pay tribute to Manaure. Salt, tobacco, gold, corn, hammocks, salted fish and smoked 
meat were all traded at local markets.568 Manuare was considered divine and was revered 
in this way. Early fifteenth-century European chroniclers wrote that Manaure’s followers 
carried Him on their shoulders when He was being transported, so that His feet would not 
touch the ground.569 Town leaders earned their titles through their abilities to battle, hunt, 
or practice medicine.570 These town leaders were probably those responsible for 
collecting regular tribute goods from the townspeople and for transporting them to 
Manaure.  
 If it is considered that little is known about the precolonial Caquetio, than even 
less is known of the Jirajaras, Ajaguas, and Ayamanes. According to the conquistadors, 
the Jirajaras were the second largest polity of the region at the time of the conquest. They 
lived in what would become known as Coro’s sierra and south of it. The Jirajaras and the 
Ayamanes spoke Jirajara, a language that was unique to these two groups of the region.571 
The Ajaguas occupied the mountainous regions west of the sierra, in the places that 
would become the colonial towns of San Luis, Pecaya, and Pedregal. Like the Caquetio, 
																																																								567	Ibid.			568	Ibid.		569	Sanoja	and	Vargas,	175.		570	Hernández	Baño,	44;	Sanoja	and	Vargas,	176.		571	Willem	F.H.	Adelaar,	The	Languages	of	the	Andes	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004),	129.	
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the Ajaguas were Arawak speakers.572 All of these groups were known hunters and 
gatherers, although it is likely that their communities centered around agriculture, like the 
Caquetio, although they settled on less abundant tracts of land. It is unknown, however, if 
they paid tribute to Manaure, although the Jirajaras were known enemies of the Caquetio 
at the time of the conquest.573  
 The conquest of Tierra Firme, and of the region that would come to be known as 
Coro, was a slow process that began in 1498. In that year, Cristobal Colón invaded an 
eastern region of what would become known as Venezuela to enslave indigenous people 
and sell them in Spain.574 The following year, another conquistador by the name of 
Alonso de Ojeda began his exploration of the region, passing by the region of Coro and 
enslaving people there.575 Two years later, Ojeda returned to Coro with another license 
from Queen Isabel, which gave him authority to establish a new colony, but after killing 
many Caquetios and enslaving still others, Ojeda’s mission failed because of indigenous 
resistance. Similar ventures continued over the next decade, but things truly took a turn in 
1511 when Queen Isabel’s war against the “Caribs” was put in motion, and 2,000 
Caquetios were enslaved and sent to toil in Santo Domingo.576  
 The act of enslaving and shipping 2,000 Caquetios to Santo Domingo would 
greatly determine the structure of eighteenth century Coro and the unfolding of the 1795 
																																																								572	Pedro	Manuel	Arcaya,	História	del	estado	Falcón	(Caracas:	Tip.	La	Nación,	1953),	74.		573	Otilia	Margarita	Rosas	González,	“La	población	indígena	en	la	Provincia	de	Venezuela”	(Ph.D.	Diss.:	Universidad	de	Salamanca,	2015),	55-61.		574	Ibid.,	73.		575	Ibid.,	84.		576	During	this	period,	all	native	American	peoples	of	the	greater	Caribbean	region	were	known	as	“Caribs”	if	they	were	hostile	to	the	Crown	or	considered	“uncivilized.”		
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rebellion. Some of the Caquetio people who were enslaved ended up working for Juan de 
Ampíes. Ampíes was impressed with the Caquetios who slaved for him, their alleged 
dedication to Christianity and their supposedly high work ethic.577 It is also likely that, as 
Arawak speakers, the Caquetios proved themselves useful in Ampíes’s dealings with the 
native Arawak speakers of Española.  
 In 1520, Ampíes received permission to create a new settlement in Curaçao, along 
with other Spaniards and his Caquetio slaves, some of who may have been natives to the 
island. Ampíes used his enslaved Caquetio people to establish relations with Manaure 
and the Caquetio on the mainland. At some point after this, Ampíes met with Manaure 
and agreed to help prevent the enslavement of his people, who were continuing to be 
kidnapped by Spaniards in coastal raids. In addition, Ampíes agreed to help Manaure 
defeat His Jirajara rivals by enslaving them instead. In exchange for these services, 
Manaure agreed to allow Ampíes and his group to establish the city of Coro, which they 
did in 1527.578  
 Ampíes would ultimately lose the city of Coro to European rivals, but the 
relatively privileged position of the Caquetios would continue throughout the colonial 
period. As anthropologist Otilia Margarita Rosas González points out, Ampíes’s plans 
were “frustrated” the year after he founded Coro when the Spanish Crown gave the 
German banking family, the Welsners exclusive rights over Tierra Firme.579 The 
Welsners eroded the agreements that had been made with the Caquetio under Ampíes, but 
once the Spanish Crown reestablished its domain over Venezuela in 1539, the Province’s 																																																								577	Rosas	González,	91.		578	Ibid.,	93-96.		579	Ibid.,	97.	
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Bishop Rodrigo Bastidas declared that the Caquetios were “amigos”, “buena gente,” and 
loyal vassals of the Spanish Crown.580  
 With this ruling, Bastidas declared the Caquetio exempt from encomienda service, 
but the rest of the indigenous population was required to submit to this arrangement.581 
Little is known about the encomienda in Venezuela, and even less so for Coro, but 
elsewhere in Venezuela, the encomienda was practiced on a rotational basis. Indigenous 
workers were required to work for an encomendero for free for one month, before they 
were allowed to return to their homes for two months. After the two months of free time 
was over, indigenous people would then return to their encomendero to work for one 
more month, and so on.582 The encomienda was ultimately abolished in Venezuela in 
1721, and indigenous labor arrangements were organized around tribute payments, which 
were made in money or kind. After 1721, Coro’s Jirajara, Ajagua, and Ayaman peoples 
were required to pay tribute, rather than be employed in encomiendas. 
 Before the conquest, indigenous people in the region that would become known 
as Coro practiced a communal political economy, but one that was not free of hierarchy. 
Societies were based upon the notion of an expanded family or household. On the 
household level, indigenous people provided subsistence for themselves through planting 
and harvesting crops on land that was held in common. It should be assumed that the 
spoils of the land were distributed in a like fashion. Indigenous people also hunted, 
fished, traded, and paid tribute to their leaders. The communal economic practices of the 
precolonial period would be carried through to the conquest and colonial periods, despite 																																																								580	Ibid.,	134.		581	Ibid.,	134;	181.		582	Ibid.,	163.	
218	
the fact that indigenous people were forced into coercive, and often brutal, labor 
arrangements. Despite the establishment of a colonial political and economic system, 
Coro’s indigenous people continued to conduct agricultural production, as well as hunt, 
fish, and gather, on a communal basis during their free time until the encomienda was 
abolished.   
 
Indigenous Labor from 1721 to 1795 
 
 During the eighteenth century, the labor-power of indigenous people was usurped 
by the Spanish Crown and their political, economic and ecclesiastical authorities by way 
of mandatory military patrols, tribute, alcabala, and corregidor payments, as well as 
plantation work and church fees. Although the Caquetio were exempt from tribute and 
corregidor payments, they were exploited in the all of the other areas. The Jirajaras, 
Ajaguas, and Ayamanes were exempt from military service but required to make tribute, 
corregidor, alcabala and church payments, and they worked in the plantations and 
haciendas in and around Coro’s sierra. The Jirajaras, who were considered the most 
dangerous, devilish, and unruly indigenous peoples during the period of the European 
conquest, appear to have been slaughtered by the Europeans at some point prior to the 
eighteenth century, although it is possible that they were incorporated into neighboring 
indigenous communities. Archbishop Mariano Martí visited the region in 1771 and did 
not report the existence of Jirajara groups in Coro, although he did recognize the three 
other groups.583  																																																								583	Maríano	Martí,	Documentos	relativos	a	su	visita	pastoral	de	la	Diócesis	de	Caracas,	1771-1784	(Caracas:	Academia	Nacional	de	la	Historia,	1969).	See,	in	particular,	volumes	1	and	6.		
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 Some of the Caquetio communities that provided military support to the Spanish 
Crown during the 1795 insurrection were organized in patrol units in Coro during 
holidays and during times of war. Around Christmas, eighteen months before the 
rebellion, Caquetío men were assigned to guard the city of Coro. The year before the 
rebellion, Bacilio López, the Head Guardian of Coro’s port of La Vela, stated that the 
Caquetío of Carrisal guarded La Vela during Holy Week, while those of Acurigua 
guarded other locations, and the Caquetío from Cumarebo would guard La Vela during 
times of war. He added that during the past six months, the Caquetío from Cumarebo had 
been keeping watch over the port, to warn authorities of any incoming boats.584 
 The Ajaguas and Ayamanes were forced to pay tribute after the encomienda was 
abolished. Indigenous tribute was a heavy tax imposed on indigenous people throughout 
the Spanish colonies. The amount charged depended on which colony and what area you 
lived in. In late eighteenth-century Coro, tribute payments varied from pueblo to pueblo, 
from one peso a year to four pesos and six reales a year. In the Ajagua towns of San Luis 
and Pecaya, for example, married men paid two pesos a year, while single men above the 
age of 18 paid one peso a year. In the place of Chirino’s birth, the Ajagua town of 
Pedregal, married men paid four pesos, and six reales a year, while single men above 18 
years of age paid two pesos, and six reales a year.585 
 Indigenous people in Coro’s sierra paid their yearly tribute in kind. The tribute 
was handed to authorities in bulk and on behalf of all tribute payers in the community. 
The four towns of the sierra made their payments in hammocks and heads of cocuiza, an 																																																								584	“Cumarebo:	Autos	seguidos	contra	el	Teniente	Justicia	Mayor	de	la	jurisdiccion	de	Coro	por	los	maltratos	que	ha	dado	a	los	Indios	y	la	introduccion	de	negros	de	Curacao,”	1794,	Indígenas	Tomo	VII,	Archivo	General	de	la	Nacion,	Caracas,	ff.	443-5.		585	Martí,	vol.1,	78-84.	
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Andean plant similar to the agave. Cocuiza served as raw material for the production of 
hammocks, ropes, and certain items of clothing. The people of the sierra would collect 
the cocuiza independently, and often had to travel great distances to do so. Authorities 
priced the hammocks at 8 reales, and the cocuizas at one real a head. One day of labor 
was valued at one real in eighteenth-century Venezuela.  
 This established system of tribute payments in cocuiza and hammocks would 
come under fire from Venezuelan authorities who had trouble reselling these goods. On 
April 14, 1788, Puerto Cabello’s Treasurer, Miguel de Basterra, petitioned the Captain 
General to see if Coro’s tribute-paying communities could make their tribute payments in 
goods other than cocuiza and hammocks.586 It appears, then, that some or all of Coro’s 
tributes were sent to Puerto Cabello at some point after being collected. Basterra 
complained that the goods he received were very difficult to sell, and if they were sold, 
the eight reales worth of hammocks could only be sold at three reales, and the heads of 
cocuiza, which were valued at one real, could only be sold for half a real.587  
 Upon receiving the news, the Captain General, Juan de Guillelmi, requested 
information on the state of Coro’s tribute-paying communities, in order to inquire as to 
whether or not they had the ability to pay their tributes in other goods. Coro’s Treasurer, 
Navarrete, replied, “the great poverty of the natives, the miserable situations of their 
towns, does not allow them to subsist, nor to dress, and much less to provide subsistence 
																																																								586	“Número	6:	Testimonio	del	Expediente	promovido	por	el	Tesorero	Ministro	de	R.l	Haz.a	de	Coro,	sobre	el	recivo	de	Cocuisa	a	los	Yndios	en	pago	de	Tributos	R.s,”	Caracas	397,	8	de	enero,	1791,	AGI.		587	Ibid.,	ff.	1.		
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for their families.”588 Navarrete added that the indigenous people in Coro’s sierra and 
surroundings did not have access to other goods from which they could pay their tribute, 
but that as a compromise, Navarrete asserted that he would no longer accept cocuiza as 
tribute, but only hammocks.589 The elimination of cocuiza as tribute payments in favor of 
hammocks must have been a new strain on indigenous people, as the labor time required 
to produce hammocks was eight times as great as that needed to produce a head of 
cocuiza.    
 Changes to the character of tribute payments changed again just two weeks before 
the May 10 insurrection. On April 24, 1795, the Administrator of Venezuela’s Real 
Hacienda, Josef del Abad, issued an “Instrucción” to quell the constant confusion that 
was common in Venezuela in respect to tribute payments.590 Of signature importance for 
the unfolding of the Coro rebellion, Abad ruled that all descendants of tribute-payers 
were responsible for paying tribute.591 This was a devastating blow to much of the zambo 
communities of Coro, who after lifetimes of avoiding the dreaded tribute payments, were 
now legally responsible for making them. As will be seen below with the case of Jácura, 
these new rules were enforced in Coro in the months before and after the May 
insurrection, and they were met with a great deal of resistance.  
 But tribute was not the only concern of indigenous people, as the alcabala had the 
effect of depriving them, as well as all poor people in the region, of the ability to feed 																																																								588	Ibid.,	ff.	7-8;	“la	grande	pobreza	de	los	naturales,	y	miseria	de	las	situationes	de	sus	Pueblos,	no	les	brinda	conmodo	alguno	para	sustentarse	ni	vestirse,	y	mucho	menos	para	conservera	la	subsistencia	de	sus	familias.”		589	Ibid.		590	“Testimonio	de	la	Ynstruccion	formada	para	las	matriculas	de	yndios	y	auto	de	su	aprovasíon	por	la	Junta	Superior	de	R.l	Hac.da,”	Caracas	514,	24	de	abril,	1795,	AGI.		591	Ibid.,	ff.	9-10.	
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themselves. The situation for indigenous women was particularly precarious given that 
the sexual division of labor in indigenous communities made them responsible for 
marketing. Many women worked in their families’ conucos, small plots of land on which 
families would grow fruits and vegetables, both for their own consumption, and in order 
to sell in nearby towns. Women would often travel long distances to sell these products. 
Just six weeks after the 1795 rebellion, María Flores, a widow from the Caquetío pueblo 
of Santa Ana complained to authorities that the alcabala collector in the town of 
Cumarebo had taken one and a half almuds from her 3 fanegas of corn, or 25% of her 
corn, as alcabala, although the going rate was 5%.592 
 The alcabala, in fact, was one of the chief complaints advanced by the 1795 
rebels. The alcabala was a sales and transport tax imposed on residents throughout Spain 
and its colonies. It was first imposed in Spain in 1342 in order to raise funds for the 
Crown’s struggle against the Moors.593 In Venezuela, the alcabala was first put into effect 
on August 4, 1596 for a period of nine years. The alcabala returned from 1624-1630, and 
in 1652 King Philip IV issued a Royal Order making the alcabala a permanent institution 
in Venezuela.594 The alcabala was to be charged at 2% on all transactions, whether they 
were traded for coin or kind, and the payments could be made in a like fashion.595 On 
																																																								592	“Expediente,”	ff.	139-40		593	F.	Depons,	Travels	in	Parts	of	South	America,	during	the	years	1801,	1802,	1803	&	1804,	Vol.	2	(London:	Richard	Phillips,	1806),	13.		594	Eduardo	Arcila	Farias,	Economía	colonial	de	Venezuela	(México:	Fondo	de	Cultura	Económica,	1946),	121.		595	Depons,	13.	
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July 1, 1753, the Governor of Venezuela, Don Phelipe Ricardos, increased the alcabala 
payment to 5% and this was the going rate at the time of the 1795 insurrection.596   
 Alcabala collection increased dramatically in the three years prior to the 1795 
insurrection, but these actions can be traced to concerns coming from Caracas’s Real 
Hacienda 25 years before the rebellion.597 Authorities in Caracas expressed their concern 
that Coro’s treasury was not collecting enough fees for the alcabala. They stated that 
eight months of alcabala payments, made from November 1, 1765 to February 1766, 
were missing, insinuating that the fees were embezzled. Just as concerning, authorities 
added that Coro’s treasury was utterly failing in their responsibility to collect alcabala on 
all the goods that were purchased and sold in the region. Using an example, the author of 
the document stated that in the previous two years, Coro’s treasury only collected tax on 
1,500 bovine animals that were sold. The author added that this was concerning given 
that it is estimated that 10 times that many bovine animals, or 15,000 animals, were sold 
during the period in question. Furthermore, the author added that Coro’s treasury had 
failed to charge alcabala on corn and cassava, the two main dietary items marketed in the 
region. 598  
 Authorities in Caracas would eventually get their wish—alcabala collection 
would increase in Coro, but it would directly lead to the 1795 insurrection. Caracas’s 
authorities reported that Coro had collected 1,108 pesos 1 real during the eight months 
																																																								596	“Ramo	de	alcabala	de	tierra:	Reparos	generales	al	cargo,”	Caracas	574,	AGI.		597	Ibid.		598	Ibid.		
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for which the money was missing from 1765-66.599 If this is taken as standard, it can be 
assumed that, before this document was created, Coro was collecting about 1,662 pesos a 
year in alcabala payments. For the years that are currently available, 1788-1794, this 
amount increased drastically. In 1788, Coro collected 3,809 pesos and 1.5 reales in 
alcabala, and over 3,452 pesos the following year, until the total dipped to 2,430 pesos 1 
real in 1790.600 In 1791, alcabala collection again spiked to 3,895 pesos .5 real. 601 From 
1788 to 1791, then, Coro’s treasury averaged an income of over 3,396 pesos from 
alcabala collection, roughly twice as much of that which was collected in the previous 
decades. 
 Once Coro’s treasurer, Don Joseph de Navarrete, was replaced by his comptroller, 
Don Francisco de Yturbe, in 1792, Coro’s alcabala collections skyrocketed, coming close 
to the 10 times as much alcabala that Caracas’s authorities requested in 1771. In 1792, 
with Yturbe serving as Coro’s treasurer, his office collected 8,096 pesos and 6.5 reales, 
over 238% higher than the previous year.602 This number jumped again to 9,036 pesos 
and 7 reales in 1793, and again to 10,939 pesos in 1794.603 Between 1792-1794, under 
Yturbe’s leadership, Coro’s treasury averaged 9,357 pesos a year in alcabala collection, 
nearly three times as much as was collected in the previous years and over 800% higher 
than Coro was collecting before 1771. 																																																								599	Ibid.			600	“Cuenta	de	Real	Hacienda	de	Coro,	1788,”	Caracas	578,	diciembre	31,	1788,	AGI;	“Cuenta	de	la	Real	Hacienda	de	Coro,	1789,”	Caracas	578,	diciembre	31,	1789,	AGI;	“Libro	manual	de	la	Real	Caxa	del	Departamento	de	Coro,”	Caracas	579,	diciembre	31,	1790,	AGI.		601	“Cuenta	de	la	Real	Hacienda	de	Coro,	1791,”	Caracas	579,	diciembre	31,	1791,	AGI.		602	“Cuenta	de	la	Real	Hacienda	de	Coro,	1792,”	Caracas	580,	diciembre	31,	1792,	AGI.		603	“Cuenta	de	la	Real	Hacienda	de	Coro,	1793,”	Caracas	580,	diciembre	31,	1793,	AGI;	“Libro	Manual	de	las	Reales	Caxas	del	Departamento	y	Ciudad	de	Coro,”	Caracas	581,	diciembre	31,	1794,	AGI.		
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 Coro’s rebels called for the abolition of the alcabala as one of their central 
demands. On June 2, 1795, Carrera wrote a memorial from his post in Coro’s sierra about 
how indignant Coro’s rebels were about the alcabala and Coro’s new treasurer, Yturbe. 
Carrera reported that Chirino had ordered the rebels to intercept and kill Josef de Telleria 
on his way to the sierra because he had failed to find a solution to the sierra’s 
populations’ complaints about the alcabala. Carrera wrote that, according to the rebels, 
they had “suffered” “violations” from the “treasurer Don Juan Manuel de Yturbe and his 
administrator Luis Barcena” and that the rebels accused Telleria of seeing “with 
indifference the unjust sorrow of the poor,” which led to his murder.604  
 Therefore, it appears that poor non-whites were the targets of the alcabala, or at 
least that is how the poor perceived things to be. As discussed in the introduction, Chirino 
was quoted by Telleria’s widow, Doña María Josefa Rocillo, as stating, “Telleria did not 
impede the tax collector of Coro from charging the alcabala with such excess and rigor.” 
Chirino also added, “that the whites were in cahoots with the tax collector so that they did 
not have to pay, and so that all the weight of the contributions fell onto the arms of the 
poor.”605 Chirino’s assessment was confirmed by Jacot weeks after the rebellion, when he 
stated that many Caquetío people have complained of being overcharged the alcabala. 
According to Jacot, people were routinely forced to give up their personal belongings, 
such as shirts and earrings, if they did not have the specie to pay the tax on the goods they 
were transporting.606  
																																																								604	“Expediente,”	ff.	109;	“tesorero	Don	Juan	Manuel	de	Yturbe	y	su	administrador	Luis	Barcena”;	“con	indiferencia	las	injustas	afliciones	de	los	pobres.”		605	Ibid.,	ff.	260-2.		606	Ibid.,	ff.	135-6.	
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 The Venezuelan state depended on taxes such as the alcabala in order to function, 
but the genesis and expansion of the alcabala in Coro went hand in hand with that of 
plantation and hacienda production. In the aftermath of the insurrection, authorities stated 
that there were 150 plantations and haciendas in the region of Coro. Of these, 95 were 
haciendas dedicated to raising 29,000 heads of livestock each year. Authorities also listed 
just seven cacao plantations. Although they did not include figures for sugar plantations, 
it is likely that most of the 48 remaining estates were dedicated to this activity. 607 
 But labor system in Coro was not particularly well developed, meaning that most 
people were not employed full time, but used plantation and hacienda labor as a way to 
supplement their subsistence practices, which were based on peasant production. About 
2,900 workers would be needed to raise the 29,000 heads of cattle on the 150 haciendas, 
meaning that each hacienda employed about 30 people at a time. This figure is consistent 
with the available data on sugar plantations. Tellería’s will reveals that he owned less 
than 40 enslaved people. About 30 of them worked on his two sugar plantations in the 
sierra, meaning that he employed about 15 enslaved people on each plantation.608 But the 
often legally free life partners of Coro’s enslaved people would also labor on plantations. 
The average plantation then, based on the data from those owned by Tellería, would 
employ about 30 people as well. If the 150 haciendas and plantations in Coro employed 
30 people each, then these would employ only about 4,500, or 17%, of the nearly 27,000 
people in Coro.  
																																																								607	Ibid.,	ff.	1-2.		608	“Testamentaria	de	Joseph	de	Tellería,	1798.”	Archivo	Histórico	del	Estado	de	Falcón.	Coro,	Venezuela.	
227	
 With 74% of Coro’s population being legally free people of African and/or native 
American descent, the alcabala had the indirect effect of encouraging peasants to work 
for wages on plantations and haciendas. Paying taxes for transport and marketing cut into 
peasants’ independent earnings, thus incentivizing day labor. In their traditional societies, 
native American and African people would produce for their own consumption, as well 
as market combustibles and/or manufactures that they themselves produced, but this 
marketing was not taxed in their homelands. The imposition of the alcabala impeded the 
ability of people to market their goods as they had in the past because they were forced to 
volunteer at least 5% of the produce that they transported and sold.  
 Therefore, as well as serving as an important source of state income, the alcabala 
had the added effect of forcing people uninterested in colonial labor arrangements into 
local markets for labor, particularly after Yturbe took over Coro’s treasury in 1792. 
Referring again to Chirino’s comments to Rocillo, the former stated that Coro’s tax 
collector was charging the alcabala “with excess and rigor.” The excess that Chirino 
refers to is probably in reference to situations such as the one María Flores found herself 
in, where she was charged 25% for alcabala instead of 5%. The “rigor” Chirino referred 
to was probably the implementation of a more rigorous taxing system to replace the lax 
system that predominated prior to Yturbe’s takeover. It is clear that after Yturbe took 
over as treasurer, the laws concerning alcabala collection were more effectively put into 
place, and many of the transactions that Coro’s inhabitants were accustomed to making, 
without being taxed, were suddenly being taxed in accordance with the law. This was 
also in accordance with what Caracas, and the Crown, expected to be enforced in Coro. 
The expansion of alcabala collection threatened the lifestyles of Coro’s rebels, and 
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encouraged these people to work for wages on plantations and haciendas, instead of 
conducting the independent production that had sustained them previously.  
 Military service, tribute, the alcabala, and plantation work were not the only ways 
in which native American labor was exploited in Coro, however. During his late 
eighteenth-century visit and inspection of Coro, Martí noted the “contributions” that the 
indigenous people of Coro’s sierra made both to their corregidor and to their priests. A 
corregidor was essentially a governor that was assigned to indigenous towns in Coro’s 
sierra. He was responsible for prosecuting crimes, litigating disputes, and ensuring that 
taxes were paid. Only tribute paying towns in Coro had a corregidor, but all indigenous 
towns had a priest that served them. The priest’s duties varied from town to town, but in 
essence, he was to ensure that all children assisted church twice a day, and were 
instructed in the Spanish language. In addition, the priest was to ensure that adults 
assisted church regularly. In some towns this was only on Sundays and holidays, but in 
others it was daily.609  
 Priests and corregidores came from elite families, and in addition, they were paid 
handsomely by indigenous workers, which ensured that they lived comfortably. In the 
sierra, one priest served both San Luis and Pecaya, and indigenous people paid him 60 
pesos a year in the former and 90 pesos a year in the latter.610 Pedregal was served by a 
different priest and he was paid 90 pesos a year in hammocks, which was likely the form 
of payment in the other two Ajagua towns.611 The corregidor of the sierra served all three 
Ajagua towns and received an annual payment of 4 reales a year from each indigenous 																																																								609	Martí,	vol.	1,	40-95.		610	Ibid.,	79.		611	Ibid.,	86.	
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person. Given the populations of the sierra, which Marti provided in 1771, each 
indigenous adult in San Luis paid the priest 6 reales a year for a total of 60 pesos. Each 
indigenous adult in Pecaya would have paid the priest about 2.4 reales a year for a total of 
90 pesos. In Pedregal, each indigenous person was responsible for paying the priest about 
3.5 reales a year for a total of 90 pesos. The corregidor was paid a total of 40 pesos a year 
from San Luis, 148.5 pesos a year from Pecaya, and 100.5 pesos from Pedregal. In total, 
then, each adult of San Luis was responsible for paying these authorities a total of 10 
reales a year or 10 work days, those of Pecaya were responsible for paying 8.4 reales, and 
those of Pedregal were forced to pay 9.5 reales or the equivalent workdays. These figures 
should be added onto the amount of tribute these community members paid, and doing so 
rounds the figure to 20.5 days of work a year for people in San Luis, 16.4 days for those 
in Pecaya, and 31.5 workdays for those in Pedregal. 
  Marti also discussed the large number of Church contributions made by the 
Caquetío. In Curamebo, each indigenous man had to pay 2 pesos a year for wax, 
presumably for the maintenance of candles. In addition, the community as a whole had to 
pay 194 pesos a year to the pueblo’s priest. By examining the size of the population at the 
time of Martí’s inspection, it can be asserted that a married couple in late eighteenth-
century Cumarebo would be responsible for up to 3 pesos a year for contributions to the 
Church. This amount of money is worth about 24 days of work a year.612 
 But not all Caquetío were charged so much by the church. The indigenous people 
of Jacura, Guaybacoa, and Carrizal paid 8 reales a year to their priest.613 Those in the 
Peninsula de Paraguaná paid even less. The 1,900 Caquetios in Santa Ana paid their 																																																								612	Ibid.,	49-51.		613	Ibid.,	40.	
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priest 180 pesos a year or less than one real each a year.614 Likewise, those of Moruy paid 
the priest less than one real a year in the form of 45 pesos, probably in the form of 
hammocks, six fanegas of corn, and three cows. 615  
 Those Caquetio in the Peninsula of Paraguaná paid these low fees because they 
received little Church control. Santa Ana only counted on church services six months out 
of the year, and those of Moruy only three. Without a corregidor, these communities had 
more independence than most indigenous towns, and they were famous for being 
uncontrollable populations. During Martí’s visit, the priest at Santa Ana, Juan Joseph 
Más y Ordoñes, told him that a local once stabbed him after a dispute.616 In another 
episode, the Caquetío of Moruy were in litigation for many years when there was 
controversy regarding a new Casique who was being imposed by the Crown. Those of 
Moruy refused to recognize Juan Gil Martínez as the new Casique and even forced his 
explusion from the town. 617  
 After the abolition of the encomienda in 1721, the nature of labor relations in 
Coro drastically changed, and these changes informed the roles of indigenous people in 
the 1795 rebellion. During the eighteenth century, indigenous people were forced to 
display their allegiance to the Crown and to contribute to its wealth through 
manufacturing hammocks, which were then sold or bartered by authorities. In addition, 
tribute payers had to pay corregidores and priests, and the Caquetio also supported the 																																																								614	Ibid.,	89.		615	Ibid.,	108.		616	Ibid.,	88.		617	“Moruy:	Testimonio	de	autos	de	los	indios	de	Moruy	contra	Dn.	Gil	Martinez,”	1769,	Indígenas	XI,	Archivo	General	de	la	Nación,	Caracas.	“Moruy:	Los	indios	de	San	Nicolas	de	Moruy	contra	el	yndio	Juan	Martínez	Gil,”	1779,	Indígenas	XI,	Archivo	General	de	la	Nación,	Caracas.	
231	
latter, albeit not as much. Indigenous people went from forced labor on plantations and 
haciendas during the encomienda period to “voluntary” labor for these institutions. The 
willingness of indigenous and other legally free workers to volunteer their labor was done 
out of necessity, however. The enactment and expansion of the alcabala, one of the 
principal targets for Coro’s rebels, had the indirect effect of incentivizing waged labor by 
cutting into the ability of legally free people to provide their own subsistence. Just as 
importantly, the alcabala was a major source of income for the Venezuelan state, and this 
was likely the rationale given for its implementation. Once alcabala payments 
skyrocketed after 1792, the rebels found their livelihoods, as well as their moral 
economies encroached upon, and many took up arms as a result. This moral economy, as 
we have seen here and in the previous chapter, was rooted in precolonial labor customs. 
Not all of those that resisted the alcabala and other means of labor extraction rebelled, 
however. In fact, most legally free people, including the people indigenous to Coro, 
fought for the Crown because they found this strategy to be a more effective means to 
ameliorate their condition.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 After the Ajaguas of San Luis, Pecaya, and Pedregal assisted the Crown’s terror 
campaigns in the sierra, which resulted in the capture and execution of 35 accused rebels, 
they demanded that they be compensated for their efforts. On August 3, 1795, Geronimo 
Tinoco, the Visitor General of the Real Renta de Tabaco stated that the people of Pecaya 
were refusing to pay tribute because in the initial days of the May rebellion, Coro’s 
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authorities promised that they would be freed from these if they fought against Coro’s 
rebels. 618 Tinoco reported that Yturbe had tried to charge the people of Pecaya tribute 
two months after the rebellion, but that they refused. The leaders of Pecaya told Yturbe to 
verify whether or not they had to pay tribute and to then return. The leaders threatened 
that if Yturbe returned saying that they did have to pay tribute that they would “rise 
up.”619 Adding fuel to the fire, Tinoco added that the Ajagua’s fellow Arawak speakers of 
the Caquetío communities of Paraguaná had stated that if Pecaya revolted, “they would 
not take up arms against their comrades.”620  
 The Ajaguas of the sierra were not the only indigenous people refusing to pay 
tribute in the aftermath of the May insurrection. In fact, Tinoco was sent to the region of 
Coro by Venezuela’s Governor and Captain General, Pedro Carbonell, to carry out a 
secret investigation into the claims made by Rio de Tocuyo’s Intendant for the Real 
Hacienda, Miguel Francisco de Latiegui. Latiegui notified Caracas that the people of 
Jácura had been refusing to make their tribute payments, and authorities feared that they 
were conspiring with other indigenous communities to refuse payments or—even 
worse—to rebel against the Crown. Tinoco was, therefore, charged by Caracas to visit 
Jácura “with the utmost caution, steady hand, and moderation, putting everything 
																																																								618	The	Real	Renta	de	Tabaco	or	the	Estanco	de	Tabaco	was	a	Spanish	Crown	monopoly	founded	in	Venezuela	in	1777,	and	enacted	two	years	later.	It	was	a	policy	that	gave	the	Crown	total	control	over	the	production	of	tobacco	and	of	cigars	in	the	Captaincy	General.	Prior	to	the	enactment	of	the	
estanco,	tobacco	was	produced	for	domestic	and	international	markets	by	private	growers.	The	
estanco	established	prices	for	tobacco	that	could	only	be	purchased	by	the	Crown,	and	it	charged	a	tax	on	all	tobacco	produced.	For	more,	see:	Arcila	Farias,	Historia	de	un	monopolio:	el	estanco	del	
Tabaco	en	Venezuela	(1779-1833)	(Caracas:	Universidad	Central	de	Venezuela,	1977).			619	“Expediente,”ff.	209.		620	Ibid.:	“no	tomaran	ellos	las	armas	contra	sus	compañeros.”	
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regarding his Real Hacienda Ministry in order with respect to the royal orders, avoiding 
any reason for complaint from the Indians and other inhabitants of that jurisdiction.”621  
 The people of Jácura told authorities that they were never asked to make tribute 
payments before, and that they would not start. The trouble appears to have begun five 
months before the Coro rebellion, in January of 1795, when Latiegui informed the 
community that they would have to begin making tribute payments. This decision was in 
accordance with the coming “Informe” of April that would require people of native 
American descent, especially zambos, to pay tribute unless they could prove Caquetio 
descendance. Although considered a Caquetio pueblo, most of Jácura’s population in 
1771 was free people of mixed African and native American descent, which made them 
more vulnerable than other Caquetio people.622 After conducting his investigation, 
Tinoco reported that Jácura had, indeed, united to refuse tribute payments.  
 Alcabala payments were also a recurring issue in Coro after the rebellion. On June 
13, a wary Jacot warned his superiors in Caracas that Coro’s authorities needed to avoid 
getting too involved in the lives of Indians, particularly in charging too much for the 
alcabala. Jacot stated that this can “upset these peoples who are the largest force in this 
Province.”623 Jacot sent this letter just five days after indicating the same on June 8, 
pleading with Caracas to grant concessions to the Caquetíos: “let providence dictate what 
it believes to be conducive to softening the spirits of those, upon whose freedom one can 
only say depends the defense and conservation of that territory, which they prove time 																																																								621	“Ibid.,	ff.	215.	“con	la	mayor	prudencia,	pulso,	y	moderacion,	arreglandose	en	todo	lo	respectivo	a	su	ministerio	de	Real	Hacienda,	a	las	reales	dispociciones,	evitando	todo	motivo	de	queja	a	los	yndios,	y	demas	havitantes	de	aquella	jurisdicion.”		622	Martí,	vol.	6,	80-1.		623	“Expediente,”	ff.	139-40:	“disgustar	a	estas	gentes	que	son	la	mayor	fuersa	de	esta	Provincia.”	
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and again.”624 He insisted that not only was the Crown’s authority dependent on Caquetío 
cooperation, but that the Caquetío were not happy, and needed to be granted concessions 
in order to preserve the Crown’s power during a period of heightened uncertainty. It is 
unclear whether or not the Caquetio were ruled exempt from alcabala payments after the 
rebellion, but given that the loangos were, it is possible that this “gift” was also granted 
to the Caquetio. 
 As the historically loyal Caquetio and the opportunistically loyal Ajaguas fought 
to defend the Crown, others were punished for their crimes, but the punishment reflected 
the dynamics of power in Coro, particularly in regards to the Caquetio. On June 3, 
Valderraín dished out punishment to 55 people implicated in the May rebellion, including 
seven Caquetios. Twenty-one of those punished were enslaved negros who were 
executed by having their throats slit. Three enslaved negras were sentenced to receive 
200 lashes in the royal jail, and to be sold outside of Coro. Twenty two loangos were sent 
to Puerto Cabello, along with the seven Caquetios, to serve on the King’s ships. The 
loangos were sentenced to seven years of labor, while the Caquetios were sentenced to 
10. Valderraín stated that the Caquetios had admitted their guilt and “although these are 
capital punishment criminals, it is not imposed because of the conspiracy that is feared 
from their comrades who are up in arms in the garrison of the city because of the 
insurgency.”625  
																																																								624	Ibid.,	ff.	137:	“que	dicte	la	providencia	que	estime	conducentte	a	dulcificar	el	animo	de	aquellos,	de	cuya	livertad	unicamente	puede	decirse	pende	la	defense	y	conservacion	de	ese	territorio,	la	qual	cada	ves	dan	nuevas	pruebas.”		625	Ibid.,	ff.	65:	“aunque	reos	estos	de	pena	capital	no	se	les	impone	por	la	conspiracin	que	se	teme	de	sus	compañeros	que	estan	en	guarnicion	de	la	ciudad	sobre	las	armas	por	el	motive	de	la	insurgencia.”	
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  While some Caquetio were being punished as rebels, others were singled out for 
special awards. On May 29, 1797, Carbonell ruled to give “The Indian Captain” from 
Santa Ana, Pedro Phelipe, and others a reward for their service. He granted Phelipe 25 
pesos, an amount worth approximately 200 workdays. Carbonell also ruled to give 
Phelipe’s Sargent, Juan Andres Bernal, 12 pesos, and 10 pesos each, to twenty soldiers 
from their same town.626 These men were given special attention because they were 
amongst the very first soldiers to defend the city of Coro against the May insurrection.627  
 The tribute paying communities of the sierra and of Jácura would eventually be 
granted “gifts” as well. In 1798, Carbonell ruled that all tribute payers in the Province of 
Coro would be, from then on, exempt from these fees. Carbonell argued that this 
exemption would allow them to “know the appreciation that loyalty merits,” after these 
“yndios” “took part in the laudable action of exterminating the enemy.”628 Carbonell 
added, “if the qualities of those Indians are accredited, they should be permitted to marry 
white women so that that population, desolate during the day, shall increase.”629 This 
license to marry white women was an extraordinary “reward” for the tribute-paying 
communities of Coro. It was also a reflection of a patriarchal society that commodified 
all women’s bodies, even white women’s, although the latter were also considered a 
symbol of wealth, grace, and beauty—one that was desired by many, and expected to be 
desired amongst all of Coro’s inhabitants.  																																																								626	Ibid.,	ff.	154.			627	Ibid.,	ff.	351.		628	Ibid.,	ff.	16-7:	“conozcan	el	aprecio	que	merece	la	lealtad”;	“concurrieron	a	la	accion	laudable	de	exterminar	a	el	ememigo.”		629	Ibid:	“que	acreditasen	su	calidad	de	tales	yndios	permitirles	casarse	con	blancas	para	que	se	aumentase	aquella	poblacion	desolada	en	el	dia.”	
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 The awards given to indigenous people in the aftermath of the Coro rebellion 
were a reflection—and recognition—of these people’s struggles against the labor 
arrangements of eighteenth-century Coro. The region’s structure of race and class clashed 
with these people’s moral economies, which valued egalitarian subsistence practices 
largely divorced from state and employer interference. This moral economy was rooted in 
the precolonial social systems of the Caquetio, Jirajara, Ajagua and Ayaman polities, in 
which towns were largely self-sufficient units that practiced communal methods of 
procuring subsistence. In this tradition, as was the case in the Loango and Gold Coasts, 
surpluses were commodified and bartered, but not taxed.  
 These political and economic traditions were constantly under attack during the 
colonial period, and a surge in these attacks led many indigenous people to take up arms, 
both for and against the Spanish Crown. Some indigenous people who lived and worked 
on the haciendas of Coro’s sierra were among the first rebels to take up arms. Chirino 
himself, and several other leaders were of both African and native American descent. 
Many more indigenous people, however, took up arms in defense of the Spanish Crown, 
often doing so because they were enticed by certain “benefits” that they thought may be 
possible to acquire, or ones that they were outright promised. It appears, then, that all 
people of African and native American descent, whether rebels or loyalists, could agree 
that current conditions prevented them from living the lives they hoped to live. The 
kernel of these lifestyles, both the real and the ideal, was political economy.  
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Conclusion: The Conquest Continues 
 
 
 The precapitalist political economy of the eighteenth-century Atlantic world 
shaped the racialized class structure of Coro, as well as the ideology of the 1795 rebels. 
This Atlantic economy was based upon peasant modes of production, which 
predominated in Europe at the time, as seen with the textile manufacturing industries of 
Flanders, Brittany and Devon. Peasant production would encourage capital investments 
in the Atlantic trades, which were organized through joint-stock companies, such as the 
Dutch West India Company (WIC), the South Sea Company (SSC) and the Real 
Compañía Guipozcoana (RCG). These firms were constructed through state backing, 
which allowed for, and stimulated, investments by wealthy Europeans. But these 
companies were unable to take full control of communitarian production in Africa and in 
the Americas, as seen with the Gold and Loango Coasts, and in Coro. The indigenous 
peoples of these regions continued to carry out their egalitarian customs with a structure 
similar to that which was practiced before the imperial intrusions of Europeans. These 
political and economic mores served as the foundation for the moral economy of Coro’s 
native American and Afro-descended communities. The encroachment onto peasant lands 
and the increase of tax collection in the years leading up to the 1795 rebellion, made 
these communitarian practices untenable, however. These incursions violated the moral 
economy of Coro’s rebels and inspired them to launch a revolutionary movement.  
 This study of the political economy of the 1795 Coro insurrection thus intervenes 
in two distinct fields of scholarship. On the one hand, it engages works on antislavery 
resistance movements in the Americas, and on the other hand, it enters into scholarly 
discussions in regards to the history of capitalism. This dissertation complements the 
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work by historians such as Manuel Barcia Paz, Jacob Carruthers, and Walter Rucker on 
the African character of antislavery rebellions and revolutions in the Americas.630 It 
supplements these histories of African cultural and military practices in antislavery 
insurrections by highlighting the role of African political and economic systems in the 
Coro rebellion. This dissertation, therefore, counters the dominant trend in the 
historiography on enslaved peoples resistance during the Age of Revolution, which sees 
the Enlightenment as providing enslaved people with their ideas concerning liberty and 
equality. On the contrary, the ideology of Coro’s antislavery rebels was rooted in the 
communalist mores of the peoples indigenous to Coro, and the Gold and Loango Coasts.  
 “The Political Economy of Antislavery Resistance: An Atlantic History of the 
1795 Coro Insurrection” also intervenes in histories of capitalism. It argues in favor of 
the need to define capitalism, and to use Marx’s definition that capitalism is an economic 
formation based on the capitalist mode of production.631 This dissertation’s research lends 
support to Joseph Inikori’s contention that capitalism did not take hold of the European 
economy until the nineteenth century.632 Therefore, as discussed above, the precapitalist 
political economy of Europe organized these formations in the Atlantic in accordance 
with the laws of this particular social system. As the dominant political economy of the 
Atlantic, this precapitalist organization concomitantly informed the structure of race and 																																																								630	Manuel	Barcia	Paz,	The	Great	African	Slave	Revolt	of	1825:	Cuba	and	the	Fight	for	Freedom	in	
Matanzas	(Baton	Rouge:	Louisiana	State	University	Press,	2012);	Jacob	Carruthers,	The	Irritated	
Genie:	an	Essay	on	the	Haitian	Revolution	(Chicago:	Kemetic	Institute,	1985);	Walter	C.	Rucker,	The	
River	Flows	On:	Black	Resistance,	Culture,	and	Identity	Formation	in	Early	America	(Baton	Rouge:	Louisiana	State	University	Press,	2006);	John	K.	Thornton,	Warfare	in	Atlantic	Africa,	1500-1800	(London:	UCL	Press,	1999).		631	Karl	Marx,	Capital,	Volume	1	(New	York:	Penguin	Books,	1990).		632	Joseph	E.	Inikori,	Slavery	and	the	Rise	of	Capitalism	(Mona,	Jamaica:	Dept.	of	History,	the	University	of	the	West	Indies,	1993);	Joseph	E.	Inikori,	Africans	and	the	Industrial	Revolution	in	England:	A	Study	
in	International	Trade	and	Economic	Development	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2002).	
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class in Coro, as well as in the Gold and Loango Coasts. In other words, the political 
economy of Europe, based on peasant production and merchant capital, created 
eighteenth century Coro, and the conditions that the 1795 rebels sought to destroy. 
 This dissertation has sought to tell the story of Coro’s rebellion alongside a 
history of the political and economic system that gave rise to it. It has found that the 
political economy of eighteenth-century Coro was intimately connected to peasant 
producers in Flanders, Brittany, and Devon, as well as the WIC, the SSC, and the RCG, 
not to mention the kings, queens, aristocrats, merchants and stockholders throughout the 
European continent. It has also found that the political economies of the peoples 
indigenous to Coro, as well as to the Gold and Loango Coasts, also influenced Coro’s 
system. Coro’s rebels, then, lived, worked, suffered, and celebrated in one corner of an 
interdependent world system, which was nevertheless ruled by the logics of capital 
accumulation and white supremacy. 
 Writing in May of 2019, white supremacy has been buoyed by racial capitalism, 
and continued its rule over the indigenous peoples of the global south, including 
Venezuela. Just weeks ago, the openly white supremacist government of Donald Trump 
launched its latest coup d’état attempt against the communitarian government of Nicolás 
Maduro Moros. Since Trump’s election in 2016, he has aggressively sought to destroy 
the socialist governments of the Americas, ramping up what was already an asphyxiating 
political and economic stance on the part of the U.S. government towards its rivals living 
in its “back yard.” In fact, John Bolton, Trump’s current National Security Advisor, 
stated last month, “in this administration we’re not afraid to use the phrase ‘Monroe 
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Doctrine.’”633 It is important to note that the vast majority of Chavistas and leftists in 
Venezuela are workers and peasants of African and/or native American descent, and that 
opposition supporters come from the professional class, which is overrepresented by 
whites.  
 The most recent tragic events in Venezuela were clearly orchestrated by the U.S. 
government, which has invested hundreds of millions of dollars into overthrowing the 
Venezuelan government since the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998.634 This most recent 
debacle began in February of 2018 when the U.S. government ordered the Venezuelan 
opposition to back out of a peace accord that it had agreed to with the Venezuelan 
government.635 Instead of signing a power-sharing agreement, most opposition leaders 
boycotted the upcoming May 2018 elections. Because of this boycott, Maduro won the 
election with 67% of the vote, followed by opposition challenger Henri Falcón, who 
gained 21% of the vote.636 It is clear that the U.S. government is uninterested in 
promoting peace in Venezuela, but is instead aiming to destroy a political and economic 
system that stands in the way of their geopolitical and economic interests.  
																																																								633	Andre	Vltchek,	“Russia	Warns	Bolton:	‘Monroe	Doctrine’	Remarks	Insulting	to	Latin	Ameica,”	Mint	Press	News,	April	12,	2019:	https://www.mintpressnews.com/russia-warns-bolton-monroe-doctrine-remarks-insult-latin-america/257331/.		634	Eva	Golinger’s	work	is	particularly	useful	in	tracking	U.S.	intervention	in	Venezuela.	See:	Eva	Golinger,	The	Chavez	Code:	Cracking	US	Intervention	in	Venezuela	(London:	Pluto	Press,	2006).	Also	see:	Jean-Guy	Allard	and	Eva	Golinger,	USAID,	NED	y	CIA:	La	agresión	permanente	(Caracas:	Ministerio	del	Poder	Popular	para	la	Comunicación	y	Información,	2009).		635Rachael	Boothroyd	Rojas,	“Government	Claims	‘Pre-Agreement’	Reached	in	Dominican	Republic,	Opposition	Denies,”	Venezuelanaysis,	February	1,	2018:		https://venezuelanalysis.com/News/13633.		636	Jorge	Martin,	“Venezuela:	Maduro	Wins	Presidential	Election,	Despite	Imperialist	Meddling-What’s	Next?”	Venezuelanaysis,	May	22,	2018:	https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/13831.		
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 The 1795 Coro rebellion was, therefore, just one of the many battles fought in the 
five-centuries-long-war to conquer non-Europeans peoples and their ways of life. This 
war is still being waged today.  
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